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Abstract 	  	  	  
Taking the discursive figure of the enervated, emasculated Khasi male as its starting 
point, this dissertation analyzes the assertions of crises being articulated by a few groups 
of Khasi men that have identified their matrilineal traditions as the cause of the 
‘unraveling’ of Khasi masculinity and a purported degradation of this hill-tribal 
community in Northeast India especially in the face of significant changes over the recent 
decades. More broadly, it examines how urban Khasis negotiate the dilemmas of these 
changes and frequently call upon modern and globally popular discourses such as 
indigenous rights, human rights, justice, dignity, and gender equality in order to describe 
or validate their understandings of different social problems. I argue that analyzing 
contestations around gender and kinship allows us to trace the multiple nodes along 
which Khasi identity is being activated, both in relation to hegemonic conceptualizations 
of modernity and progress, and through complex dialogues with ideas about nationhood 
and group belonging, especially in their imbrications with understandings of ethnicity, 
race, gender, sexuality, language, religion and culture. 	  	  
 
 	  	  	  
	   v 
Table of Contents 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	  .........................................................................................................................	  I	  
ABSTRACT	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  IV	  
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  ...........................................................................................................................	  V	  
INTRODUCTION	  ......................................................................................................................................	  1	  OF	  FATHERS	  AND	  FIRST-­‐BORN	  SONS:	  MATRILINY	  AND	  FEELINGS	  OF	  MALE	  DISCRIMINATION	  ................	  3	  CONTEMPORARY	  ‘CRISIS’	  IN	  SHILLONG:	  THE	  MATRILINY	  V.	  MODERNITY	  DEBATE	  .....................................	  7	  DISSIPATED	  MATERNAL	  UNCLES,	  DOMINATING	  HEIRESSES:	  THE	  ‘WEAKER	  SEX’?	  ..................................	  10	  THE	  MYTH	  OF	  MATRIARCHY:	  THEORIZATIONS	  ON	  PATRIARCHY	  AND	  MATRILINY	  ..................................	  12	  ANTHROPOLOGICAL	  SUBJECTS:	  LEGACIES	  AND	  ‘PROPER	  OBJECTS’	  OF	  THE	  DISCIPLINE	  ..........................	  16	  AN	  (OTHER)	  OUTSIDER:	  STUDYING	  THE	  ‘TRIBE’	  IN	  INDIA’S	  NORTHEAST	  ..................................................	  22	  
ON	  METHODS	  ...........................................................................................................................................................	  40	  
CHAPTER	  1	  .............................................................................................................................................	  49	  
ANXIOUS	  OUTSIDERS:	  NORTHEAST/INDIA	  AND	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  DIFFERENCE	  ...........	  49	  FRAMINGS	  OF	  THE	  NORTHEAST	  WITHIN	  THE	  DOMINANT	  DISCOURSE	  ........................................................	  53	  NORTHEAST	  AS	  EXCEPTION	  ..................................................................................................................................	  55	  BACKWARDNESS	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  61	  RACIAL	  OTHERING	  .................................................................................................................................................	  67	  NORTHEAST	  IDENTITY	  AS	  TRIBAL	  DIFFERENCE	  ..............................................................................................	  74	  THE	  FUTURE	  OF	  THE	  JAITBYNRIEW	  ....................................................................................................................	  81	  
CHAPTER	  2	  .............................................................................................................................................	  88	  
MATRILINEAL	  LENSES,	  ANTHROPOLOGICAL	  EFFECTS	  ...........................................................	  88	  FRAMING	  KHASI	  MATRILINY	  ................................................................................................................................	  89	  OF	  ANTHROPOLOGY,	  TRUTH	  AND	  INHABITINGS	  ............................................................................................	  100	  MATRILINEAL	  FRAMES,	  PATRILINEAL	  EYES	  ...................................................................................................	  109	  
CHAPTER	  3	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  119	  
MATRILINY	  MATTERS:	  PERFORMANCE	  AND	  THE	  COLONIAL	  CONTEMPORARY	  .........	  119	  OUTSIDE	  THE	  FRONT	  DOOR,	  INSIDE	  A	  SOCIAL	  STRUCTURE	  .........................................................................	  124	  MATRILINY:	  THE	  RECALCITRANT	  MODERN	  ....................................................................................................	  134	  STATE	  INTERPELLATIONS	  AND	  THE	  ENGENDERING	  OF	  KHASI	  PURITY	  .....................................................	  146	  INDIGENEITY	  IN	  (POST)COLONIAL	  RUINS:	  THE	  MATERIALITY	  OF	  KINSHIP	  .............................................	  153	  
CHAPTER	  4	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  161	  
KHASI	  MEN	  IN-­‐SIGHT:	  THE	  RECURSIVE	  ENACTMENT	  OF	  EMASCULATION	  ...................	  161	  OUTSIDER	  LOOKS,	  INSIDER	  REALITIES	  ............................................................................................................	  167	  PATRILINEAL	  CONFUSIONS	  AND	  PATRIARCHAL	  CONTINUUMS	  ...................................................................	  175	  FROM	  WARRIORS	  TO	  BREEDING-­‐BULLS:	  RECITING	  TO	  MAKE	  REAL	  .........................................................	  184	  ANTI-­‐MATRILINEAL	  MEN	  IN	  COLONIAL	  KERALA	  ...........................................................................................	  190	  
CHAPTER	  5	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  194	  
MATRILINEAL	  ANXIETIES:	  GENDER	  POLITICS	  AT	  AN	  IMPASSE	  ........................................	  194	  
	   vi 
EXTINCTION	  AS	  EVENT:	  CONSTRUCTION	  OF	  A	  COMMUNITY	  IN	  CRISIS	  ......................................................	  197	  ABSENT	  UNCLES,	  ABJECT	  FATHERS:	  THE	  STORY	  OF	  THE	  “SUNK-­‐DOWN”	  KHASI	  MAN	  ..........................	  211	  ANXIOUS	  REFLECTIONS:	  SPECTACLE	  OF	  THE	  MONSTROUS	  FEMALE	  ..........................................................	  225	  TROUBLED	  ENGAGEMENTS:	  COUNTERING	  ANTI-­‐MATRILINY	  VOICES	  .......................................................	  230	  
CONCLUSION	  ......................................................................................................................................	  246	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	  .................................................................................................................................	  266	  
	  	   1 
Introduction 	  
 
carolyn:  Alfie just got a nephew - from his sis 
carolyn:  Mark ( A's dad) already hinting abt a second grandchild – 
me:  maybe he wanted a dotter  
carolyn:  dont know - but Bari's [Alfie’s sister] hubby wanted a son - typical of Khasi husbands 
me:  the new age khasi husbands (sigh) 
carolyn:  forgot to tell u abt this trend among K Hubbies - no not the new age - even from my 
time. my young male colleague at office got teased as a hen pecked cos he got a daughter 
me:  how odd 
carolyn:  yes for a 1st child they want a SON 
me:  oh really? so what does that mean - becoz he'll be outnumbered by women or something like 
that? why do you think that is? 
carolyn:  not in my father's generation though 
me:  started in your generation? 
carolyn:  I think so. my late uncle who is of my age -(a politician) climbed a lemon tree , picked 
one and ate the whole fruit when he got a daughter for a 1st child. he continued producing 11 
daughters till he finally got a son as the 12th child 
me:  really? did he eat 11 lemons? he produced so many just for a son? 
carolyn:  but there are some khasi guys now who have been out of Shill for a while - who dont 
feel the same way 
Sent at 9:43 AM on Tuesday 
carolyn:  However, till now I often hear the pride in the father's voice when he announced that he 
got a son 
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me:  your uncle? this is surprising - i thought it was different among khasis - that if they didn't get 
daughters they were upset 
carolyn:  not only my uncle - others too 
carolyn:  the wife would of course not be happy without a daughter 
me:  oh so typically would you say that women and older men would want daughters but men 
from your generation on started wanting sons? (broadly speaking) 
carolyn:  yeah 
carolyn:  KM would often say they want to produce a football team 
me:  KM? 
carolyn:  khasi men dupe 
me:  ah 
carolyn:  Americanised Carrie 
me:  you think maybe that's another indication of the sense of alienation that 'km' have been 
feeling - wanting a son to share solidarity with in the household? 
carolyn:  there goes your analytical mind = its a thought but 
 
Carolyn and I exchanged many such conversations while I was doing my 
fieldwork in Shillong, capital of the state of Meghalaya and one of the major cities in the 
Northeast region of India. This is an excerpt of an Internet chat between us after I had 
returned to the United States from one of my trips there. It actually replicated a little 
‘game’ we had come up with when we spent time together – she would share an 
observation about something related to Khasi society, especially about stuff she knew I 
was interested in, and would wait for me to put it into some kind of a cognitive or 
interpretive framework. She clearly had views about her own community but wasn’t 
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especially keen to ply me with them. Instead she seemed to derive pleasure in hearing my 
questions and reflections first. Once in a while she would tell me that she looked forward 
to reading my analysis, and how being an outsider I might be able to see things 
differently than people who lived there because they were too close. I didn’t share her 
confidence (how could I?), but was nevertheless secretly pleased that she said it. After 
all, why would someone spend so much time studying something that everyone already 
knew? But as will hopefully become apparent through this dissertation, what everyone 
‘knew’ was in fact at the heart of many of the problems that I was there to study. 
Of Fathers and First-born Sons: Matriliny and Feelings of Male 
Discrimination 
 
The trend that Carolyn was alerting me to in our chat – that Khasi men of her 
generation (she must be around sixty years old) and younger want their first-born child to 
be a “SON” – was clearly something I hadn’t explicitly encountered in my fieldwork 
before. Most people spoke about how Khasis, being matrilineal, were unlike people from 
patrilineo-patriarchal ‘mainland’ India (in other words – ‘my people’) – they actually 
valued girl children, and atrocities like female feticide and infanticide were unheard of in 
their societies. Organized into clans or kurs that are strictly exogamous, descent for the 
Khasis is supposed to be reckoned through women. While both children take their 
mother’s title, it is the daughter’s children who advance the kur, making them (as Carolyn 
notes) highly valued in the traditional scheme of things. 
Khasi sociologist Tiplut Nongbri notes that the importance of the clan and 
consequently its perpetuation results in the strong expectation of women to produce 
children and failure to do so is of grave concern “not only to the woman in question but 
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to the whole family, so much so that infertility and sterility are valid grounds for divorce” 
(2000:367). In general Khasis consider children as blessings and a source of wealth for 
the clan, and I was told that within the ‘conventional’ worldview there could be “no such 
thing as too many girls” in a family. However a preference for fewer children has become 
routine for urban, sophisticated Khasis, particularly the younger ones. They claimed to 
receive children of both sexes as equal gifts, but would often murmur about other people 
who were unhappy without a daughter, especially in clans that had wealth or name to 
pass on. Sometimes they would make fun of the ‘nongkyndongs’ (Khasi word for 
villagers or ‘country bumpkins’) both for the gaggle of children they had in tow and also 
for being explicitly preferential towards girl children. 
That Khasi men of Carolyn’s generation wanted “to produce a football team”1 
worth of boys was something new to me, as was the assertion that the gender of the first 
child had particularly special significance for them. Having a girl could induce so much 
disappointment that a Khasi man might climb a tree and eat a lemon whole? Or produce a 
football team of girls in the process of trying to produce a boy? “Till now,” says Carolyn, 
“I often hear the pride…when he announced that he got a son.” Such images (both 
comical and poignant)2 of strong and public expressions caught me by surprise, but not 
the broader idea that more contemporary Khasi men might actively prefer sons to 
daughters even though there seems to be nothing in the longer history of the community 
to foreshadow such a phenomenon.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Unlike in mainland India where cricket is the most popular sport, Khasis (and others from the Northeast) 
are mad about football. Shillong has had its own professional club called Lajong (“our own”) since 1983: 
http://www.shillonglajong.com/history/ 
2 This simultaneous operation of parody and pathos is a recurrent trope in the field I was studying and will 
surface later in the dissertation too.	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In a sense it goes right to the heart of my research project – an examination of 
(relatively) recent assertions and articulations being made by certain groups of Khasi men 
in Shillong who have been lobbying to fundamentally transform the social fabric of the 
tribe – a radical switch over to a patrilineal system. Taunted by non-matrilineal outsiders 
(both in personal interactions and through media representations) for being ‘unmanly,’ 
‘disenfranchised’ and ‘hen-pecked,’ many Khasi men resent their allegedly abject 
position in society and attribute their problems as men to the disjunction of ‘traditional’ 
matriliny in a ‘modern’ world. Unlike other national and international men’s groups that 
bemoan the loss of male authority within ‘traditional’ institutions, these men invoke 
‘modern’ discourses of gender equality and human rights (ironically mirroring 
mainstream feminism), which they feel are denied to them both under ‘traditional’ 
matrilineage and in its more ‘modern’ transmogrifications. 
One of the things they are arguing then is that ‘traditional’ matriliny is set up to 
‘discriminate’ against men. So, for instance, as conventions go sons are not given a share 
of the property (especially the ancestral property, which by custom goes to the youngest 
daughter). Additionally, their own earnings before marriage are supposed to be handed 
over to the mother, making it hard for young men to become financially independent and 
to eventually support wives and children. Then there are claims of more subtle forms of 
differential attitudes within certain households – sons are made to feel somewhat tertiary 
within the household and mothers might refer to them sadly as “u ban leit sha ïing ki 
briew” (he will go off to live with others/become a part of someone else’s home). While I 
was told that this way of thinking was no longer explicitly expressed in Shillong homes 
where contemporary understandings of gender fairness have gained favor, there was a 
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suggestion that such prejudicial feelings that are products of the ‘traditional’ system 
continue to linger. The uncanny movement in the SRT’s deployment of the language of 
gender equality is that it turns against, in fact, the unstated seductions of feminist utopia 
as will be clear in the following story. A leader of one of the men’s groups urged me to 
go and see for myself if I had any doubts: 
You can see the discrimination of the men when you go to any hospital. You stand in front of the 
delivery room, invariably there will her [the woman’s] relatives sitting outside waiting for the 
result, you watch this – as soon as the doctor peeps his head out and says “it’s a boy,” the men will 
be quite happy, you watch the reaction of the women [adopting deflated tone] – “ah it’s okay, 
whatever God gives, it’s quite alright.” And if they say it’s a girl [sing song voice and clapping] – 
“oh she’s so lucky.” 
This person’s disgust is thinly veiled at this point, and he is counting on my sense of 
gender justice to protest this discrimination, and yet – clearly when we look at this from 
the lens of feminism that has been developed in patrilineal societies where girl children 
are routinely slaughtered such that laws have to be passed about this, how can we 
sympathize with his anger?  
That the ‘traditional’ Khasi gender worldview endorses different attitudes, roles, 
expectations and ways of being for men and women is not disputed by anyone. 
Supporters of Khasi matriliny in fact argued that men were not given ‘rights’ to property 
since traditions prescribed that men go out to work and support his family whereas 
women were entrusted primarily with domestic chores and caring for men and children. 
Traditionally Khasis believe that for one unit of energy a woman has, a Khasi male has 
twelve, and thus it is the physical and intellectual inferiority of women that entitles them 
to property ‘rights,’ I was told. Khasi feminists pick up on such beliefs to demonstrate in 
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turn how despite being matrilineal Khasi society is at heart a patriarchal one, with women 
being subordinated, infantilized and restrained from participation in the political domain.3 
For the men’s groups however, aspects of the traditional gender-kinship system are 
handpicked and then percolated through globally prevalent and ‘progressive’ frameworks 
like gender justice or rights-based activism, allowing them to then be recast as 
‘discrimination’ that Khasi men are having to experience. 
 
 
Contemporary ‘Crisis’ in Shillong: The Matriliny v. Modernity Debate 	  
The men’s groups are also trying to formulate a set of arguments about what is 
happening to Khasi matriliny in the contemporary moment. For this purpose they 
implicitly draw on anthropological literature, which has extensively attended to the 
mutations within matrilineal systems, often estimated to be inherently weak and unstable, 
with the advent of modernity. Much ink has been spilled over the question of whether 
matriliny is bound to disintegrate in its encounter with forces like colonialism, shifting 
subsistence modes, private property and differentiation of wealth, urbanization, the rise of 
national identities, nuclear families and so forth. Some authors have tended to evaluate 
this interface as potentially producing threatening chasms within the societies they have 
studied (Goody 1959; Gough 1961; Meillassoux 1981; Murdock 1949; Schneider 1961) 
while others have dismissed these dark and cynical prophesies, focusing instead on the 
flexibility (sometimes to the detriment of women) that matrilineal societies have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Nongbri notes for instance, “In an oft-quoted Khasi simile, ka kynthei ka khynnah (the woman, the child), 
women and children are collapsed into a single category” (2000:369).	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demonstrated in the face of rapid upheaval (Blackwood 2000, Colson 1980, Douglas 
1971, Kato 1981, Nash 1974, Poewe 1981, Stivens 1996). 
Jill Nash’s work with the Nagovisi of South Bougainville in Papua New Guinea is 
an example of the latter category. Her thesis is that the Nagovisi, because of certain 
features specific to their society (such as non-conflicting role of men as fathers and 
maternal uncles, structurally indispensable role of women, local endogamy and dual 
organization), have been able to accommodate fairly successfully to changes like land 
shortage, increases in cash cropping and a population spike, adapting their matrilineal 
practices by building alliances amongst their previously distinct descent groups. As a 
counterpoint to the Nagovisi she cites the works of T.S. Epstein (1968) and A.L. Epstein 
(1969) with the Tolai, which is far more concerned with the future of matriliny, seen by 
them as on the verge of collapse because of intense conflicts between fathers and sons 
due to uncertain rights and obligations in the face of changing residence patterns, 
population growth and litigations over land. 
Mary Douglas also takes on the thorny question of the continued viability of 
matriliny in Africa from a cross-cultural perspective by engaging some of Schneider’s 
more problematic beliefs about the inherent disadvantages of matrilineal systems that he 
discusses in his introduction to Matrilineal Kinship. She contends instead that “matriliny 
should be capable of flourishing in modern market economies wherever the demand for 
men is higher than the demand for things. Because of the scope it gives for personal, 
unascribed achievement of leadership, matrilineal kinship could have advantages in an 
expanding market economy” (1971:131). Nongbri’s own assessment of this debate 
highlights how both positions have some validity, with the former emphasizing the 
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mutability or vulnerability of matrilineal systems in the face of global processes and the 
latter highlighting their simultaneous vibrancy and adaptability. She stresses that “the two 
models are not mutually exclusive; both can be judicially used to understand the 
dynamics of matrilineal groups in contemporary society,” and alerts us to the danger of 
dogmatic adherence to any one side (2000:366).  The debate about the fate of matriliny 
continues to hang in the balance but it is increasingly uncommon to encounter arguments 
that pitch matrilineal societies as teetering unsteadily on the precipice of modernity and 
globalization. 
But some Khasi men’s groups are deploying exactly this kind of imagery in their 
discussion of the problems with contemporary matriliny. Influences from external forces 
of modernity have transformed the internal logics of the matrilineal system, rendering it 
impractical and unstable in the modern context, they argue. Migration within and outside 
the state has disrupted the conventional practice of village endogamy, which enabled 
Khasi men to continue to play a vital role as a kñi (maternal uncle) in their natal ïing 
(household). Now the kñi lives in another village or city, or even abroad, leaving care of 
families to the father, who despite being entrusted with responsibilities is never truly 
accepted as an insider and given the due authority/respect, being of a different clan than 
his wife and children. This tension that men experience in their dual roles as fathers and 
brothers is what Audrey Richards (1950:246) has famously named the “matrilineal 
puzzle.” In an essay that undertakes a macro-level, cross cultural study of matrilineal 
systems of the Central Bantu, she highlights this dynamic that has been extremely 
cardinal to studies of matriliny and key to the ‘disintegration model’ discussed above – 
the problem of reckoning descent through the woman who, in order to produce children 
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for her matrikin, must necessarily marry a man from another lineage. In contrast to the 
patrilineal model, this system was seen to have an “internal strain” because of the friction 
generated between fathers (the bearers of authority in the family unit) and uncles (the 
leaders of the lineage). 
Dissipated Maternal Uncles, Dominating Heiresses: The ‘Weaker Sex’? 	  
In the Khasi context these men’s groups argue that male authority has been 
completely eroded, since the institution of the kñi has fallen into decline and yet the 
power of the father is very circumscribed. Being aware of the dominant masculine ethos 
within Khasi society I found myself confused by what I was being told. If a man doesn’t 
have authority as a kñi surely he must have authority as a father, I asked back quizzically. 
My interlocutor replied indignantly: 
Now here in my father-in-law’s house, who has the power? Not the kñi anymore! He’s left the 
house, he’s gone and married somebody else. He has got his own children to take care of. Who has 
taken the power from the mother after she died? The youngest daughter, my wife’s youngest 
sister! Now shouldn’t it be the other way around? When the father is still alive the father should be 
the controlling factor in that house, to decide whether to sell or not, how to run the business, 
everything that happens in that house. The youngest daughter is doing everything; she has all the 
legal power in her hand, whereas her father who is still living there in the house is just a father 
figure, nothing else, no deciding powers at all. Major decisions cannot be taken by the father in 
that house anymore, after the wife dies. All this problem has started because the youngest daughter 
is behaving as if everything is under her control, because the kñi has run off. It is a practice now, 
misuse of power by the khadduh, and losing of power of the kñi. He’s still the kñi in name, but he 
doesn’t come and interfere. He’s not there anymore. Kñi is there for show. 
This purported displacement of power, out of the hands of men and into the hands of 
women, is arguably at the heart of the concern being expressed by these men. The 
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khadduh or the youngest daughter is no longer merely a custodian of property; she is the 
heiress (in the legal sense) and has assumed control and management of the property 
taking over the roles traditionally assigned to the kñi. However women are seen as 
inherently incapable of performing these tasks properly – being less gifted intellectually 
and more prone to emotions and sentiments, the suggestion is that they have either 
mishandled (intentionally) or then mismanaged (inadvertently) the power and resources 
at their disposal. Drawing on both traditional and globally prevalent norms about 
masculinity and femininity these men’s groups are pointing implicitly to the chaos that 
follows the reversal of established gender roles and hierarchies. Khasi men are struggling 
unsuccessfully to land on their feet in this newly ordered world; plumbing the depths of 
despair they end up resorting en masse to alcohol and drugs to cope with their 
disenfranchisement. The chasm widens as Khasi women, in the face of this male 
degradation and the abuse and abandonment that they have to consequently endure, are 
allegedly increasingly electing to marry outside the community, exacerbating the 
situation for men particularly but more importantly, as I was told, for the community at 
large. 
Even as they draw on problematic and patriarchal ideas about ‘inherent’ gender 
differences these men’s groups are simultaneously mobilizing feminist values about 
gender justice and equality to argue that Khasi men are being ‘discriminated against’ 
within both ‘traditional’ and ‘contemporary’ matriliny. That matriliny has given women 
unfettered power or is directly or indirectly responsible for men’s problems in Khasi 
society is contested by many within the community, yet these men have been increasingly 
successful in proliferating the idea that Khasi men are emasculated by the matrilineal 
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system. We can see in Carolyn’s formulation how “hen-pecked” is used as a noun. Thus 
men could go from being hen-pecked to becoming “a hen pecked.” If men want to have 
more sons (and early on) it is possibly to empower themselves in a household full of 
matrilineal (read ‘overly dominant’) women. 
The Myth of Matriarchy: Theorizations on Patriarchy and Matriliny 	  
This conflation of matriliny (where descent is reckoned through the women) with 
matriarchy (where women are the dominant or ruling class) can be traced back to the 
work of Swiss scholar Johann Bachofen who, in his treatise Mother Right first undertook 
the task of grappling with matrilineal descent. For him matriarchy/matriliny was a 
cultural stage inserted between rampant “primitive promiscuity” and the subsequent, 
more civilized patrilineal/patriarchal system. It was associated with the domestic and 
state rule of women (gynocracy), who passed on their property and names to their 
children. Women’s power stemmed from their stronger proclivity to religion: "prophecy 
began with women…mystery is the true nature of every religion, and wherever woman 
dominates religion or life, she will cultivate the mysterious...seen in this light, matriarchy 
becomes a sign of cultural progress, a source and guarantee of its benefits, a necessary 
period in the education of mankind” (1967[1861]):86-87). He thus fleshed out the 
matriarchal myth, arguing that it was only subsequently that men wrested power and 
society became male dominated as currently evinced in Western Europe. 
While other social evolutionary thinkers like McLennan (1886), Morgan 
(1997[1871]) and Tylor (1889[1871], 1896) did not concur with him on specific issues 
like what exactly matriliny was, its precise origins and its metamorphosis into patrilineal 
descent systems, they broadly validated his framework of cultural evolution. Eller argues 
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further that after the publication of Engels’ influential Origins of Family, Private 
Property, and the State, “the myth of matriarchal prehistory was taken up as effective 
political ammunition by both communists and first-wave feminists, and later by fascists 
as well” (2011:7). 
In time the evolutionists’ collapsing of matriliny and matriarchy was also not 
accepted as it became increasingly clear that women’s purported authority over men in 
these societies was restricted only to myths and legends and was not a recorded 
contemporary feature anywhere. Here Eller offers an interesting perspective however 
when she argues that early twentieth century anthropology’s shunning of the matriarchal 
myth is commonly associated with the efflorescence and improvement of ethnographic 
fieldwork but in her assessment: 
The heyday of matriarchal myth in the nineteenth century passed largely because the questions it 
addressed – having to do with marriage, women’s rights and Victorian sexual attitudes – fell out of 
vogue, and the whole theoretical apparatus of an evolutionary shift from matriarchy to patriarchy 
went with it, like the baby with the bathwater. [These] theories…did not attain the same sort of 
prominence again until a similar set of questions – about women’s rights and sexual attitudes, 
among other things – again engaged the public, this time in the Unites States in the 1970’s. 
[2011:10] 
Evaluating the reality of socio-economic and political agency/autonomy wielded by 
women within various matrilineal systems, scholarship produced by British social 
structuralists did however strongly reject evolutionary depictions of matrilineal societies 
where women ruled society, had a higher status, or dominated over men. Once this idea 
of the matriarchal myth was demolished it became possible in the 1970s, particularly with 
the influence of feminism, for scholars of matriliny to consider gender dynamics more 
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closely, and be more attentive to authority, agency and autonomy enjoyed by women in 
some matrilineal societies (Crehan 1997, Mandala 1990, Peters 1997). However, Khasi 
sociologist Tiplut Nongbri’s work (2000, 2003, 2008, 2014), which has offered the most 
extensive analysis of gender dynamics within Khasi matriliny, seems to underscore the 
‘older’ view in arguing that Khasi women (despite being privileged in comparison with 
patrilineal women) are by no means ‘matriarchal.’ Setting up a distinction between 
“conquering sons and dutiful daughters” (2014:50) she demonstrates (through analyses of 
poetry, idiomatic expressions, kinship structures, rituals, speech patterns etc.) that Khasi 
men have clearly been bestowed with the position of authority while women, being 
characterized as the “weaker sex,” are “obliged to submit to the control of their brothers 
and the protection and support of their father and/or husband (52).” While men enjoy 
great autonomy in society, Nongbri argues that women’s freedom of movement and 
expression have traditionally been fairly circumscribed. 
However, the commonplace notion that in matrilineal communities men are 
subordinate to women, which emerged out of fanciful, but long debunked theories from 
the nineteenth century, continues to resonate within the popular imagination. As Eller 
argues, up until the late nineteenth century the “matriarchal myth reigned as dogma 
within British anthropology. From there it spread out to the cultural mainstream and 
made itself useful to people with a variety of philosophical and political perspectives on 
gender” (2011:99). These notions have played a crucial role in the continued negative 
perceptions of Khasi men particularly by patrilineal outsider communities. Stories about 
Khasi men being “ruled by women,” “servants,” “breeding bulls” and so forth abound in 
national and international media accounts. It is this widespread misperception that many 
	  	   15 
Khasi men in Shillong have learned to internalize and deploy strategically in order to 
lobby for men’s rights despite simultaneously being molded by values that are rather 
patriarchal or chauvinistic. This dissertation examines the various national/global tropes 
that these men draw on to make claims of (or against) ‘tradition’ and masculine primacy. 
How are concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ wrestled with, re-produced and deployed 
in these constructions of gender narratives that propel social movements in Khasi 
society? What insights do these multiple mobilizations of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ 
offer, when undertaken by matrilineal Khasi people – both for academic discussions on 
marginalized postcolonial modernities and also for feminist theory and politics that 
describe gender identity/inequality and posit a different, more ‘modern’ future, but 
always by assuming/privileging the normative patrilineal model? The provocative call 
made by these men (some seeking to overturn and others to adapt matriliny) is arguably 
symptomatic of important transformations within Khasi society since its encounter with 
British colonial forces, and more recently due to its sustained interface with patrilineal 
migrant communities. Paying attention to claims being made by these men as well as the 
responses by different sections of Khasi society accords us an opportunity to map and 
analyze these radical changes. My suggestion is that by focusing on the shifting patterns 
of kinship, responsibilities, inheritance and gender roles we can get a sense of people’s 
engagements with these transformations in their ways of being Khasi – of relating to one 
another and the world around them. I am particularly interested in the way people grapple 
with and understand matriliny in the first place, both as an anthropological category but 
also as fundamentally shaping their own identities as individuals and members of a 
distinct tribal community. The significance of matriliny to the Khasis is key; despite 
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acknowledging the changes that some of these men are pointing to, most sections of 
Khasi society continues to ignore their appeals (for diverging reasons), arguing that their 
matrilineal customs are unique and are deeply interwoven with their traditions and tribal 
identity. This dissertation explores the multiple nodes along which Khasi matriliny 
becomes articulated in Shillong and considers how it came to be that a category like 
matriliny, which shows itself in such different ways and means such different things to 
different people, become the focus or the pivot upon which the identity, and indeed the 
very “future” of a community has come to rest. The instability of this category – the 
diverse ways it is invoked, or understood, the different, sometimes starkly opposite 
directions in which it seems to move, or the distinct or contradictory tropes that it is made 
to rely upon – all these, I shall argue, are critical to its very existence, rendering it both 
possible, and impossible. 
Anthropological Subjects: Legacies and ‘Proper Objects’ of the Discipline 	  	  
Before I left Minneapolis for my extended fieldwork stretch, I met a last time with 
David, one of my four research committee-members. As I sat in a sheltered nook in a 
corner of his office surrounded on three sides by tall shelves of books, a large bilum 
stared at me from another corner and I realized I was nervous. Even though I’d already 
spent two summers in Shillong and had quite a few friends and networks I could count 
on, I couldn’t easily shake the jitters. This was it. After all the reading, preliminary field 
study, exam taking, prospectus defending, grant winning and such, the task of fieldwork 
was finally upon me. And frankly I felt wholly unprepared – unschooled and unskilled – 
and uncertain, both of what exactly the task entailed and whether I was the right person to 
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undertake it. I was an outsider not only to those I was going to do my research with, but 
also to the discipline of anthropology – an alien in both fields, as well as to the United 
States. A student of literature and cultural studies, I felt the one foot I had pushed through 
the anthropology door shake under me. David was reassuring in his brusque, endearing 
manner, and we got talking about how long I would need to complete my research. I had 
had different discussions on this subject with different people in my department and I 
wanted David’s opinion too. “Any anthropologist worth their salt will stay long enough 
to at least experience all four seasons,” he said with his distinctive toss of the head. 
That formulation lingered with me as I did my fieldwork in Shillong.4 It seemed 
like such a quaint thing to say. But David is of a slightly older generation; an 
anthropologist in his early sixties whose research in Papua New Guinea has resulted in 
prolific writings, he cuts a significantly different figure than most of the other cultural 
anthropologists in my department. The ones whose work I was most interested in initially 
bear a distinctly Foucauldian stamp and, given my academic background and sharpened 
sensitivities to the structuring role of power and its differential quality, naturally I 
gravitated towards them. This work in a sense bore testimony to the dramatic 
transformations within anthropology over the past five decades, as it has responded to 
numerous critiques, the simplest yet harshest being its complicity with the colonial 
enterprise and the power wielded by the white, male anthropologist over the object of his 
study – the ‘primitive’ or ‘native’ Other (Asad 1973, Kuper 1988). Edward Said (1978) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I couldn’t but remember Michael as the seasons changed, which were hard to miss accompanied as they 
are by breathtaking blossoms attacking trees all over the city – cherries, peaches, pears, plums, oranges, 
rose apples, jacarandas, rhododendrons, orchids and others – veritably “a calendar of flowers” as Shillong-
born poet Nabanita Kanungo notes in a wonderful reflection on time and memory: 
http://prairieschooner.unl.edu/fusion/feast/what-ill-take-me-when-i-leave-shillong 
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was influential not only for pointing out the continued imbrication of orientalism in 
encounters Europeans had/have with ‘others’ (see also Rabinow 1977, Crapanzano 1980) 
but also for highlighting the impact of ‘scientific’ disciplinary knowledges (produced by 
Europeans about the ‘orient’) in consolidating and reifying popular dualisms about the 
‘west’ and the ‘rest.’ 
Anthropology found itself addressed here in both discussions, and has since (and 
perhaps much before) been heavily invested in freeing itself from its dark historical 
associations with colonialism, racism, Euro-American supremacy and dominance, and 
setting itself apart from popular, condescending dabblings in the difference of the ‘other.’ 
Challenges from postcolonial theory, poststructuralist and deconstructive philosophy, 
neo-Marxisms, critical race, feminist and queer theory, activism, literature and art have 
likewise triggered a series of convulsions within the discipline, occasioning radical re-
theorizing, reflexivity, explorations of the literary and representative, “studying up,” 
multi-sited ethnographies and so on. In an experimental attempt at “self-historicizing,” 
James Clifford tells us about a conversation he had in the early 70s with Malinowski’s 
student Raymond Firth outside the library of the London School of Economics about 
recent critiques of anthropology for its collusions with colonial power: 
He shook his head in a mixture of pretended and real confusion. What happened? “Not so long 
ago we were radicals. We thought of ourselves as gadflies and reformers, advocates for the values 
of indigenous cultures, defenders of our people. Now, all of a sudden, we’re handmaidens of 
empire!” [2012:419] 
In that moment we can know what it is to “feel historical,” argues Clifford. When you 
find yourself repositioned and bewildered, right after the ground under your feet suddenly 
slides away. That was what many of the older liberal Western scholars experienced (amid 
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rapid decolonization) when confronted with the idea that colonialism was a “period” with 
an ending, he writes. For many anthropologists of that era careful attention to the lives of 
‘primitive’ Others held the promise of pushing at the very limits of Western, metropolitan 
experience and philosophy, enabling alternative/radical imaginations of human potential 
and the good or the ideal life. The discipline arguably arrives at a full circle at this 
moment when senior, experienced anthropologists, who have (to their minds at least) 
devoted entire careers to a struggle against ethnocentric biases, get castigated for being 
Eurocentric, colonial and old-school (Ferguson 1999, Peletz 1995). As Clifford looks 
back a quarter of a century to when Writing Cultures was first published he feels 
similarly repositioned, having had to contend (along with others of his generation) with 
more contemporary questions about gender, sexuality, class and race to name a few. 
Globalization and neoliberalism have heralded political strife, economic insecurities and 
environmental degradation, and all these are tied up with the intense and ongoing 
transformation of power relations and the decentering (not defeat) of the West, but as 
Clifford writes, “The discipline of anthropology has been an inextricable part of this 
decentering, and so have its critiques, books like Writing Culture” (419). 
As for myself, I didn’t have to go very far to see just how far anthropology (in its 
participations in these decentering critiques) had come since its early days – my 
professors were studying categories, global capital flows, contemporary genetic practices 
in the Netherlands, blues music, memory, landscape, biopolitics, psychonanalysis, 
conspiracy theories, pigeon phobias, non-human agency and intermediary states of matter 
found in swamps and marshes. My own advisor’s most recent work considers the 
existence of ghosts, modalities of haunting and new kinds of moral imaginaries enabled 
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by interspecies politics and bestial powers. This corpus of exciting new research, surely 
at the cutting-edge of contemporary anthropology, was aligned closely with my 
theoretical interests, asking similar kinds of methodological and ethical questions as I had 
been. It seemed like I might fit into the discipline after all. 
Except my topic of interest wasn’t exactly ‘cutting-edge.’ It seemed like 
something of a double whammy – I was proposing to conduct research with a group 
called a ‘tribe’ and, if that wasn’t problematic enough, ‘kinship’ was to be my field of 
study. While it is certainly the case that the Khasis are part of the Indian nation-state and 
consequently my fellow citizens, I knew enough about the history of the Northeast region 
to be conscious of its strained relationship with where I’m identified as being from, 
referred to by them as ‘mainland India,’ and how that positioned me as an outsider or a 
‘dkhar,’ a complex category refering to non-Khasis, but only those who are also non-
(hill)tribal, or seen to be from the subcontinental plains. Post-war critiques of 
anthropology that challenged epistemologically the possibility itself of white scholars 
conducting research with non-western ‘others’ threw into disarray the very criteria that 
legislated upon the “proper objects” (Butler 1994) of anthropology. Several Euro-
American ethnographers consequently turned their anthropological eye back to their own 
societies, to “re-enter the West cautiously, through the back door, after paying their dues 
elsewhere,” as Michel-Rolf Trouillot put it, even as this return was often “no better 
theorized than were previous departures for faraway lands (1991:19).” 
For many third-world, indigenous and more broadly ‘minority’ anthropologists 
routed through the Western academy the problem of being tainted by inequitable relations 
of (colonial) dominance or racism was ostensibly resolved since they worked mostly 
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within their own communities, but other problems mushroomed under their feet. Trouillot 
notes here that these anthropologists “can and do voice their cultural claims, not on the 
basis of explicit theories of culture but in the name of historical authenticity. They enter 
the debate not as academics – or not only as academics – but as situated individuals with 
rights to historicity (19).” This claim to authenticity is a delicate one rendering them on 
the one hand native informants par excellence but also on the other purveyors of ‘partial 
truths’ within a discipline that has had a long and fraught relationship with the ideal of 
objectivity. Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) argues thus that anthropologists who are “halfies” – 
(people of mixed national or cultural identity through processes of “migration, overseas 
education, or parentage”) – are necessarily estranged from the “self of anthropology” 
given that the “other” that they study is “simultaneously constructed as, at least partially, 
a self.” Their dilemmas, she describes, are serious: 
As anthropologists, they write for other anthropologists, mostly Western. Identified also with 
communities outside the West, or subcultures within it, they are called to account by educated 
members of those communities. More importantly, not just because they position themselves with 
reference to two communities but because when they present the other, they are presenting 
themselves, they speak with a complex awareness of and investment in reception.  
We could add here that such anthropologists face a double conundrum – not simply the 
consciousness of how they will be received by Western anthropologists as an ‘other’, but 
also of how to represent themselves as anthropologists to communities that have 
historically been stigmatized by the work that anthropology has done or how to thus re-
present the discipline in immediate and embodied ways (I was nicknamed anthropology, 
shortened to “anthro” by a hysterically funny, truly gay Naga friend within minutes of 
being introduced and consequently teased mercilessly). That representations – who 
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speaks about whom, through what structures and using what techniques or modalities – 
have complex ethico-political ramifications is plain to most of us with scholarly 
aspirations. Given the barbed history of Northeast India’s marginalization at the hands of 
colonial and postcolonial India, and their identification (broadly speaking) as hill-tribal 
and thus different from those (like me) from the mainland, the question of positionality 
was a fairly vexing one to say the least. I was very conscious of my historical (and real) 
privileges as a ‘mainlander’ being sent by an American univeristy to study a ‘tribe’ from 
the Northeast. Some of the organizing assumptions of the discipline that allowed 
concepts like ‘tribe’ and ‘kinship’ to become an object of its study have been thoroughly 
critiqued – primarily the strange paradox that anthropology sought to generate unifying 
ideas about the nature of human existence based on its  systematic yet exclusive study of 
‘primitive’ non-western societies. Western academics influenced by the ‘critical turn’ in 
anthropology negotiated these complexities in multiple ways, often by returning home as 
noted above. 
An (Other) Outsider: Studying the ‘Tribe’ in India’s Northeast 	  
The anthropogical interest in the ‘other’ doesn’t vanish entirely however, as so 
much research is directed at non-normative groups within the West, including (via the 
call to ‘study up’) those comprising the elite and powerful echelons. As Sherry Ortner 
(1984:143) argues, especially since “more and more anthropologists are doing fieldwork 
in Western cultures, including the United States, the importance of maintaining a capacity 
to see otherness, even next door, becomes more and more acute.” Again, the connections 
between ideas about otherness/difference and objectivity are not incidental and are bound 
up with the foundations of the discipline. Even as these might be eschewed by many 
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within the discipline they continue to be linked in the popular imagination with the work 
we do. But by the late 80s anthropology had to confront its utter disenchantment with its 
traditional subject of study – the ‘primitive’ or ‘exotic’ Other, and by extension allied 
concepts like ‘tribe’ and ‘kinship.’ There has since been a palpable suspicion against an 
anthropology that for instance posits a ‘primitive’ Other “with ‘more kinship’ 
(complicated clan structures, extended families, deep lineages, or even the large families 
of immigrant groups to the United States)…contrasted with the ‘modern’ industrialized 
societies with trim nuclear families” (Stone 2001:1). 
Anthropologists in the 1990s did come back to offer compelling arguments for 
research with non-western and even small-scale societies, challenging popularly held 
ideas about the so-called primitives being contemporary forefathers to allegedly more-
‘evolved’ people and showing instead how they are equally imbricated in capitalist 
world-systems, multiple global flows, complicated nationalistic projects, fraught cultural 
or religious politics and so forth. In a sense my work is influenced deeply by 
anthropologists like Anna Tsing who provide entry points into sophisticated explorations 
of the ways in which ostensibly secluded communities, “out-of-the-way places” are in 
fact being shaped by debates across national and cross-national arenas (1993). In a 
similar vein Paige West’s rich ethnography set in Papua New Guinea shows how the 
Gimi, “a seemingly less-than-developed people, actually exists within and at the same 
time generate what has come to be known as the transnational…[which is]…a process 
through which Gimi and their interlocutors produced space, place, environment, society 
and self” (2006:xii). Disjunctions between biodiversity conservation principles and 
rhetorics deployed by NGO workers and the aspirations of local people for development 
	  	   24 
– schooling for their children, medicines and medical aid, clean water supply, loans, 
income generation avenues etc. – lead to complex negotiations and frustrations for all 
involved while also showing up the powerful interconnections between individual and 
communal realities and global processes. 
Such ethnographies disrupted readerly romances with radical differences 
associated with the ‘primitive,’ even as they challenged the burgeoning field of cultural 
studies (and by extension newer trends within anthropology?) to “move beyond its roots 
in Eurocentric literary criticism and philosophy, and participate in a cultural dialogue that 
crosses professional, ethnic, and national boundaries between the West and the Third 
World” (Tsing 1993:31). The discipline of cultural studies in India has in fact from the 
outset been deeply invested in putting texts from the Western canon into conversation 
with realities within the postcolonial nation, and my own work hopes to contribute to the 
ideas being generated in that field and more broadly to social science in India in addition 
to writing from within the discipline of American anthropology. 
The question still lingers for me however (and is not obviously one that I could 
resolve) – in the postcritical landscape of anthropology, how does one take something to 
be the object of one’s inquiry? What is the space assigned to the Other qua ‘primitive’ or 
‘exotic’ within anthropology and what are the consequences of such studies or then of 
avoiding such studies? While early anthropological discourses were instrumental not only 
in the creation of categories like ‘tribal’ but also in casting them (even if inadvertently) as 
backward or less evolved, it is also important to attend to the complexities accompanying 
the role of anthropology in the Northeast, which has a very specific historical trajectory 
in relation to the rest of India. I was alerted to this when, during a preliminary fieldtrip, I 
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shared my research ideas with an anthropologist from the region whose work and spirit I 
admired. She asked to meet me after reading my prospectus. As I sat down in her office 
the first thing she said was: “I will not be interested in supervising your work if you’re 
planning on doing one of these postmodern projects.” I could not have been more caught 
off guard and I’m not sure if my surprise was readily apparent to her but she continued 
nevertheless, “I’ve been reading all these anthologies (gesturing to some book shelves), 
these so-called literary ideas, reflexivity and all…but I don’t agree with them. They are 
not so relevant here.”  
If anywhere it’s relevant surely its here I was thinking but she continued to offer a 
very interesting critique of what she was calling ‘postmodern anthropology’ as being 
unable to account for the significant contributions of older models of anthropology in a 
socio-political context like the Northeast. India and China engage each other repeatedly 
in cartographical battles even as much of the borderland is extremely hard to access, 
much less patrol. In the Northeast today, there continue to be communities that live in 
areas virtually impossible to reach for want of infrastructure like roads, communication 
and so forth, rendering the invisibility marking the lives of the people from the region 
rather literal in their instance. Gathering data about these communities was imperative to 
this anthropologist, since according to her the lack of knowledge being produced 
perpetuates social and state violence against them, their very existence un/under-
acknowledged. Being a tribal and having experienced closely their marginalization in the 
Northeast and a scholar with a clear sense of that history, her need to document the social 
realities of these communities that she felt herself a part of was not merely a cultural-
conservation project undertaken solely for academic purposes, but was instead infused 
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with a keen recognition of the power and politics of knowledge production, of being 
written into existence so to speak, in a context where most elites, both at the local and 
national level, remain unaware of communities most severely marginalized. 
It is here that she finds classical style anthropology to be its most useful and 
despite the critiques that have been leveled against it in the last few decades she 
articulates the need for its recuperation, or at least was cautioning me against adopting a 
blanket, overly simplistic (or even reactionary she seemed to imply) rejection of it. This 
conversation did have a profound impact on me, forcing me to be mindful of the ability 
of classical anthropology to produce – knowledge, discourse, people, thought and even 
affect – and (as she was suggesting) to empower, even as my work is simultaneously 
engaged in exploring some of its underlying assumptions and methodologies that have 
been problematic. But, at any rate, by the late 2000s it would have been impossible for 
me to conceptualize a project to study kinship patterns among a matrilineal tribe called 
the Khasis in a distant part of the world just because it was poorly accounted for in the 
literature – neither would I find myself drawn to such a topic nor I hazard would the 
discipline be willing/able to accept it as such. 
I was confronted with the question of whether these concepts (and methodologies) 
had fallen out of the scope of critical Western anthropology, and if so, did this constitute 
an abrogation of responsibility – by anthropology, of concepts that it helped create no 
less, and which it now discards to national and/or developementalist discourse? In 
relegating them awkwardly to a bygone anthropological era we forgo the opportunity to 
ask ourselves the question – how do we rethink these analytical categories and 
understand the work they are put to in various contexts and discourses (including within 
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anthropology)? As James Ferguson (1999) has shown in another postcolonial context 
(Zambia), anthropological ideas have had the power to structure the knowledges and 
practices of both postcolonial states and their citizens. For postcolonial Khasis, as we 
shall see, these categories are far from obsolete or even problematic (though they are not 
at all unaware of those trajectories and will draw upon them selectively), becoming 
instead full-fledged nodes of self-understanding and trademarks upon which they have 
chosen to peg their own identity in relation to those that they have historically construed 
to be ‘others.’ To many of them then anthropological ditherings about the propriety or the 
feasibility of scrutinizing such categories would at best be perplexing and at worst 
considered a violence or at least a failure of the discipline to account for the after-life of 
notions/imaginaries that it helped spawn. 
For the Khasis being tribal and matrilineal are central to their self-identity and are 
repeatedly invoked in their ‘modern’ assertions as citizens and as a community within the 
nation-state but also in the larger international arena that they are conscious of being 
situated within. While ideas like modernity might not be compelling analytical categories 
anymore, they continue to be important particularly to postcolonial subjects, and this 
project is consequently obliged to take more seriously the ways in which metaphors of 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ are being mobilized within Khasi society and  the discpline of 
anthropology, both in the West and in the Northeast. Further, to track this affiliation 
between ‘tradition’ and tribal identity is crucial in India where ‘tribe’ is a politically 
contested and fragile entity – communities designated ‘Scheduled Tribes’ receive 
Constitutional reservations. 
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Engaging critiques of classical anthropology, my dissertation problematizes a 
conceptualization of the ‘tribe’ as simply being the precursor of the civilized modern – an 
assumption enumerated by earlier anthropology and inherited by the Indian state in its 
approach to the ‘Scheduled Tribes.’ It seeks to rethink the ‘tribe (in its intersections with 
gender and kinship) as a new configuration, a distinctly modern category. This task of 
tracking the unfolding of the ‘tribe’ in the Northeast has not been undertaken in any 
sustained fashion and is particularly crucial since the Northeast tribes have historically 
been treated as a unique entity, being provided for especially by the Sixth Schedule of the 
Indian Constitution. In examining the question of what makes the tribes of the Northeast 
so different this dissertation attempts to tease open and illuminate anew the project of 
modernity and postcolonial nation building within the Indian context. 
Colonial anthropological scholarship, influenced as it was by theories of social 
evolution, placed tribal and aboriginal communities even below the Sanskritized caste 
Indians, marking them as ‘noble savages’ outside the pale of any form of civilization, and 
these notions are inherited by mainland India finding expression in policies, research as 
well as popular attitudes. Among the Shillong Khasis, particularly the intelligentsia, there 
is a striking rejection and perhaps even reversal of this formulation. Many Khasis express 
a sense of distinction, mostly indirectly but sometimes even directly, in comparison with 
mostly dkhar but also other tribal communities.  
Therefore, I was told very early by a senior non-Khasi researcher at the North 
East Hill University in Shillong, that my project was “unfeasible” because people, 
particularly men, wouldn’t wish to speak to me for being both a ‘dkhar’ outsider and a 
woman. This of course made me consider not only my ability to conduct the research but 
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also raised troubling questions for me about the consequences of my being a part outsider 
(non-Khasi and non-tribal) and a part insider (shared national imaginaries and 
knowledges) in relation to the politics of participating in and writing about life in 
Shillong. What kinds of self-other gymnastic feats would I have to pull off and what 
would their ethical and existential consequences be, I wondered? I found to my surprise 
that my dkhar status was mitigated by my being from Bombay, which was perceived as a 
distant, more cosmopolitan place, as opposed to cities like Calcutta or New Delhi that 
many people are much more familiar with. And of course my being a student at an 
American University along with apprehendings of my class privilege, cultural capital, 
gender normativity and so forth made me an acceptable person for many Khasis to talk 
to.  
In fact as it turned out, both my gender and my outsider status facilitated my 
research enormously. Being a gender-conforming woman I was automatically 
interpellated into hetero-normative orderings that then made me a pleasant/attentive and 
sometimes ‘desirable’ listener for my some of my cis-gendered straight male 
interlocutors. One of them even suggested flirtily that I take a Khasi boyfriend so that I 
could learn about Khasi kinship “first hand.” Also people felt more comfortable sharing 
intimate aspects of their lives with me since I was an outsider (thus also seen as having 
no stakes and being more neutral and less prone to gossip) who would soon leave 
Shillong. At any rate, given the contemporary manifestations of tribal-dkhar dynamics I 
can say with some amount of certainty that conducting this research would have been 
exponentially more difficult (if not outright impossible) had I been a Bengali from 
Shillong studying at Delhi University.  
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This feeling of distinction that Khasis have in relation to dkhars is perhaps linked 
to their close encounter with the British. Sohra was the first British capital in the region 
before it was moved to Shillong, which then continued to be the administrative capital of 
undivided Assam up until 1972, when Meghalaya attained statehood and Shillong 
became its capital, while Dispur was named as Assam’s new capital. In the contemporary 
moment, when Meghalaya has become just another state in the Northeast, it is easy to 
forget the long and unique history of the Khasis with the British who, particularly after 
the idea of hill stations in other parts of colonial India began to gain traction, discovered 
in Khasi and Jaintia Hills great potential for a European retreat. Writing about their 
journey “across the woody hills, which lie between Goahattee and Nunkhlow,” Major 
Adam White writes in his Memoirs of the late David Scott: 
Emerging from the hot muggy atmosphere of the plains and the noisome effluvia of these 
Assamese wilds, it is scarcely possible to conceive with what delight we behold the enchanting 
verdure of these hills, and breathed their pure and balmy atmosphere. [1832:33]5 
Thrilled with encountering a climate that reminded him of his native England, in 1826 
Scott proceeded to seek permission to build in Nongkhlaw a house where both invalids 
and colonial officials could go to “eat the Europe air” (37). Most Shillongites today are 
proud of this historical legacy of their town, and often invoked the British designation of 
their city as the “Scotland of the East,” especially when lamenting its dirty and polluted 
state.  
In 1828, Sohra was selected as an appropriate spot for the building of a 
sanatorium, which was to become a hub of missionary activities and the first British 
capital of the region. The evangelical efforts of the Welsh missionaries, led by Thomas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  https://archive.org/stream/memoiroflatedavi00watsrich#page/n3/mode/2up	  
	  	   31 
Jones (who moved to Sohra in 1841) led to the welcoming of Christianity and the 
burgeoning of schools. Currently 70.3% of Meghalaya’s population is Christian and 
74.43% of the population is literate (2011 Government of India Census). Subsequently in 
1842, the Roman script was adopted for the Khasi language, further increasing the 
acceptance of English. This popularity has occasioned many parents to name their 
children after unusual words from the English language repertoire but also names of 
Western icons (such as Hitler, Moonlight, Virginity, Rolling stone, Billy Kid, Darling 
and so forth) and many Khasis narrate these stories with amusement and sometimes a 
tinge of embarrassment.6  
It is certainly not insignificant that standardized Khasi was modeled on the Khasi 
spoken by the Khynriams, the community of Khasis who live in Hima Khyriem (that 
included Sohra), since these were the first group that the colonial officials and 
missionaries encountered and studied, which has had the effect of indirectly invisibilizing 
or deemphasizing the languages spoken by other types of Khasis. Likewise, the early 
settling of Sohra had definite implications for the study of Khasi matriliny, which also 
was based on data gleaned from the Sohra Khasis, creating a normative and hegemonic 
understanding of Khasi matriliny, and more broadly culture, often at the expense of the 
Pnars, War Jaintias, War Khasis, Bhois, Lyngams and so forth. Here too, the role of 
anthropology and other ‘scientific’ disciplines is key. As McDuie-Ra puts it: 
Ethnographers worked hard to create identities such as ‘Naga’, ‘Khasi’, and ‘Garo’; all specific 
administrative projects to bring diverse groups into singular identities and subjugate them to a 
local ruler and frequently a local revenue collector…In the Khasi Hills, the role of the Syiem, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A recent feature story in the Shillong Times provides a perspective on this topic: 
http://www.theshillongtimes.com/2014/03/10/whats-in-a-name-everything/ 
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‘chief’, was emphasized and given increased importance and uniformity by the British in order to 
appoint a loyal local ruler, despite the different systems of authority in different parts of the Khasi 
Hills. [2009] 
Therefore, the British colonial encounter created not only a singular understanding of 
Khasi culture based on the study of the Khynriams (rendered tacitly into the prototypical 
Khasi), but also allowed them to become established as the early elites, who continue, 
albeit in subtle ways, to hold a hegemonic sway over Khasi society, especially as it gets 
represented to outsiders via disciplinary knowledge, but also perhaps in the formulation 
of ideas about Khasi identity and consequently even Khasi nationalism.7 While it is 
certainly the case that several Khasi rulers fought hard against incursions by the British 
(early 18th century Syiem U Tirot Sing is still celebrated as a Khasi freedom fighter – his 
death anniversary is memorialized each year on the 17th of July as a state holiday) and 
that there was a lot of resistance to colonial rule, many people I spoke to also underscored 
the significance of close interactions between the Khasis and the British, which they say 
played a role in facilitating Khasi modernity, exposing them to alternative, more 
metropolitan outlooks, and even perhaps giving them an edge over other tribals in the 
region.  
It is not a coincidence thus that many of the important leaders of the Hill-State 
Movement were Khasis from Shillong who, because of their sustained exposure to larger 
regional and national politics, were arguably in a much better position to articulate their 
resistance to middle-class Assamese hegemony. Others openly talked about how if they 
had to be “ruled” by outsiders, they would still prefer the saheps (British) to the dkhars, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The tensions between Jaintias (which itself is a contested identity category) and Khasis tend to be 
articulated most often.  
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an indication of how some Khasis explicitly connected the colonial and the postcolonial 
states as ‘rulers’ of their community, but also of how tenuous they found their ties with 
the larger Indian nation-state. On one of my early trips I was talking to a Khasi shop 
owner in Laitumkhrah, and he told me “You know we say like this…we are Khasis by 
birth and Indians by accident,” and this is apparently a fairly common motto particularly 
among some sections of Khasi youth who identify more closely with the idea of Khasi 
nationalism.   
While Khasi antipathy towards the Indian-state was certainly not a commonly 
expressed sentiment, I discuss some of these voices, in order to gesture towards the larger 
fact that urban Khasis are differently interpellated into the federal structure of the Indian 
nation-state; while most recognize themselves as Indian citizens, they are also 
simultaneously able to short-circuit their national or even regional affiliations to feel and 
(particularly if their class background permits) be a part of more Westernized 
worldviews. Shillong, for instance, has earned itself a reputation as the rock capital of the 
country, but other kinds of western music – classical, heavy metal, blues, soul, and even 
hip hop – are also very popular and during my time there, I attended several music 
concerts held in public squares like Don Bosco, Fire Brigade, Police Bazaar and so forth, 
which was attended by both young and old.  
An eighty-three year old, middle class Khasi woman living in Mawkhar recalled 
with nostalgia her teens when she said Shillong was a “much more vibrant,” 
cosmopolitan town, where you could encounter “cultured people of various 
backgrounds.” She talked about how each locality would have socials with contemporary 
Western music and dancing, heavily attended by youth, both male and female, without 
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parental disapproval, and “everyone felt free and had a lot of fun.” It is not insignificant 
that during the 1980s and 90s when violence against outsiders in Shillong was at its acme 
and political groups like the Khasi Students Union were issuing threats against women 
choosing to wear kurtas instead of the traditional Khasi jaiñsem, the Seng Kynthei 
(collection of women’s groups) spoke out strongly against such policing of Khasi 
women. Khasis often construct their identity in relation to larger, more global paradigms, 
where both their unique history within the region and their tribal, matrilineal culture 
dovetail, allowing them to see themselves mirrored in and reflective of progressive and/or 
Western ideas about gender and sexual expression particularly.  
At the same time there are serious concerns about the future of the community, 
which gets seen as frail in the face of numerous and rapid changes that are taking place. 
One of my informants, a retired civil servant turned social activist spoke about how 
changes in indigenous tribal societies tend to “threaten the comfort zone” making it 
“traumatic and people don’t want it.” “The trauma of change,” he said grimly, “plays on 
our psyche, we are unwilling to admit it but it plays very hard on our psyche…these old 
value systems within our blood which have been handed down by word of mouth. And 
what are we expected to do really when we find that these value systems don’t help us get 
on with life?” This dissertation examines how urban Khasis negotiate the dilemmas of 
these changes and frequently call upon modern and globally popular discourses such as 
indigenous rights, human rights, justice, dignity, and gender equality in order to describe 
or validate their observations and diagnoses of different social ‘problems.’  
Analyzing contestations around gender and kinship allows us I argue, to trace the 
multiple nodes along which Khasi identity is being activated in contemporary Shillong, 
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especially in relation to hegemonic conceptualizations of modernity and progress. I show 
how this activation of Khasi identity is in complex dialogues with ideas about nationhood 
and group belonging, especially in their imbrications with ethnicity, race, gender, 
sexuality, language, religion and culture. In studying articulations of Khasi identity, I 
focus on three primary categories – hill-tribal, matriliny and men’s rights – in order to 
suggest that understandings of what it means to be Khasi are co-constituted with multiple, 
everyday expressions of these three very fluid conceptual categories. Further, I identify 
and elaborate three principal modes through which ideas about Khasi identity are stitched 
together – the performative, the affective, and the discursive – arguing that each of these 
modes reveals different facets of the categories that are being invoked and (re)made.  
Working with the performative mode allows us to see clearly that Khasi identity 
(and its allied categories) is not inherently meaningful, nor is it a direct or singular 
product of colonialism, or even postcolonialism. I show that these are thoroughly modern 
categories that are produced through the multiple, intersecting gazes that bring into focus 
the complex genealogies of colonialism, racialization, and patriarchies. The affective 
mode allows us to attend to the creation, consolidation and sublimation of a range of 
feelings that suture subjects into nationalist (and supra-nationalist) imaginaries. Being 
attentive to the discursive enables us to take seriously the sometimes contradictory and 
sometimes consistent formations of Khasi nationalism that are produced through the 
affective and performative, but also through the sociological and historical. Khasi ethno-
nationalism can thus be understood through interpretive categories produced within 
disciplinary knowledges of post/colonial anthropology and historiography, which are in a 
tense relationship with mainstream Indian nationalism as well as larger 
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conceptualizations of international citizenship and hegemonic Western/Christian 
conceptions of modernity. 
Through each of these modes we can then zoom in and out of a range of 
experiences – from the individual to the community and then further moving up to larger 
imaginaries of collective identity, in order to analyze the complex impacts that follow 
from the dialogues and dissonances produced through these traversals. This dissertation 
can thus be read as a multiscalar conceptualization of Khasi identity that remains 
attentive to both the contradictory and the coherent iterations of nationhood and national 
subjectivities in the everyday psychic and social life of Khasi people.  
Identity politics have typically articulated the concerns of groups discriminated 
against because of their dislocation from the universal, unmarked subject even as the 
particularities of their experience (of marginalization) are consistently erased through 
subtle processes of cooptation. However, as we see in one of my primary analytical sites, 
the Khasi men’s rights movement is strategically using feminist categories, insights, 
ideology and techniques of analysis in their own struggle to fashion a narrative and 
ideology of masculine subjugation. How is the universal being mobilized in this context 
to assert itself as the marginal and thus co-opt its language and political praxis?  What are 
the historical trajectories that enable this reversal? 
 Political sociologies of the Northeast have been very critical of what has been 
called the post-independence “political engineering” of the region, which has long been 
“pronounced a failure” in hindsight (Baruah 2005:5). Drawing somewhat on these 
critiques but most centrally gleaned from insights gained through my own fieldwork I 
suggest that ideas and movements around Khasi ethnonationalism—which were 
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conceptualized primarily as a resistance to its historical marginalization from the 
mainstream or normative Indian citizenry—have ended up partially replicating the pitfalls 
of mainstream nationalist modes of imagining and organizing belonging. Erasures of 
intra-group cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, perpetuation of 
stereotypes that legitimize pre-existing social hierarchies, and systemic marginalization 
have all become variations on the theme of ‘collateral damage’ for the larger goal of 
consolidating a standardized imagination of the ‘true,’ ‘singular’ or ‘unified’ Khasi 
identity. What are the dangers posed by the uncritical reclaiming of marginality and a 
politics based on that by a now hegemonic, elite Khasi nationalism? 
Even as I endorse the insights of scholarship that diagnoses the problems inherent 
within ethnonationalism and its concomitant violences, in this dissertation I push for the 
importance of not conflating Khasi nationalism with dominant Indian nationalism, or 
conceptualizing the former as a pocket size version of the latter. Being a minority group 
that has historically had to face specific and unique modes of (racialized, primitivized and 
sexualized) marginalization at the hands of the mainland, non-tribal, upper caste 
Hindu(ized) citizenry, the uptake of these categories necessarily becomes more 
complicated within the Khasi context and cannot be read as a mere replication or 
mirroring of the mainstream dominant discourse.  
To do so would not take seriously enough the ramifications of subordinated 
nationalisms, that (even as they reach in problematic ways for consistency and 
coherence) are necessarily negotiating a fraught relationship with a powerful globally-
endorsed nationalism, which through its own industries, affects and frameworks is 
constantly trying to absorb it into its fold. Furthermore, to conflate these two nationalisms 
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would also be to assume that there is only one kind of nationalism and that the others are 
merely versions that can unproblematically stand in for each other. I argue for a 
reconsideration of a hegemonic idea of nationalism; instead we need to be attentive to the 
qualitatively different forms of nationalism(s) and identity politics that are operating in 
new complicated and sub/dominant forms. 
Similarly, even as I open up for critique the various problematic ideologies and 
assumptions that are central to the articulations of anti-matriliny men’s groups, I show 
how the discursive figure of the depleted, emasculated Khasi man is produced in the 
complex exchange and absorption of gazes between dominant, non-matrilineal outsiders 
and Khasi men whose masculinity is doubly displaced from what I call hegemonic 
patrilineo-patriarchy and is always already readable as ‘failure’ or ‘lack.’ While the 
‘traditional’ Khasi gender worldview is a fairly patriarchal one, I suggest that it too 
cannot be conflated with patrilineo-patriarchy. I suggest that the task of simply 
highlighting (using critical lenses developed for patrilineo-patriarchy) the problems with 
the assertions being made by the men’s groups runs the risk of not accounting in any 
meaningful way for the different ways that gender dynamics pan out in the matrilineal 
Khasi context and the possibly real problems that emerge from there.  I also explore the 
contributions and the lacunae of mainstream patrilineal feminism, which has historically 
been working through a different set of gender logics, dichotomies and hierarchies and 
dichotomies, and I argue that drawing on this model had posed several conundrums for 
Khasi feminism. 
Through an ethnographic focus on the routine lives, contentions, pressures, and 
complex considerations that Khasis are subject to and constantly navigating, I propose 
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that there is a need for interpreting these everyday experiences in their relationship to 
larger conceptual categories and the power differentials these categories are organized 
around. To be clear, I do not at all wish to recuperate Khasi nationalism or the men’s 
movements as resistant, fraught or subaltern and therefore unambiguously positive. I am 
in fact very much invested in a close and careful analysis of both their hegemonic, 
imperial and thus prohibitive impulses and wish to underscore the ongoing political 
importance of such kinds of analyses.  
In this dissertation however I argue for the need to think about large-scale 
narratives of modernity or nationalism or patriarchy in their imbrication with lived 
realities so as to ask what an analytical investment in the everyday allows for. What kinds 
of new political, affective formations are generated in this interface? My ethnographic 
work highlights the need to consider questions about ideas like national, racial, ethnic, 
and gendered subjectivities, both to look at their manifestation in very specific socio-
political instances and to understand how ideas about group identity are produced at the 
confluence of such individual or everyday experiences.  
It is important, furthermore, to look at how these specific manifestations interface 
with conceptualizations of the universal creating new, divergent forms of the local and 
the universal, rather than simply being examples or micro-models of the dominant 
universal and thus already knowable concepts. To put it differently, if one is to abide by 
the everyday realities of these particular contexts – with their historical, geographical, 
quotidian locatedness – what kinds of new interpretive categories can be seen to emerge?  
Furthermore, what might an understanding of the uniqueness and qualitative 
differences of minority, (sub)/national subjectivities (both held in opposition to and in 
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conjunction with the dominant) enable for a reconceptualization of the 
mainstream/universal conceptualization of nationhood? In what ways are national 
subjectivities produced quite fundamentally by people’s routine contestations and 
internalizations of discourses around gender, sexuality, kinship, and racialization? 
Finally, in this dissertation I examine how multiple axes of group identification that are in 
excess of the rubric of nationalism – hill-tribal, Northeast regional, pan Southeast/East 
Asian and global/Western – complicate the supposedly intrinsic, non-porous concept of 
both Indian nationalism and Khasi identity.  
On Methods 	  
This thesis emerges out of 20 months of fieldwork spanning three summers 
between 2007 and 2011 and one continuous year between 2009-2010.  During these 
months I lived both as a paying guest and a tenant in four different people’s homes – a 
Mizo woman, a Khasi woman, a Jaintia man and a Khasi man. From each family I 
learned a great deal – but was most struck by the uniqueness of every household and the 
qualitative differences between the dynamics of each from the others. While 
understandings and expressions of Khasi identity are one of the principal concerns of this 
dissertation, it is precisely through witnessing and sharing the small and routine aspects 
of these families (and others I became close with) that I was reminded of the dangers of 
ascribing too much value to a concept – i.e. identity -- that is fraught and overdetermined 
to begin with. This project is marked by a central tension then – how does one open up a 
heavy, politically laden and charged concept like group identity to attend both to the 
multiple structures and fault lines around which social life is differentially, often 
violently, organized and to the complexities and contradictions of individual lives that 
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tend not to be contained neatly within identity categories, while also accounting for the 
impulse that drives a minority community to consolidate and assert itself.    
Living with and watching people’s lives unfold outside the realm of specific 
‘research interests’ was an illuminating if challenging experience. It provided a crucial 
and much needed foil to my more ‘research-oriented’ methods, around which I tried to 
organize my days in the field. These always required some preparation and planning – 
following up with people I met socially or calling people out of the blue, requesting and 
scheduling interviews, getting people in the same room for a focus group discussion and 
so forth – and the ‘material’ I gathered from these efforts has been rich and enormous. 
But I was conscious of the fact that, when confronted with questions, people have 
specific modes of responding that are inflected by several things – how the interviewee is 
perceiving you and whether they want to say what it is they think you wish to hear or to 
challenge what they think your assumptions might be, or by how they think they ought to 
answer given their own trajectories and worldviews and if others are present too, then 
modulating for that additional audience and so forth. 
As anthropologists we are trained to be vigilant about the pitfalls of taking what 
people say at face value. I did make an effort to adopt techniques like asking the 
informant to recall a concrete event rather than asking a general question (for example, 
“What did you do this morning?” rather than “What do you do every morning?”) but 
these do not provide immunity from some of the problems outlined above. When faced 
with a question people consciously summon themselves up in that moment, and this can 
often be experienced as jarring or a kind of violence. Thus even in my more ‘formal’ 
interviews I made a conscious effort to subjugate my impulse to pose pre-formulated 
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questions, preferring instead to help facilitate a space that might allow the interviewee to 
follow their own thoughts or talk about what they found interesting, even as I would seek 
clarifications or exemplifications.  
According the feedback I received, this made the interview seem less like an 
interview and more of a ‘friendly chat.’ I was especially concerned initially about being 
too intrusive since my research involved having people share with me various aspects of 
their personal lives and intimate details or feelings about their social existence. However, 
I soon found, much to my surprise, that people were often relieved to have the chance to 
discuss such things, especially with a complete outsider. Most of my ‘formal’ interviews 
thus went on for anywhere between 2-5 hours, with some going on for nine hours at a 
stretch. 
Being an outsider with a very delimited network of initial ‘contacts’ I was forced 
to rely on scheduling interviews, but while there were definitely many cases of people 
with whom I was only able to conduct a single interview, I always attempted to build a 
relationship with my informant that would extend beyond the space of that interview. 
Much of my ‘interviewing’ thus was not of the ‘formal’ variety – my perspectives have 
been framed by numerous, sometimes fleeting, conversations I had with so many 
different people. Walking back home after an early morning basketball session at Fire 
Brigade, buying DVDs in Police Bazaar, tracking down a potential Khasi teacher at St. 
Anthony’s College, eating momos at the market in Motphran, sipping rice wine at 
someone’s house in Jowai before attending the Behdienkhlam festivities, waiting for the 
Sumo to Pynursla, bumping into a familiar face at Swish Café, watching a teer match on 
the way to Sohra – there were countless such instances when I would fall into 
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conversations with people without having planned anything. And even if they began 
talking about something directly linked to my research I learned quickly not to attempt to 
pull out my voice recorder since that was a sure shot way to disrupt their train of thought 
and even their desire to talk to me. 
Not all these conversations would lead to ‘something more’ and many of them 
were about things not ostensibly linked to my research topic, but I participated attentively 
– being an outsider brings with it, in a very lucid manner, the consciousness of how little 
you know about what is happening around you – and I found out quickly that often the 
things that don’t initially seem relevant end up being crucial to how you think about your 
topic. This story featuring Danny is a great example: Danny drove a local taxi. I 
happened to get into his cab one afternoon in Polo and we got chatting after I tried 
practicing my Khasi with him and we joked about it. His English wasn’t that great (much 
better than my Khasi was though), with strong signs of the famous Mawlai accent. Often 
called the ‘wild West’ of Shillong, Mawlai is known for being a pretty old-school Khasi 
locality – not many outsiders live there and the stereotype is that people from Mawlai 
don’t like to mix with non-Khasis, particularly the dkhars.  
But Danny and I became pretty friendly. When he learned that I was expecting a 
visit from a childhood friend from Bombay, he immediately suggested that I call him if I 
needed a taxi to take her around. It turned out that he had another taxi – a tourist one. 
Come to think of it, I’m not sure that it was even registered as a taxi officially. Since 
Shillong is a tourist destination, whenever my friends or family members visited I would 
end up taking them around to see the sights. And so it was that on a Sunday morning my 
friend and I made a trip to Sohra with Danny in his ‘taxi.’ After seeing a few places, 
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however, Danny started getting restless. He had agreed to spend the day there taking us 
around but by early afternoon it became clear he wanted to head back to Shillong. Not 
having eaten anything all morning we told him that we should get lunch before heading 
back, but he shepherded us along by saying we could get something to eat on the way.   
We started the drive back and with every other village that went by we got 
hungrier, especially since we could tell that none of the food shops were open. Danny 
kept pacifying us by saying he knew where the next place was where we could get food, 
but as each place was closed he would come up with the next halt plan. This went on 
endlessly much to our disbelief. My friend was leaving the next day and I had really 
wanted her to try jadoh (a Khasi culinary specialty) before she left. But finally she pulled 
out a bag of chips saying she felt faint. Danny wasn’t having it however, and managed to 
shame her for her lack of resilience (and for thinking that Ruffles was a suitable 
substitute for jadoh).  
Since we weren’t far from Mawkdok and he promised us that the shop there 
would definitely be open, we decided to wait. But as it turned out the Mawkdok shutters 
were closed too. By this time we were both too shocked to respond. I was annoyed with 
Danny for how things had unfolded and as I opened the bag of chips I said to him 
irritably, “What is it – on Sundays Khasis don’t have to eat or what?” As if immune to 
my tone, he smiled and replied with his typical dry wit – “On Sundays, we Khasis eat the 
Bible.” I knew of course that most Khasis had converted to Christianity (and also that 
Danny wasn’t from a Christian family) but it only hit me then clearly, not just because of 
how he phrased it but also by the bitter sarcasm dripping in his voice, how distinct the 
tension was between those who believed in the indigenous Niam Khasi religion and the 
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Christian Khasis and gaining that insight turned out to be crucial for how I was to think 
about my research subject(s).  
Another mode of conducting research was to participate in events occurring in 
and around Shillong. For these particularly I relied heavily on friendships both with 
Khasis and non-Khasis, affective bonds that I forged with numerous people who would 
remember me and give me a call, ask me to come along with them, or tell me about 
something they thought I should check out. With them (and alone) I attended weddings, 
funerals, festivals, concerts, fashion shows, art exhibitions, locality cleaning drives, 
Dorbar meetings, family get-togethers, cookouts, camping trips, shopping, gardening, 
press conferences, poetry readings, church services, wine tastings, film screenings, jam 
sessions, parties, protest marches and other such events. Participant observation, 
especially as a counter and a supplement to the stories people tell you, is a hallmark of 
anthropological research; much of what I learned in Shillong was through sharing these 
activities with different people, watching them as they moved through spaces, made 
decisions about what to do and how to comport themselves, interacting with different 
kinds of people, and talking and processing with them about how we differently 
experienced and understood the same events. I also found that I learned a lot just by 
living in a neighborhood, navigating routine tasks, being tuned in to the rustle of 
everyday life there, and witnessing the weeks and months pass by.  
There was another thing I learned slowly – that there are things you possibly 
won’t ever learn about. I realized that being an outsider often meant not being clued into 
the coordinates of life unfolding around you – not only not knowing how to read things 
but also not even knowing that there was something to be read. I was talking to a half 
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Khasi-half Mizo friend about the thing that struck me the most about the Khasi men I was 
there to ‘study’ – they are extremely easy to share public spaces with. I could roam 
around alone at all odd hours without fear of sexual harassment or be squashed in a taxi 
with three men in the backseat and not expect to be groped or feel even the hint of a 
grope. Khasi men were careful to not let their gaze linger on you for even an extra 
second. Being raised in the mainland (and even through my experiences in the U.S.), I 
felt like I had arrived in a different kind of utopic universe altogether and I was talking 
about this with my friend – wondering out loud whether this was connected to their being 
matrilineal.  
She laughed and said that Khasi men were no saints and that I probably didn’t 
even realize when they were being inappropriate with me. I must have looked confused 
because she went on to tell me about how in Shillong guys don’t pinch and poke, but they 
watch from a distance with their friends, they might stalk you or crack obscene jokes 
when you pass by. They certainly objectified women – it’s just that I couldn’t see it. This 
was an eye opening moment for me – both because I started noticing in bits and pieces 
what men were up to, but also because it forced me to reconcile with the partial view of 
things that I would necessarily have, mostly because I was an outsider.  
This dissertation is consequently a partial one at so many levels. Apart from my 
blinkered view, my research is culled from the limited range of experiences I had and the 
stories and lives of the few people with whom I had encounters. Further, in writing this 
dissertation I have only been able to include some of those stories, given constraints of 
space and considerations of thesis structure. Right away you can see two or three layers 
of arbitrariness in the putting together of this research. Coming at this differently you 
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could say that this research is as much a product of what I didn’t see, whom I didn’t talk 
to, lost opportunities, gambles not taken. Contingency is built into it and is a central part 
of its method. Social realities are nothing if not blurry, ephemeral, complicated, 
confusing and possibly unknowable (even for a non-outsider). And ‘methods’ by 
definition are supposed to be methodical – organized, structured, logical, coherent. How 
does one map onto the other? Can we use one to ‘know’ the other?  
In his wonderful book After Method: Mess in Social Science Research, John Law 
draws on the groping figure of a blind person (whose range of perception is qualitatively 
much different by virtue of its halting stance), to advocate for a method built on the idea 
of ‘the stop.’ He writes: 
The stop slows us up. It takes longer to do things. It takes longer to understand, to make sense of 
things. It dissolves the idea, the hope, the belief that we can see the horizon, that we can see long 
distances. It erodes the idea that by taking in the distance at a glance we can get an overview of a 
single reality. So the stop has its costs. We will learn less about certain kinds of things. But we 
will learn a lot more about a far wider range of realities. And we will, or so I also argue, 
participate in the making of those realities. (10) 
Drawing insights from his work I suggest that resisting hegemonic ideas about what is 
‘good,’ ‘sound’ research and ‘useful’ or ‘generalizable’ data is crucial to begin imagining 
methods that are capable of capturing (however fleetingly or tentatively) the complexities 
of the social fields we traverse in our research efforts. Taking our frailties as seriously as 
our ambitions is a necessary step both in figuring out the kinds of researchers we wish 
fashion ourselves into (and thus the kinds of realities we wish to ‘make’) and in 
decolonizing methods, through advocating for a new set of goals – the formulation of 
“quiet methods, slow methods, or modest methods” (15). This dissertation is heavily 
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steeped in the ‘stop,’ both methodologically and conceptually. It promotes the idea of 
suspension, of slowing things down till they reach a state of limbo, of turning them 
around and viewing them in different lights. It is less interested in the ‘writing on the 
wall’ as much as on the layers of whitewashing that allow us see the writing, and the 
traces of things erased, now barely visible to the non-lingering eye that were historically 
responsible for the making of the contemporary text, and that continue to reframe and 
reanimate it.   
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Chapter 1 
Anxious Outsiders: Northeast/India and the Making of 
Difference 
 
 
Late in January 2014, an incident involving the murder of a young student from 
Arunachal Pradesh in New Delhi’s Lajpat Nagar market was picked up and fronted by the 
mainstream media, spawning reactions of horror and shock from across both the political 
spectrum and various social media. Candlelight vigils were held in remembrance of Nido 
Taniam, whose death was reported to have resulted from a beating he received at the 
hands of a local shopkeeper and his friends, after protesting being teased about his 
hairstyle and looks8. Stories such as these, of serious and senseless violence against 
minorities in the heart of the country’s capital, quickly garner attention for their 
exceptional quality, spawning debates on mainstream television channels that spill onto 
mainstream dinner tables.9 It subsequently falls upon those who actually belong to these 
minorities to demonstrate how experiences of violence are not merely exceptional, but in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Something as seemingly trivial as hair trends will return as an important point in subsequent discussions 
of Khasi masculinity as well. While the intentional cultivation of certain hairstyles and looks typically takes 
us into the domain of queer or alternative genders and sexualities whereas here it comes across more as a 
marker of racial difference, this dissertation tries in fact to explore the imbrications between discourses of 
race, gender/sexuality and even kinship. In this instance specifically, the differently ‘put-together’ looks of 
Northeastern young men in other parts of mainland India mark them both as racially ‘other’ (more East or 
Southeast Asian) as well as insufficiently masculine and thus inherently violable.   
9 A striking example of this in recent times is of course the 2012 December Delhi gang-rape case, which 
made headlines for its especially brutal nature, occasioning multiple discussions and protests. South 
African director Yael Farber has recreated this story for stage, and the play Nirbhaya, (which premiered at 
the Edinburg Fringe festival in August 2013) is, according to its official website, a “searing new work that 
cracks open the cone of silence around women whose lives have been shattered by gender-based violence.”  	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fact a persistent, practically pedestrian aspect of their lives. Students from the Northeast 
carried banners saying “Stop Racism” as they marched in protest across the city, much to 
the chagrin of many mainstream (read mainland) Indians, who have a difficult time 
accepting their own ideas or actions as being racist. Duncan McDuie-Ra historicizes this 
tendency of contemporary Indians to externalize racism as a foreign phenomenon by 
arguing, 
Since gaining independence, and particularly when India played a prominent role in the non-
aligned movement and Afro-Asian solidarity, intellectuals and politicians in India publically 
criticized racism in other parts of the world, particularly South Africa and the United States (Gupta 
1978; Logan 1985)…As Zaheer Baber (2010) notes, in India, racism has come to mean something 
‘white people do to Indians’, deflecting attention away from racism towards minorities and 
foreigners in India. [2012:115] 
In his illuminating ethnography of Northeast migrants in the capital city Delhi, McDuie-
Ra writes about discussions with his informants about the media’s penchant for stories of 
racism towards Indian students in Australia. One Naga student in Kohima responded 
thus: “They [the media/government] only care about this because it happened in a foreign 
country. How many tribal students get beaten up in Delhi every year? How many girls get 
raped? No matter how loud we shout, they will never hear” (116). The idea that minority 
communities face violence and discrimination along the lines of religion and caste is 
already a bitter pill for many mainstream Indians to swallow, who cling adamantly to the 
idea that clichés like ‘unity in diversity’ are a fair reflection of India’s reality and 
habitually herald Hinduism as a tolerant religion (in comparison to the so-called 
‘religions of the book’), so when incidents of racial violence like the one described above 
come into the spotlight there is a heightened sense of discomfort and what ensues 
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invariably are attempts to explain the racial aspects of it away and substitute them with 
other, more palatable factors such as economics, development and so on. 
Through an examination of a debate aired on national television following the 
murder of Nido Taniam, this chapter examines in detail the modes by which the 
Northeast and the Northeast subject are rendered exceptional within the mainstream 
consciousness, such that it becomes possible to think of the region as a ‘frontier’ or 
simply as ‘space’ that ‘belongs’ to the nation-state. Hundreds of communities living there 
for centuries are thus recast as expendable. People from the Northeast, particularly the 
hill-tribals, find themselves ‘othered’ along multiples axes like religion, race, ethnicity 
and culture in complex ways and being marked as non-normative citizens, they 
constantly have to keep proving their belongingness and loyalty to the nation-state. I will 
examine some of dominant conjurations of the Northeast and show how they have been 
produced at the confluence of multiple discourses, particularly by colonial knowledge 
production, which have been central to the inscription of difference onto the Northeast 
frontier of British India. I will undertake an analysis of these discourses that have framed 
understandings of the region and its peoples, particularly as evolving out of a thorny 
relationship with postcolonial India, that has persisted in the marginalization of the 
Northeast even as it has sought to co-opt its land, resources, people and talents within the 
jingoistic rhetoric of ‘unity in diversity.’  
Simultaneously I track the proliferation of multiple (sub)nationalisms in the 
region which, enabled in no small measure by post/colonial policies and techniques of 
government that have historically among other things promoted an intimate link between 
tribe and land, draw heavily on internalized anthropological categories like ‘race,’ 
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‘ethnicity,’ ‘tribe’ etc. to fashion ideas about ‘community’ that hinge on the idea of 
identity politics and substantive difference (both from the mainstream and for the other 
minority groups in the region) leading to articulations of varying kinds of what has been 
called ‘ethnonationalisms.’ I explore some of the expressions of Khasi nationalism, and 
discuss how the mainstream Khasi imagination, while not being pro-secessionist, is very 
much invested in an understanding of community – the Khasi jaitbynriew – that is bound 
up in ideas about inherent ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ difference.   
Seen as frail and under threat by ‘racially’ distinct mainland outsiders or dkhars, 
the community is able to ‘speak’ only from two kinds of (not completely separate) 
knowledges – 1) the post/colonial national benevolence that erases a violent history from 
which they emerge as tribals with benefits, and 2) through a kind of (sub)nationalism 
(that both replicates and is divergent from) dominant articulations of nationalism in their 
inextricable links with erasure of internal difference through standardization, perpetuation 
of stereotypes that often end up promoting jingoistic chauvinism, racism, masculinism, 
heterosexism and so forth.  
In this chapter I try to set up the conceptual framework of this dissertation around 
which multiple discussions about kinship, gender, sexuality, race, identity politics and 
rights-based activism are organized. I argue that disassembling the dominant discourses 
that shape the mainstream Indian imagination’s Othering of the Northeast has 
implications for our understandings of Northeast (sub)nationalisms, and that a close 
analysis of the complex relationships between these mainstream and minority forms of 
nationalism will further allow us to retheorize not just the nation, but also our 
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contemporary understandings of postcolonialism, modernity, citizenship and other 
frameworks that structure people’s sense of belonging.  
Framings of the Northeast within the Dominant Discourse 
 
In the aftermath of the Nido Taniam murder, an English-language national 
television channel hosted a debate on its popular show called the ‘Big Fight’ entitled: 
“Are Indians Racist?”10 In the topic of the debate itself is embedded a default notion that 
racism isn’t considered a problem for Indians within India, which now possibly merits an 
inquest. The show was a fascinating one, where myriad reasons were proffered to deflect 
issues away from those of race and ground them instead within rationales of economics, 
development, migration and so forth. What kept surfacing was that guests, who were 
arguing against the idea that Indians are in fact racist, ended up relying on extremely 
racist claims to make their points. For instance, when writer-activist Binalakshmi Nepram 
raised the question of why, when a movie was being made about Manipuri boxing icon 
Mary Kom, her role was given to Priyanka Chopra (a popular North Indian Bollywood 
actor) instead of a ‘Northeast face,’ Shiv Sena spokesperson Rahul Narvekar interjected 
by saying: “Was Priyanka Chopra picked up for the role of Mary Kom because she was 
from Punjab or Mumbai, or because of her talent?” A statement like this not only baldly 
implies that people from the Northeast lack in talent, but also, much like the critiques 
against SC/ST reservations that uncritically front the question of ‘merit’, erases the 
hegemonic notions of beauty upon which Bollywood stardom relies, which makes it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-big-fight/the-big-fight-are-indians-racist/308737?video-
mostpopular 	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virtually impossible for someone ‘chinky,’ as the Northeasterners are often derogatorily 
called, to ‘make it’ in the film industry (i.e. be ‘popular’) or be seen as attractive or 
talented. Further, it implicitly endorses the move to selectively appropriate the success of 
a figure from the Northeast (whose face, read race, must necessarily be shrouded), 
whether for the purposes of fanning jingoistic sentiments of national pride, or for the 
lucrative prospects of filmmaking, even as the realities of erasure and marginalization of 
people from the region are systematically papered, or in this case celluloided, over. 
An analysis of another exchange from this show might be productive and in fact 
touches upon several issues that frame some of the key discussions in this chapter. Senior 
Bharatiya Janata Party leader and Harvard accredited economist Dr. Subramanian Swamy 
makes this statement: “As far as Northeast is concerned, we need to give a special 
attention. I mean you can’t say this is an evolutionary process. We need to give special 
intention, because they are our bulwark in the border, and I might tell you that 
Arunachalese are 65% common DNA with us, so this racial difference is rubbish.” There 
are some indignant exclamations at this point and the NDTV host Vikram Chandra adds 
with a chuckle: “I would have thought it was more than 65%.” Swamy assertively pushes 
forward, “Yes, you please read the DNA studies, and therefore I say to you…” At this 
point Chandra tries to interject, “Can I just ask, at the end of the day though…” but 
Swami interrupts, “Don’t, don’t…I think the people from Arunachal shouldn’t emphasize 
their differences…” Chandra is meanwhile successful in his interjection and says, “It 
should have nothing to do with national security – it should be on very simple 
humanitarian issues that you should not be discriminating against anyone from your 
country or abroad.” When confronted by such a framing of his statement Swamy tries to 
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clarify, “No, no, that is…Please don’t misrepresent me. I am talking about what the 
government ought to do, because today they are complaining about how the police is 
manufacturing the case or how they’re distorting it and how the media is giving false 
reports, all that is happening. I think this should be given special attention, that’s why I 
suggested, before starting the program, that you should monitor this whole investigation 
by court.” 
 
Northeast as Exception 
 
Swamy’s statements highlight some key points. The first of course, is the Indian 
nation-state’s conceptualization, mirroring British colonial attitudes, of the Northeast as 
having a ‘special’ status. Even more fundamentally, it is the only region of the country 
that exists not merely at a discursive level or in the minds of people as a way of loosely 
classifying the diverse national citizenry along spatial lines, in the way that North or 
South India is often invoked. The geopolitical reality of the category Northeast India, 
extending out of various British administrative policies, is easily apprehended; from the 
existence of a Ministry of Development for the North East Region (MoDONER) and the 
North Eastern Council at the Centre, the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, which 
exclusively addresses the hill tribes of the region, to the enactment of the Armed Forces 
(Special Powers) Act, 1958 that applied exclusively to the “Seven Sisters” as the states of 
the Northeast are often uncritically referred to,11 the region has accrued a solidity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The seven federal states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and 
Tripura. In 2002, Sikkim was also administratively appended into this category.  
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particularly from the perspective of mainstream/mainland Indians, that is undeniable 
(Baruah 1999). 
When Subramanian Swamy, a key mouthpiece of this mainstream position, insists 
then on the need to give the region ‘special attention,’ we must ask precisely for what 
reasons is the Northeast marked as special. Swamy’s spontaneous explanation – that 
‘they are our bulwark in the border’ – might upset the liberal sensibility for being too 
utilitarian or brazen, but it strongly echoes the mainstream sentiment, which sees the 
Northeast principally as a frontier land, a buffer zone protecting the ‘sanctity’ of India’s 
borders from its more treacherous and prehensile neighbors. Indeed, 98% of the region’s 
borders are shared with neighboring countries – Bangladesh, China, Bhutan, Myanmar 
and Nepal (McDuie-Ra 2009, Mukhim 2007). The actual realities of life in the region, the 
hardships people face, the erasure of immense diversity along multiple axes, the political 
aspirations of people, their marginalization – these by themselves are not ‘special’ 
enough to merit attention, but are instead easily subsumed by the dominant, jingoistic 
narrative, what has been called “the nationalization of space” (Baruah 2003), that pays 
‘special attention’ to the Northeast only when Indian territorial sovereignty is under 
question. 
This attitude extends back to the time of the colonial Indian government. 
Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, an Austrian anthropologist known particularly for his 
earlier work among the Nagas was commissioned to conduct fieldwork in 1944 in north 
Assam bordering Tibet, which he described then as a “terra incognita, a country closed to 
both traveller and anthropologist.” He writes in his ethnography Himalayan Barbary: 
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On my first day in Shillong, Mills explained how it was that at a time when the Japanese invasion 
of Burma had brought the war to the frontiers of Assam, the Government of India were 
nevertheless embarking on an ambitious programme of exploration in the Eastern Himalayas. The 
sudden realization that India’s eastern borders were vulnerable had convinced Government of the 
need to fill the political and administrative vacuum which had been allowed to persist between 
Assam and Tibet ever since the establishment of British rule. Mills pointed out that my work in 
the eastern part of the Balipara Frontier Tract…was to be part of a larger plan which embraced the 
whole frontier. [1955:xi] 
The British government was initially reluctant to take over what was then called the 
North East Frontier; the discovery of the tea plant, but also coal, petroleum and other 
natural resources were instrumental in ridding them of their initial hesitancy (Dutta Roy 
1996). Alexander Mackenzie (secretary to the Government of India in the Home 
Department and the former Under Secretary and Secretary to the Government of Bengal) 
(1979[1884]), in his ambitious efforts at “putting the wild story of this frontier into 
complete and fitting dress,” (iv) outlines how even after fighting “intestine troubles” on 
behalf of rulers in the principality of Assam and the subsequent war between the British 
and Burmese governments in 1824 (which led to the signing of the treaty of Yandaboo), 
“the Government in Calcutta was strongly averse to taking absolute possession of the 
province,” (5) and it was not until October 1838 that “Assam as a whole became a Non-
Regulation Province of the Indian Empire” (6). The history of shifts in British frontier 
policy in the Northeast is a complex one that merits separate analysis but it is certainly 
the case that the securing of borders in the name of national interests has been a long-
standing preoccupation of the Indian state since colonial rule. 
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Swamy’s subsequent comments, an attempt to clarify his position, even though it 
deals presumably with the micro-logic of the Nido Taniam incident (in suggesting the 
need for the courts to monitor the investigation), replicates this larger dynamic perfectly. 
His warning “I am talking about what the government ought to do, because today they are 
complaining about how the police is manufacturing the case, or how they are distorting it, 
and how the media is giving false reports, all that is happening,” highlights precisely the 
us-them paradigm that lies at the heart of the postcolonial Indian attitude to the Northeast. 
At the level of discourse, the Northeast is claimed as an indisputable component of the 
Indian nation-state, and people from there heralded for being as ‘Indian’ as anyone else 
(or perhaps only 65% Indian, if Swamy’s ‘DNA studies’ are to be believed, i.e. sharing 
less DNA with other Indians than with chimpanzees), but what shows up at the slightest 
perception of potential conflict, and this here is a prime example, are the fault lines in the 
idea of who is ‘truly’ Indian.  
It is at moments like these that they become starkly distinguished from the 
normative, ‘unmarked’ Indian, who never has to demonstrate or prove their Indianness, 
and who can never, structurally speaking, be referred to as ‘they.’ Swamy, when 
challenged on humanitarian grounds, quickly falls back on the systematic practice of 
‘othering’ people from the Northeast. His reference to ‘them’ subtly yokes him, the TV 
show host and the mainstream Indian audience into a shared positionality, those who 
must constantly be vigilant so as to preempt the artful proclivity of people from the 
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Northeast to manipulate situations with the goal of dissenting against and undermining 
the Indian nation-state, as has historically been their wont.12 
Since independence, the Northeast has been cast by the Center as politically 
fragile, again replicating colonial attitudes toward the region. When Swamy insists 
prescriptively that ‘people from Arunachal shouldn’t emphasize their differences,’ he is 
attempting to contribute to what Sanjib Baruah (2002:4182) calls India’s “vacuous 
nation-building strategy,” that insists on unity and national integrity with regard to a 
Northeast that is conceptualized as always already secessionist. ‘They’ subsist 
continually under a pall of suspicion, presented as factious subjects, suspicious, in turn, 
of a supposedly well-intentioned paternal state, and always therefore threatening to reject 
its logic and laws. This has been, over the decades, a key node of engagement with the 
Northeast. Various insurgency movements in the region, several of which were based 
upon a rejection of newborn India’s claims over it, were on the one hand, violently or 
strategically repressed, and on the other, attributed to the region’s isolation and lack of 
development/infrastructure. Consequently, counter-insurgency and its fraternal twin – the 
discourse of ‘development,’ have been the fundamental and ongoing narratives that 
structure the Centre’s policies and attitudes towards the Northeast. Chalking up all 
dissent to people’s unhappiness stemming from economic marginalization and a general 
‘backwardness’ of the region has been a favored strategy for New Delhi, since it 
conveniently skirts more vexatious political factors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Interestingly, the audience of the show itself seemed to be dominated by ‘Northeast faces’ that are not 
being addressed in this utterance and who, despite being Indians living in Delhi, are, in a quick sleight of 
hand, excluded from the ambit of the ‘proper’ Indian national subject. 	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Xonxoi Barbora would nuance this further perhaps by arguing that development is 
better described as a country cousin of counter-insurgency, since the ‘militarist mindset’ 
of the Center tends to overshadow discourses of development. He writes: 
Colonial concerns and postcolonial cartography have created a condition wherein the discourse of 
citizenship has all but disappeared from the language of development and rights. Instead, one sees 
the extension of a garrison mentality, where the north-east is sought to be micromanaged by 
policy-makers for whom the people and the region is a veritable military terrain…The garrison 
mentality that drives such policy initiatives is so strong, that even visiting politicians completely 
forget their civilian constituency and speak like army generals giving their soldiers a pep-talk in 
the barracks. [2006:3811] 
It is precisely this modality that Swamy slips into when he talks about what ‘the 
government ought to do,’ in order to preempt potentially thorny situations of political 
dissent that are associated with the Northeast. The “garrison mentality” (3811) that 
Barbora identifies and outlines is a useful one and merits elaboration. It references the 
way that military, and more broadly security personnel (from the mainland) experience 
and navigate their tenures in the Northeast. Getting assigned to Kashmir or the Northeast 
is often referred to as a ‘hardship’ posting in military parlance, and the way in which 
most officials from the mainland endure this period is by creating a veritable bubble of 
‘Indianness’ and minimizing interaction with people from the towns, except to talk about 
“how they get everything they need in their camps – cooking gas, food, movies – 
everything that allows them to feel less homesick during their stints in the north-east.” 
“Sequestered in their camps,” Barbora observes, “they spend years without ever learning 
the language or the customs of the local people. Yet they believe that they have recreated 
a mini-India within their garrisons” (3811). The tendency to recreate a ‘mini-India’ 
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within the Northeast is not the sole prerogative of military folk, who isolate themselves 
from the socio-political realities of the areas they are delegated to and supposedly 
responsible for. This “garrison mentality” is perceived to have seeped into non-military 
people too.  
From my Khasi interlocutors, I often encountered expressions of bitterness and 
resentment toward non-Khasis of variegated backgrounds – bureaucrats, teachers, 
businessmen and so forth – who, despite having lived possibly for two, maybe three 
generations in Shillong, have neither learned Khasi nor made any attempt to integrate 
with the local people or customs. My facility with Khasi, as limited as it is, was received 
with surprise and pleasure for most of my Khasi interlocuters, and my adoption of local 
age-appropriate fashions and hairstyles was often a source of mirth and banter. On my 
part, whenever I was asked, phi dei Khasi? (Are you Khasi?), by someone I was meeting 
for the first time, I would be particularly pleased, since it seemed important to me to mark 
my difference from the other ‘outsiders’ who, for various reasons, have a negative image. 
This theme will be elaborated in subsequent sections. 
 
Backwardness 
 
To return to Swamy’s comments in the debate – spliced between two iterations of 
the need to give the Northeast special attention/intention is a curious clause that he does 
not quite string into a full sentence: “…we need to give a special attention. I mean you 
can’t say this is an evolutionary process. We need to give special intention, because…” 
The chasm long identified by linguists, between the signifier and the signified, renders it 
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impossible of course to claim unmediated knowledge of Swamy’s ‘true’ intentions, and 
this utterance is a particularly cryptic one, given how it is made – absent context or 
clarification. However, in invoking evolution, Swamy references a key theme that has 
arguably overwhelmed the discourse around the Northeast as being different or ‘special.’ 
The ‘backwardness’ of the region (mentioned above) is not merely a function of the fact 
that it is relatively isolated from the rest of the country. Indeed, the Northeast is 
connected to mainland India by a narrow swath of land extending out east from northern 
West Bengal, which, along with its predominantly mountainous topography, has 
restricted its trade and connectivity. Mainstream narratives have tended to blame what is 
called the ‘chicken’s neck’ problem of the Northeast, seen as the cause of its isolation and 
impoverishment but as McDuie-Ra argues, “…this explanation, while containing some 
merit, overlooks the ways the communities in the region are connected across 
international borders and have generally oriented themselves away from the corridor that 
connects the region to the rest of India, and towards communities across international 
borders…” (2009a:314). However, colonial and postcolonial adjudications from afar, 
particularly the two partitions of Bengal leading up to the creation of Bangladesh, have 
reworked regional cartographies in ways that have restricted or sundered many of the 
important historic trade routes and complex socio-political alliances between 
communities, exacerbating problems of isolation and deprivation for people in the 
Northeast (Gassah 1994, van Schendel 2005). 
Mainstream accounts of regional backwardness that highlight geo-economic or 
geo-political reasons in fact barely conceal the more stark and longstanding perception 
that the people who inhabit the region are inherently primitive. These notions can of 
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course be traced back to colonial modes of administration, which mandated the 
production of an elaborate body of ‘knowledge’ about the ‘natives’; as Nicholas Dirks 
points out, the brute force of a superior army, wealth and political adroitness are not the 
sole explanations for the triumph of colonial conquest; equally central to its ascendancy 
is the deployment of “cultural technologies of rule,” which made the frenetic 
accumulation of socio-cultural knowledge about the colonized rather imperative (2001:9). 
Bernard Cohn (1968) elaborates on three unique traditions from which knowledge of 
Indian society emerges – the orientalist scholar, the missionary worker and the 
administrative official. The production of scholarly ‘knowledge’ – linguistic, historical, 
anthropological and so forth, relied however, on existing stereotypes about the Orient and 
further spawned Orientalist discourses that have been instrumental in shaping ideas about 
both India and the Northeast. 
Colonial knowledge production drew on Victorian intellectual sensibilities that 
were bound up with widely held notions of Western superiority and civilization. These 
set the tone for research conducted by early armchair anthropologists who, fascinated by 
ideas of the origins of mankind and human sociality, devised fairly elaborate theories of 
social evolution. These theories (since discredited) posited a quantifiable and unilineal 
hierarchical spectrum of human cultural development, based upon which the West could 
peek at its own past through the window provided by scholars studying remote 
‘communities’ and ‘tribes,’ which could be placed accordingly on various levels of what 
Aihwa Ong calls “an escalator rising toward the West,” with the final destination being 
the ‘civilization’ of western Europe (1999:31). 
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In his now canonical Time and the Other: How Anthropology makes its Object, 
Fabian, after demonstrating how social evolutionists mangled and misappropriated 
Darwin’s conception of naturalized time, argues that what they did do in positive terms 
was to go on to map time across space. In his words, “the temporal discourse of 
anthropology as it was formed decisively under the paradigm of evolutionism rested on a 
conception of Time that was not only secularized and naturalized but also thoroughly 
spatialized. Ever since…anthropology’s efforts to construct relations with its Other by 
means of temporal devices implied affirmations of difference as distance” (1983:16). It is 
within this paradigm then that he situates the ‘primitive,’ not so much as the object of 
anthropological inquiry as instead a mode of thinking adopted by the West, which 
thereafter deploys various strategies of distancing in order to produce what he famously 
calls a “denial of coevalness.” Thus, moving away from the nation-state’s heartland 
toward its Northeast peripheries, you travel even father back in time, so to speak, and the 
‘primitives’ you encounter there are ‘different’ in even more exaggerated ways. 
The primitive-civilized spectrum that blossoms in tandem with this more 
philosophical, schizogenic deployment of Time frames colonial accounts, which have, 
therefore, cast the Northeast more broadly, and in particular the hill-tribal communities, 
as savage, warlike, headhunting hordes, warranting tactics like sequestering, pacification, 
repression and reorganization into British civilization and subjecthood.13 Thus, around 
the middle of the 19th century Peter Robb argues: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The Khasi Chiefs were seen as particularly violent in their resistance to colonizing forces, with figures 
like U Tirot Sing celebrated even today as Khasi freedom fighters. While this might seem like a 
paradoxical stereotype for a matrilineal community, Khasi matriliny is in fact (in the accounts of many 
people) traced to this warring past, where men who were busy fighting battles made women the repositories 
for the preservation of clans and property.   
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The prevailing border strategy was one of holding an ‘inner line’ while allowing a further region 
to be claimed but not closely administered, except when some danger to the settled area was 
anticipated. The inner line was drawn so as to separate ‘tribal’ areas from Assam proper, and the 
crossing of it was regulated by penal sanctions and a system of passes. [1997:258] 
Robb demonstrates how subsequently the British attitudes and policies begin 
transitioning from “broad to narrow frontiers,” where the “state would seek a monopoly 
of force, applied through its own structures, and also affect the well-being of ‘its’ 
people,” which is certainly the mode of administration that the postcolonial Indian state 
has inherited and embraced. However, traces of the broad frontier ‘mentality’, in its 
imbrications with ideas of tribal backwardness and intractability, continue to linger 
arguably, both in the nation-state’s governance strategies as well as in popular and 
mainstream attitudes towards the region. While educated and cosmopolitan persons are 
unlikely to appear on television today claiming that people from the Northeast are 
inferior in any inherent way, when Swamy insists on the need for ‘special attention’ to 
the Northeast, he is responding to this very wide-spread, perhaps even sub-conscious idea 
that simply with the passing of time and concomitant processes of evolution, people from 
the region will be lifted out of their own cultural backwardness. In Kuper’s words, older 
stereotypes of primitive communities “have persisted until very recently, indeed, still 
survive, if no longer within mainstream anthropology” (1988:1). This argument is 
poignantly attested to by Ellen Bal’s subject Rosie, a Garo student of anthropology at 
Dhaka University: 
They [Bengalis] ask if we eat frogs or snakes. That is alright. But they ask more stupid questions 
about our dress. They can see that we wear the same clothes that they do, but they still ask us if 
Garo women cover the upper part of their body, and if they wear very short clothes…Their 
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questions are so strange…I don’t mind if they want to know more about us, but they ask it in such 
a way that we don’t seem to be human beings. They want to insult us by asking stupid questions. 
That’s what I don’t like. [Bal 200021-22] 
As Fabian argues, even though many of the ‘justifications’ of Western (or Indian) 
superiority have evaporated what is left behind is in fact evolutionism’s conception of 
Time, “the all-pervading denial of coevalness which ultimately is expressive of a 
cosmological myth of frightening magnitude and persistency” (1983:35). The 
conceptualization of the savage and his location in the past is a foundational offshoot of 
Western knowledge-making about the Orient and continues to linger in the popular 
imagination even today. Referencing the “iron grip of colonial ideas about castes and 
tribes” Baruah writes, “many nineteenth and early twentieth century British scholar-
administrators would have been astounded, and embarrassed by the appeal made more 
than a century later, to their often tentative ideas” (2005:xvi). 
Further, scholars have broadly acknowledged that the impact of disciplines like 
anthropology and history has been profound for colonized societies not solely in the 
voluminous fact-gathering and ‘interpretation’ it generated but also in terms of shaping 
the very modes of colonized ‘self’ understanding (Ferguson 1999). The Constitutionally 
provided reservations for SC/ST groups closely following India’s stumble into 
independence has added a fresh qualitative thrust to the more anthropologically weighted 
categories of caste and tribe. Susie Tharu et al. in their insightful re-appraisal of the 
history of reservations in India hint at this when they argue that the role of reservations 
has unfortunately been limited to a mere tool for governance and at best a mechanism for 
social and political ‘representation’ and in the process has lost sight of its goal of 
accomplishing social justice. This aspect of representation within a dominant nation-state 
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has been important to the identity and politics of SC/ST groups in the postcolonial era, 
and rightly so; indeed Tharu et al. powerfully demonstrate that rather than being an act of 
charity bestowed by (the dominant but in fact the numerical minority) caste-Hindus on 
the so-called minority communities to facilitate their ‘development,’ reservations were in 
fact a “foundational necessity” enabling the Republic to even come into being by creating 
the ‘illusion’ of a national majority (2007:41). 
 
Racial Othering 
 
In a debate about racism it is of course inevitable that race comes up for 
discussion. There are however, several vectors upon which understandings of race and 
racial politics move and Swamy’s remarks in the debate highlight some of the tensions 
that arise from the interface between these idioms. When he invokes “DNA studies” that 
supposedly ‘prove’ that Arunachalese share 65% of their DNA with “us,” there are a few 
different ideas that get mobilized. The first of course, is the concept that race is a valid 
category of understanding biological differences between human beings. Building on 
Orientalist theories of essential differences between white Europeans and visually distinct 
Others, modern racial theories have drawn heavily upon ‘scientific’ discourses 
(anthropometry, craniometry, eugenics etc.) in order to evolve detailed and hierarchical 
taxonomies of the human species, which were then used to justify colonial projects, 
impose slavery and perpetrate genocide against non-white populations around the world. 
The scientific basis of racial theories has since been seriously undermined, with the 
second half of the 20th century particularly seeing an explosion of scholarship 
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dearticulating race from any biological reality and identifying it instead as a contrived 
ideology or mechanism that distorts our understanding of human social existence and 
perpetuates inequalities. In 1998 the American Anthropological Association itself 
released a Statement on “Race” which attempted thus to represent the ‘contemporary 
thinking and scholarly positions of a majority of anthropologists’: 
In the United States both scholars and the general public have been conditioned to viewing human 
races as natural and separate divisions within the human species based on visible physical 
differences. With the vast expansion of scientific knowledge in this century, however, it has 
become clear that human populations are not unambiguous, clearly demarcated, biologically 
distinct groups. Evidence from the analysis of genetics (e.g., DNA) indicates that most physical 
variation, about 94%, lies within so-called racial groups. Conventional geographic "racial" 
groupings differ from one another only in about 6% of their genes. This means that there is greater 
variation within "racial" groups than between them…	   Racial beliefs constitute myths about the 
diversity in the human species and about the abilities and behavior of people homogenized into 
"racial" categories. The myths fused behavior and physical features together in the public mind, 
impeding our comprehension of both biological variations and cultural behavior, implying that 
both are genetically determined. Racial myths bear no relationship to the reality of human 
capabilities or behavior. Scientists today find that reliance on such folk beliefs about human 
differences in research has led to countless errors.14 
While scientific and intellectual communities have extensively rejected the facticity of 
biological explanations of race, this association has been both pernicious and persistent 
within the popular imagination. While many would likely reject discrimination or hatred 
towards people based on their racial difference, what lingers is the idea that race is still a 
valid scientific category that can provide knowledge of human capacities, impulses, 
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behaviors and so forth. Just as theories of social evolution outlined above continue to 
frame our mental landscapes, and indeed the most ubiquitous understanding of modernity 
as a “coming to see” or a “shucking off of beliefs and ways” of ‘premodern’ people 
(Taylor 1995:31), long after the theories themselves have been dismissed as speculative 
and lacking merit, ideas about the ‘reality’ of race have also remain embedded in our 
minds and further gain legitimacy by their putative associations with science. This is the 
second idea that Swamy is mobilizing in his remarks – not only that race is a valid social 
category, but also that there are “DNA studies” or “scientific data” out there to attest to 
its credibility. 
This brings us to a third and closely allied move, which is the offering up of 
dubious ‘scientific research’ (of which there are volumes) to support one’s beliefs and 
formulations. When Swamy asserts confidently that Arunachalese share 65% DNA with 
“us”, there is a palpable reaction against his astonishing claim from the audience, and the 
host is forced to intervene mildly with “I would have thought it was more than 65%.” In 
my fieldwork too I encountered this summoning of scientific ‘proof’ to make claims 
about both the distinctiveness and the dilution of the ‘Khasi race.’ This is not to suggest 
of course that everyone who invokes such studies is a double-dealing charlatan; it should 
be clear by now that ‘scientific racism’ has in the past and still continues to make a deep 
impression on the minds of people. What surfaces then is the circularity between 
inherited racial ideas and prejudices, interactions with race-centered ‘knowledge’ 
production (particularly in their pseudo-scientific avatars) and renewed and reworked 
popular understandings of racial identities and differences. 
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If the audience displayed exasperation at Swamy’s comments however, it was not 
solely a reaction to his preposterous understanding of genetic science. Even as Swamy 
posits the existence of a 65% shared gene pool in order to highlight similarities between 
“them” and “us,” and thus insists that people from Arunachal shouldn’t emphasize the 
question of racial difference, there is a tacit understanding that this is merely a strategic 
and shrewd invocation of race. Therefore, if in the future, a more credible scientific study 
was to ‘prove’ that Arunachalese only share 5% common DNA with mainland Indians, it 
is fairly unlikely that Swamy would then recognize an ‘essential’ difference upon which 
secessionist claims, for instance, could be justified. The selective citation of race based 
solely on political calculations has a long history and is perhaps a fourth trajectory 
emerging from Swami’s remarks. 
As noted above, in the context of a postcolonial Indian reluctance to perceive 
racism within its own boundaries, minorities are forced to detail and highlight the 
specifically racial dimensions of the discrimination they experience. Northeasterners 
often talk about how their ‘racial’ features immediately mark them as distinct from the 
mainland population and make it impossible for them to be sutured seamlessly into an 
imagination of the Indian citizen-subject. In a compelling analysis of colonial discourses 
and visual depictions of Naga ‘others’ in postcolonial India (based partly on her 
experiences of living in Delhi for seven years), anthropologist Dolly Kikon writes, 
For instance, the term chinky, a derogatory word used in India to refer to people with the 
epicanthic fold of the eyes, does not identify one’s nationality or ethnicity, although it is generally 
used to refer to people who could be from a wide swathe of land that roughly cuts across the 
eastern Himalayas, where the Naga territories are situated. Racial stereotyping is so ingrained into 
the public memory that sexual harassment on the streets of New Delhi, the capital of India, goes 
	  	   71 
something like this: ‘Hello chinky baby, honey…smooch smooch [makes kissing sound]…hot 
baby, honey, pinky, chinky, ping-pong, ching-chong.’ Besides disgusting sounds and derogatory 
remarks, the perpetrator tries to rhyme it with nonsensical words like ping-pong and ching-chong. 
Crowds of awkward teenagers seeking out some fun in the streets often shout, ‘hey chinky’ every 
time they see people with east Asian features. Such ‘innocent fun’ that Hindi/Punjabi speaking 
teenagers in New Delhi engage in reflects a normalization of a visual regime where people like 
Nagas do not have a secure place within the nation-state. [2009:92-93] 
Mainlanders often counter the critique of racism towards people from the Northeast with 
hostility; they are quick to try and erase the exceptionality of the Northeast in this 
instance, and flourish examples like the harassment of Biharis in Bombay, or the north 
Indian banter against “madraasis” and so forth. In a country as ‘diverse’ as India each 
community is the subject of many stereotypes and jokes, so why do people from the 
Northeast insist on reading this ‘innocent fun’ as racism? Mc-Duie-Ra’s informant Chen, 
an Arunachali student explains: 
People say “Bong” to mean Bengalis. But the Bengalis also use it themselves. And no one runs 
across the street just to say it and then start laughing. Even if someone wanted to say it to their 
face, they can’t tell if someone is a Bengali by looking. With us you can. So as soon as someone 
sees us, they say “chinky.” And at least “Bong” refers to the right people. They call us “chinky” 
because they think we are Chinese. [2012:91] 
The recognition of the centrality of the visual register when it comes to an understanding 
of the organization of racial discrimination is as fraught as it is inescapable. Critiques of 
racism are careful to usher the concept of race away from biology-oriented framings in 
order to emphasize its historic and socio-political dimensions. However, since racial 
discrimination is most often based upon readily apparent physical features, this act of 
separation is always a tricky one, and it is precisely this dilemma that Swamy tries to 
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convert to his advantage. This then highlights a fifth and final projectile, which is the 
tension between biological and socio-historical dimensions of race. One of the 
foundational insights of critical race theory and whiteness studies has been that even 
though the scientific validity of race as a mode of classifying people’s biological 
differences has been sufficiently undermined, this should not catapult us into 
‘colorblindness,’ or the idea that since the reality of race or racial differences between 
human social groups has been corroded, we ought to stop acknowledging it completely. 
In fact, to do so would be racist. For centuries, racial ideologies, stereotypes and 
hierarchies have been driving human interactions and shaping structural inequalities and 
their effects continue to be felt across the world. Put differently, while race doesn’t exist 
anymore, racism remains entrenched, continuing to impact the lives of millions of people 
around the world, and thus needs to be both acknowledged and accounted for. 
The critique of racism against people from the Northeast follows precisely this 
logic – Northeasterners are pointing out that even though biological or genetic differences 
between them and people from the mainland are negligible, barring surface differences 
like the ‘epicanthic fold of the eyes,’ that they are nevertheless marked as foreigners – 
teased, humiliated, aggressed against, and sometimes killed. The simplicity of this 
formulation doesn’t make it any easier for those invested in the project of postcolonial 
Indian nationalism to swallow. In order to muddy this critique of racism a strange tactic is 
deployed, where race is wrested from its social and discriminatory context, and precisely 
because it is forced into an insistence that visual (thus physiological) cues prompt racism 
(as opposed to economic issues, or changing demographics caused by migration), it gets 
relocated within the biological. Once back in that realm, mainlanders can argue that 
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biological differences in fact don’t exist, or in this case that the “DNA studies” show that 
they’re not significant enough. In this way, by strategically sliding between the two 
registers (the social and the biological), there is an attempt to neutralize the critique of 
racism, and further to cast people from the Northeast as different than “us” precisely 
because they are insisting on racial differences (which has cleverly been recalibrated). 
Not only do people from the Northeast have to endure racist discrimination and 
consequently an unstable position within the nation-state as Kikon argues above, but if 
they try to articulate their predicament they run the risk of being castigated for 
unnecessarily ‘emphasizing their differences,’ for being disloyal, anti-assimilationists and 
so forth, thus implicitly justifying all over again, the us-them paradigm highlighted 
above. 
In this section I have undertaken a protracted decomposition of a few fairly 
prosaic remarks made by a jingoistic mainstream politician because I believe they contain 
within them some crucial nodes of understanding and engagement that colonial and 
postcolonial India has developed with respect to the Northeast. Aired on national 
television, these comments are designed to resonate implicitly with the mainstream/land, 
middle-class audience, India’s “civil society” to use Partha Chatterjee’s (2003) 
formulation, who end up picking up on what Stuart Hall calls the “professional code,” 
which functions “within the ‘hegemony’ of the dominant code,” but does so in a more 
subtle manner (2003:101). The professional code he adds “serve(s) to reproduce 
hegemonic definitions, specifically by not overtly biasing their operations in a dominant 
direction: ideological reproduction therefore takes place here inadvertently, 
unconsciously, ‘behind men’s backs’” (102). Rendering these ideological assumptions 
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legible demands the labor of diagnosing and deciphering the multiple and intersecting 
significations that coalesce to confer a status of exceptionality to the Northeast from 
within the popular Indian imagination. Further, as we will see many Northeasterners have 
internalized this conferral of exceptionality or the inherent difference that has been 
imposed upon them. 
Northeast Identity as Tribal Difference 	  	  
The post-independence period has witnessed demands from several groups in the 
Northeast for India’s recognition of their sovereignty. The predominantly tribal region 
has been the site of serious contestation to the smooth formation of the Indian state, with 
the rapid proliferation of political mobilizations for separate state-hood surfacing at the 
time of independence. Stifling and pacifying these movements (and also dealing with 
internal tribal militias) becomes a unique problem of key importance to the Indian nation-
state for strategic defense reasons (Chaube 1973, Dutta 2003). This consciousness gets 
heightened after the Indo-China war of 1962 and consequently we find the Northeast 
emerging as a special category (Misra 2000). In 1966, as a reaction to Operation Jericho 
(an armed protest by the Mizo National Army (MNA) against Indian callousness and 
negligence following a calamitous famine in Mizoram), Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
ordered the Indian Air Force to crush the rebellion and, between March 5th and 13th 
Aizawl and other cities bore the brunt of aerial gunfire and bombing. For the first and 
only time (to date), India launched an Air Force attack on its own citizens; this dark slice 
of Indian history has of course been silenced, and most mainlanders continue to be 
ignorant about it. The MNA was consequently wiped out but insurgency endured up until 
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the signing of the Mizoram Peace Accord in 1986. Similarly, the movement for Naga 
nationhood has been going on for more than half a century now and militant groups like 
ULFA in Assam, and others in Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura too have 
been, at various points, seeking autonomy from Indian rule (Mukhim 2007). Many of 
them articulate irreconcilable racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic differences from mainland 
Indians as well as a fundamental antipathy toward them. As Papori Bora demonstrates, 
these claims to a fundamental difference have their roots in colonial discourses: 
In other words, ethno-national identity categories are a product of colonial knowledge production, 
and this knowledge production is a form of power, which is productive, in the sense that they 
produce the subject|here in the Northeast as tribes, hill people, plains people and ethno-linguistic 
communities. This is important to examine because colonial discourses survive in the postcolonial 
period through the discourses of nationalism and modernization. In other words, the terms of the 
debate are set by colonial discourse in terms of what it means to be a Northeastern subject, and 
what counts as Northeastern history, politics and society. [2011:27] 
During my research in Shillong I came across various expressions and articulations of a 
unique Northeast identity – from large Star cement billboards that celebrated Northeast 
cultural icons like Bhupen Hazarika (from Assam), Lou Majaw (Meghalaya), Mami 
Varte (Mizoram) and Sourobhee Debbarma (Tripura), to the mass excitement and frenzy 
that gripped the Northeast when Amit Paul, a Shillong contender, made it to the final 
round of television show Indian Idol, and when the Shillong Chamber Choir won India’s 
Got Talent in 2010, which was followed by fireworks and impassioned impromptu 
celebrations in PB (short for Police Bazaar, as Khyndailad is popularly known) in the 
middle of the night attended by both young and old. The multiple differences between 
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people in the Northeast, what Mrinal Miri calls the ‘insider’s view’ of the Northeast, 
often get bracketed when it comes up against mainland India (2007:3). 
But within the Northeast there is a definite marker of distinction between people 
from the plains, most notably the Hinduized Assamese elites (but also the Bangladeshi 
Hindus who crossed into India post-partition as well as the Manipuri Meities) and those 
from the hills – tribal communities following indigenous religions or Christianity, who 
have historically been further removed from the project of Indian nationalism. T.B. 
Subba argues that, “development of education, economy, and infrastructure provided the 
once feud-stricken rival clans and tribes with an opportunity to unite and fight against 
outsiders whose claims as harbingers of civilization were no longer acknowledged” 
(1996:45). The splintering of colonial Assam following the Hill-State movement led by 
the All Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC), has hinged on a similar articulation of 
differences between what Mackenzie had (a century ago) described as “the Assam 
sovereigns and their savage neighbors” (Mackenzie 1884). The post-independence 
leadership in Assam while espousing a clear vision of Greater Assam was unable to 
maintain equitable economic development in the region and began to be seen as 
indifferent towards its hill tribes. Particularly in 1962 when Assamese was selected as the 
official language, the consciousness of continued and deep-seated exclusion among the 
leaders of the hill tribes became heightened. In an odd repetition of history, the hill-tribal 
communities forcefully rejected centralized Assamese power and cultural hegemony just 
as the Assamese had once rejected Bengali domination. Picking up on this paradox Nari 
Rustomji writes, “It was Assamese chauvinism, ironically enough, that diminished 
Assam and lost her tribal population. It is anomalous that the Assamese failed to 
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anticipate the reactions of the tribal people to the imposition of Assamese when they 
themselves were so sensitive over the issue of language” (1983:36). 
However, according to P.R. Kyndiah, “one of the frontline leaders of the 
movement,” (15) the APHLC envisioned their struggle as one “waged not against any 
community but mainly directed against the policies and programmes of the Government 
of Assam which tantamounted to the assimilation of the identity, culture and language of 
the hill tribe people” (2010:17). He recounts a key meeting that was held in Shillong in 
June 1954, where Captain W.A Sangma (President of APHLC) first formulated the idea 
of separate statehood for the hill areas. Kyndiah asserts “it was in this meeting where he 
[Sangma] advocated that hill tribal people have no other way than to go all out for a 
separate state to enable them ‘to preserve their racial identity, language and culture’” 
(18).15 The administrative separation of the hill tribes from the Assamese plains dates 
back to colonial government policies (Ludden 2003), but it is perhaps only after 
independence that the formerly ‘savage’ tribes begin to articulate a politics based upon an 
understanding of their own fundamental difference from the plains people. Even as 
differences abound between these hill-tribes there is a sense of camaraderie between them 
and a recognition of shared histories and marginalizations.  
Kyndiah writes about another interesting meeting between APHLC leader Rev. 
J.J.M Nichols Roy and Naga leader A.Z. Phizo after the death of Assam’s distinguished 
leader Gopinath Bordoloi, where the future of the Nagas and the hill tribal people were 
discussed alike. While Phizo was committed to a vision of independent Naga nationhood 
to be secured by any mean, Nichols Roy was a preacher of Gandhian sensibilities, thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Here	  Kyndiah	  is	  citing	  Sangma’s	  reasoning	  for	  a	  separate	  state.	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opposed to violence of any sort, who sought separate statehood for the hill-tribes, but 
ultimately envisioned them to be a part of India. The conversation ends, according to 
Kyndiah, with Phizo making the following remarks: “as hill brothers we are bound to 
each other but I recognized we have differences…let us sail in two boats, if your boat 
leaks or sinks we will come to your help, if our boat leaks and sinks, as hill brothers, you 
come and help us” (2010:23). 
This conceptualization of a deep bond of fraternity among communities in the 
Northeast particularly along two axes – hill residence and tribal status – is a powerful and 
evocative one producing, according to Baruah “what James C. Scott calls the ‘lived 
essentialism’ between the hill ‘tribes’ and the valley civilizations, that is their stereotypes 
about each other, [which] remained a powerful organizer of people’s lives and thoughts” 
(2005:8). The consciousness of a shared experience of marginalization along axes of 
religion, ‘race,’ ethnicity, cultural mores, food habits, and so forth unite people from the 
hill-tribes against people from the plains. As Mukhim explains, there are few things that 
“tribes view with greater concern than the possibility of being turned into a minority in 
their own homeland…A minority like the Khasis feel more weakened by the entry of 
people from outside because non-tribals have traditionally controlled the economic forces 
in their land” (1996:30). Subba also highlights the seriousness of the fears experienced by 
tribes and notes, “The case of Tripura has clearly shown what a devastation can be caused 
by demographic topsy turvy: the indigenous tribes there have now been reduced to one 
third of the total population. Similar threats are perceived by the tribes of Assam and 
Meghalaya, if not other states too” (1996:45). 
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The fear of the erosion of tribal communities is arguably a result of a long history 
of what Baruah calls the “protective discrimination regime” that goes back to “colonial 
times when policy instruments were devised to protect vulnerable aboriginal peoples 
living in isolated enclaves – once described as ‘backward tracts” (2005:184). British 
colonial policies (culminating in the Government of India Act 1935) marked this region 
as a separate zone outside the jurisdiction of the laws that were applied to the rest of the 
country. Within this protected enclave, tribal groups were allowed to continue practicing 
their customary laws, kinship systems and clan-based rules for land, property, inheritance 
and so on. National leaders replicated this dynamic with the drawing up of the Sixth 
Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which delineates special provisions for the 
administration of ‘the Tribal Areas in Assam.’ Another continuing colonial institution 
was that of the Inner Line, which even now restricts outsiders from entering certain states 
in the Northeast without a permit. Over the first few decades after independence the 
Indian government, building upon the institutions created by the Sixth Schedule, 
bolstered the idea of exclusive homelands for tribal groups. The “isolated enclaves” 
subsequently “became full-fledged states, and the protected minorities turned into 
majority groups in these states” (Baruah 2005:184). Now both land ownership and 
legislative seats are overwhelmingly reserved for Scheduled Tribes within their own state 
(Barbora 2002, Biswas and Suklabaidya 2008). 
Reservations for the newly politicized Scheduled Tribe is not the only significant 
change set into motion with the creation of the postcolonial state; what we also find 
interestingly is a splintering of the very category tribe – while tribal populations of 
mainland India fall under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, the 
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Northeast tribes are specially catered to by the Sixth Schedule discussed above. In her 
analysis of Edward Gait’s A History of Assam, Papori Bora develops an interesting 
argument about the role of philology in the colonial association that gets made between 
tribes and nations, where she claims: 
This discursive formulation of Gait has consequences for the self-identification of various 
communities in the Northeast where the trope of continuous external aggression and imposition of 
an alien language has led to politicization of language and the inability to imagine a political 
community beyond a nation-state…I would argue that the description of the tribes as nations has 
led to a desire for the always-deferred nation in Northeastern politics. [2011:68] 
This intimate association between the tribes and land contributes to the continuation of 
figurations of nationalism that are inextricably connected to tribal/ethnic identities 
resonates well with Baruah’s (2005) critique of ethnic homelands. Baruah provides a 
thought-provoking analysis of the problems inherent within the Indian nation-state’s 
“hurried exercise in [the] political engineering” of the region (2005:4). Drawing on, but 
significantly reworking the position taken by nationalist writer Ghurye, he argues that 
“the practice of extending institutions intended to promote tribal self-governance and 
autonomy to particular scheduled tribes in specific territories – legitimizing the idea of 
ethnic homelands – has meant a de facto regime of two-tiered citizenship” (2005:10). 
This has caused intense conflict between what Baruah calls the ‘citizens’ and the 
‘denizens’ of the Northeast, the latter having made (across generations now) significant 
contributions to the social and economic development of the region, but who nevertheless 
continue to be cast as outsiders with no political agency. The mobilizations among 
descendants of tea plantation workers in Assam, many of whom belonged to the mainland 
‘savage tribes’ (Ghosh 1999), to be included as Scheduled Tribes from Assam highlights 
	  	   81 
the different trajectory that the Northeast tribes (as opposed to mainland Indian 
‘adivasis’) have been set upon since colonial times, a trajectory that gets escalated by the 
Indian nation-state, becoming in Baruah’s opinion an integral component of what he calls 
the ‘durable disorder’ of the Northeast. 
The Future of the Jaitbynriew 
 
A striking example of the tension between tribal and non-tribal communities lies 
in the Khasi word – dkhar, which literally translates to outsider. As an anthropologist 
especially I was acutely conscious of my status as an outsider, having grappled deeply 
with the ethics and politics of a US-based anthropologist seeking to conduct research 
with a ‘tribe,’ despite neither being Khasi, nor ‘tribal.’ So early on when a couple of 
Khasi friends commented jokingly on my dkhar status, even though I recognized the 
implications, I accepted it willingly (being a true outsider with no experience of living 
there and consequently no personal stakes) and even embraced it, often cracking jokes 
about my being a dkhar that amused many Khasis I interacted with and found me favor 
with them. It was only when I tried some such joke with one of my local Punjabi 
informants and witnessed his angry red-face and indignant response that I realized clearly 
how dkhar is an extremely political category that many would argue is a racist slur. 
Resistance, often violent, to the influx of non-Khasis (felt most strongly in Shillong) has 
had a formidable history in Meghalaya, and non-Khasis have had to endure not only the 
violence, but also the feeling of being what this informant called “second-class citizens 
[who] have to keep their heads down and stay out of trouble,” despite having lived there 
for generations. Renewed demands for the imposition of the Inner Line Permit, which 
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restricts entry of ‘outsiders’ into the state, has been the catalyst of fresh violence in the 
city with some non-tribals being burned to death.  In a bold opinion piece published 
recently in a national newspaper, the editor of The Shillong Times (A widely circulated 
English daily in Meghalaya) Patricia Mukhim outlines the history of atrocities against 
‘outsiders’ in the state, their experience of heightened vulnerability and the continued 
apathy among Khasis. She writes provocatively, given the larger context of 
mainstream/land marginalization of the Northeast: 
Non-tribals have lost the right to speak up and dissent. They live like third class citizens. Those 
who survive to do business do so by paying protection money to these different pressure groups. 
Non-tribals are debarred form buying land in tribal areas after the Land Transfer Act was passed in 
1978. Those with self-respect have left Shillong and other parts of Meghalaya to settle elsewhere. 
Others continue to live here but with almost no rights. At least in Delhi, north-easterners have the 
freedom to protest the government’s acts. Nido Tania’s killers are in jail. What about the many 
deaths of non-tribals in Meghalaya since 1979? Will the family members of the deceased ever get 
justice? 16 
While anti-dkhar rhetoric most often focused on the vulnerability of the Khasis, Jaintias 
and Garos in Meghalaya (particularly in an urban commercial hub like Shillong that has 
attracted many groups of outsiders), I had an intuition, which was subsequently 
confirmed by my Khasi friends – that dkhar was not simply any outsider, but one coming 
specifically from the plains. Therefore, a Naga or a Mizo, even though they are non-
Khasis would never be referred to as dkhar, and they would also relate similarly to a 
dkhar, for whom they would have a parallel word in their language. For instance, in an 
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interesting and humorous blog post17 Kima, who goes by the online name Mizohican, 
writes: 
In Mizoram, we call mainland Indians (people having Indo-Aryan and Dravidian looks and 
physical features) as “Vai”. The word “Vai” originated from the Hindi word “Bhai” which means 
“brother”, and it is used to describe a non-Mizo, an outsider…	  if you’re a non-Mizo and you walk 
on the streets of Mizoram today, you may still encounter an unfortunate incident of a few 
miscreants (usually inebriated ones) menacingly passing comments at you like, “Vai chhia” 
(disgusting outsider), etc., at you…	  This, of course, happens extremely rarely today… But I’m just 
giving you a heads-up in case you do visit Mizoram in the future. 
In Shillong I frequently encountered a similar idea that the dkhar is dirty and disgusting. 
It is true that most Khasis I knew were very fastidious and every morning I woke to the 
sound of a broom making aggressive contact with my neighbor’s front porch and the 
splashing of what felt like endless buckets of water against their car. I once noticed aloud 
how washing clothes was also a favorite Khasi pastime, and a Khasi friend added 
sardonically, “we have to wash clothes every day, we even wash brand new clothes if we 
buy them from a dkhar shop, but after they’re clean we don’t mind putting them to dry 
out on the grass right by a busy highway.” Khasi cleanliness was always however, 
implicitly juxtaposed with dkhar proclivity for dirt and filth; I often felt like I was being 
observed in turn, so as to ascertain my personal relationship with the stereotype. Hill 
stations, as the British designated them, have been renowned for their pristine beauty; 
people from the plains, who travel to hill stations as tourists are often prone to littering, 
thus perpetuating the stereotype of the dirty and uncouth plainsperson. In Shillong too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 http://thealternative.in/inclusivity/a-historical-and-visual-journey-to-what-people-of-mizoram-think-
about-india/ 
	  	   84 
there has been a heightened consciousness of the deterioration of the city, with the rise in 
population, and several initiatives were being undertaken such as the cleaning of the 
abysmally dirty river Wahumkhrah, which flows down into Lake Umiam, a major water 
reservoir for the area. The population of the Shillong Metropolitan Area is 345,325 (2011 
Census of India), and urban poverty and hardship is readily visible to anyone passing 
through. Yet, as many Khasis I spoke to pointed out, you are unlikely to find a Khasi 
person (or anyone who ‘looked’ tribal/East Asian) begging on the streets. Contrary to 
cultural norms in the plains, tribal communities like the Khasis look after their own, I was 
told and even if a family falls upon hard times, the extended clan will be there to support 
them. 
  The rhetoric against outsiders was a recurrent theme during my fieldwork, 
especially in my conversations with groups and individuals mobilizing against the 
matrilineal system of social organization. The continual slippage in the usage of outsider 
and non-tribal was noticeable to me however, which often had the effect of glossing over 
questions of ‘race’, ethnicity, religion and so forth. This phenomenon is perhaps a 
reflection of Shillong’s unique and cosmopolitan history, being the capital of erstwhile 
Assam, and a town that continues to be the locus of educational institutions and 
commercial ventures having led to the settling of multiple groups of outsiders, both tribal 
and non-tribal. The preservation of the uniqueness of the Khasi community in the face of 
such differences is a concern for many Khasis. The postlapsarian story of the seven huts 
(hynñiew trep) remaining on earth (which get permanently separated from the nine 
families in heaven) forms the basis of the uniqueness of the Khasi identity. Organizations 
like the (now proscribed) Hynñiewtrep National Liberation Council and the Khun 
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Hynñiewtrep National Awakening Movement (which translates in its acronym to ‘arrow’ 
and in its full form to ‘an awakening of the children of the seven huts’), the political party 
that arose from the extremely active Khasi Students Union, have been espousing anti-
outsider sentiments and at various points calling for an exclusively Khasi province. The 
increased settling of various communities in Shillong has not only put a strain on the 
existing resources, but has also significantly increased the number of inter-communal 
marital alliances. This latter is a source of grave concern for such groups wanting to 
protect the perceived fragility of the Khasi ‘jaitbynriew.’ 
  Many people I spoke to in Shillong brought up a concern for the future of the 
jaitbynriew, not just the groups mobilizing against matriliny. Now jaitbynriew can be 
loosely translated as community, but as one of my informants put it – “when you say 
Khasi jaitbynriew it rouses very strong feelings within us…makes us feel very 
protective.” A middle-school principal I went on a picnic with expressed sadness about 
the state of the jaitbynriew saying “we Khasis have no roots, we’re like fallen leaves, 
blowing around in the wind.” Indeed, it is difficult for outsiders to understand all that is 
encapsulated by words like hynñiewtrep and jaitbynriew, which draws variously on 
notions of culture, ethnicity, tribe, indigeneity and so forth. In newspapers articles many 
use the term Khasi race (which perhaps is an attempt to capture the intensity of the word) 
and for all the SRT members I spoke to this was a crucial category. A senior SRT 
member once exclaimed, “there is no point in keeping Khasi customs alive if the Khasi 
race itself dies out.” 
Resisting the influx of outsiders into the state is a predominant discursive trope 
and even though there are over a million Khasis and just about as many Garos, and 
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further they are the overwhelming majority in the state, they still feel extremely 
threatened by the 1 billion ‘Indians’ but also increasingly by the Muslims who enter 
Meghalaya both from Bangladesh and Assam. Yet as I have been trying to point out there 
seems to be a palpable difference in attitudes towards outsiders qua ‘dkhars’ and those 
who belong to other hill tribes. That concern for the Khasi community/jaitbynriew gets 
articulated along the lines of race is not coincidental, and goes back perhaps to an 
internalization of colonial discourses that Bora (2011) elaborates on. While there is a 
definite emphasis the three key tenets of the indigenous Khasi religion – tip briew tip blei 
(knowing yourself leads to knowledge of god), tip kur tip kha (knowing your lineage on 
both sides) and kamai ïa ka hok (earning righteousness in your lifetime) – ideas about 
Khasi uniqueness hinge for many (particularly the SRT men) on the perception of 
racialized appearance.  
Hegemonic notions of beauty favor fair skin and a Khasi friend once talked about 
how as a child she was pitied for her darker complexion, and called “baïong” (literally 
black), while her sister who was fair was consistently admired. A young Jaintia man who 
was disgruntled with his in-laws and telling me about his experiences ended by saying, 
“They don’t care what I feel now. They got fair-skinned grand-children because of me, so 
now I don’t matter anymore.” Intermarriage of Khasi women with ‘dkhar’ men 
(particularly if they have darker skin) is the most frowned upon – as one young single 
Khasi woman put it, “If I go home and say I’m going to marry a Muslim boy, or a 
Bengali, then toh I’m in big trouble, but if I marry a Sahep (white man), a phareng (white 
foreigner), then everyone will secretly think – nee, so lucky she is.” Similarly, one Khasi 
woman based in Bangalore said she hadn’t been able to tell her family about her 
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relationship with a black man from Ghana, as they would strongly disapprove. In a blog 
entry entitled Ka Jaitbynriew in Turmoil Rev. H.H Mohrmen points to the double 
standards of Khasi society: 
If a man enters into an inter-racial wedlock and marries a non- Hynñiewtrep woman, a ceremony 
of Tang-jait is performed to initiate a new clan from the woman. And if a woman enters does the 
same and marries a non-Hynñiewtrep man she is called “kaba ioh lok khyllah,” (woman who 
marries strange men) and children out of the wedlock are called Khun- shiteng or Khun khleh 
(hybridized kids).18	  
While themes of social upheaval within the tribe arising from problems like inter-
marriages and gendered discrepancies will be analyzed in subsequent chapters, I have 
tried to show here that the idea of race is an extremely fluid and mobile one, and is 
deeply entwined into conceptualizations of Northeast identity when juxtaposed against 
the mainland, and into tribal identity in its interface with Hinduized, or 
“Aryan/Dravidian” looking people from the plains, even as broader notions of racial 
hierarchies (white v/s black) are endorsed and replicated in various ways. Histories of 
Assam tend to diverge in interesting ways; when understood in its former colonial sense 
as referencing the Northeast more broadly they focus on its exceptionality in relation to 
mainland India, but when emptied of what Gait (1905:i) calls its “pure Mongolian” races 
they often focus on the writing of the Hinduized Assamese subject into the Indian nation-
state. While colonial categories like race, tribe and so forth might seem outmoded and 
hackneyed tools with which to approach an understanding of the contemporary politics of 
the Northeast, they continue to mobilize meanings for communities there, and get 
deployed in multiple, contradictory ways, thus warranting deeper reflection.	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Chapter 2 
Matrilineal Lenses, Anthropological Effects  	  
 
 
“In the first place their social organization presents one of the most perfect examples still 
surviving of matriarchal institutions, carried out with a logic and thoroughness which, to those 
accustomed to regard the status and authority of the father as the foundation of society, are 
exceedingly remarkable.” --- Sir Charles Lyall in his introduction to P.R.T Gurdon’s monograph – 
The Khasis (1907). 
 
There isn’t a word in Khasi for matriliny or matrilineal. It was during a cigarette break 
from a late evening poetry-reading gathering up in Risa Colony that this fact was 
impressed upon me rather pointedly. My interlocutor was Jason Khongwir, a young 
English literature lecturer, and we were meeting for the first time. I had already been 
introduced to the group as an anthropologist there to study Khasi matriliny, which was a 
source of varying degrees of amusement for most. We were all drowsy on wine brewed 
from the popular local berry soh mon when he, with his simple statement, caught me off 
guard by spontaneously calling into question the role of anthropology in the framing of 
matriliny. This was the first serious critique of my research that I had encountered in 
Shillong, and I was both apprehensive and excited. A paraphrasing of what he said to me 
– it is quaint that you, being an anthropologist, are here to study Khasi matriliny, when 
the fact is that before you people came here there was no such thing. Of course 
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matrilineal practices existed, but it is only with the arrival of Victorian patriarchs in the 
guise of colonial administrators/anthropologists who, when confronted with this 
alternative mode of social organization find it “exceedingly remarkable,” and go on to 
name it variously (depending on the prevailing anthropological categories of 
understanding) as “matriarchal institutions,” “matriarchates” and so forth, that these 
practices coalesced into matriliny as such. 
Framing Khasi Matriliny 
 
To put it differently, the matrilineal way of life has been a Khasi reality for a long 
time and keeps changing and adapting over time, but it is only when it was named from 
outside, and studied under various rubrics like descent, kinship terminologies, marriage 
practices, inheritance laws etc. that matriliny as a concept truly took on a life of its own, 
became animate. We find here a fissuring of Khasi matriliny: within the domain of 
anthropology it functions as a cognitive category, as a way of unpacking and framing 
social realities, but once emancipated from its conceptual frameworks and designations it 
cascades outwards into actual and routine lived experiences, ideas, emotions and so forth, 
many of which can (if desired) be retroactively connected back to the category/concept, 
but others perhaps that slip away from the anthropological grasp. 
As I conducted my fieldwork, I could not let go of that most explicit paradox my 
interlocutor articulated the very first time I met him and it remains cardinal to my 
research, prompting me to consider more deeply what it might mean to stop constantly 
looking at Khasi matriliny as something to study, as a sort of identifiable entity whose 
various aspects can be cataloged. Is there a danger, I ask tacitly, in thinking that Khasi 
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matriliny is an inalienable entity that as a whole then encounters and interacts with 
external factors? In a useful introduction to a series of articles that revisit the “matrilineal 
puzzle” (Richards 1950), Pauline Peters investigates the issue of whether matriliny is 
better understood as a totality/ “set of social structures” (1997:137) springing from the 
impulse to build typologies and the emphasis on bounded societies – the powerful legacy 
of Malinowski and his students she suggests – or as a conglomeration of characteristics, 
an idea that starts gaining traction in the late 1950s via critiques of structuralism and is 
exemplified by Edmund Leach’s decisive dismissal of the category “matrilineal societies” 
for being as improper to a study of social structure “as the creation of a class blue 
butterflies is irrelevant for the understanding of the anatomical structure of the 
Lepidoptera” (1961:4). 
Peters’ review of 20th century approaches to matriliny leads her to endorse the 
propositions of the latter group. She writes, “Today social theorists are more inclined to 
see kinship or descent or marriage as sets of discursive and action strategies, less 
determinants of social life as frameworks for it, less causes for behavior as arenas for 
interpretation, negotiation and contestation” (1997:139). However, the formulation of 
kinship as a “set of characteristics” (137) has implicit in it a sense of relationship between 
these disparate or assorted features that qualifies their belongingness to a common set or 
a matrix, though this is perhaps a very different set than the one offered to us by earlier 
anthropology.  Even as kinship studies has been through multiple deconstructions and 
reinventions, the question – “what is kinship?” – continues to dog contemporary theorists. 
Where once kinship was considered a primordial structuring principle, a pre-
existing force that causes people to behave with or relate to others in particular ways, it 
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begins to be seen more as an effect, the thing if you will, that names a series of everyday 
actions, strategies, practices, processes and exchanges that constitute humans as social, 
economic and political beings. Here too structure plays a role, but it is not a defining one. 
“Official relationships which do not receive continuous maintenance tend to become 
what they are for the genealogist: theoretical relationships, like abandoned roads on an 
old map,” wrote Pierre Bourdieu (1977:38) who argued that it is through constant 
practice that individuals more vigorously maintain those kin relations that “satisfy vital 
material and symbolic interests [emphasis original].” What gets recognized here is that 
people tend to exert personal autonomy in their lives, making evaluations, assessing 
contingencies and enacting rules or norms in ways that sustain or are beneficial to them. 
The play between structure and practice has been of great interest to me in my 
engagement with Khasi kinship, and the overwhelming emphasis on its structure that I 
kept encountering (both in academic accounts and in popular discourse) prompted me in 
turn to keep an eye on the unfolding of people’s everyday lives, and be attentive to how 
routine practices both sustain and amend social realties, enabling society (despite 
narratives of social upheavals and crises) to reproduce itself (though not necessarily in its 
own image) from one generation to the next. Further, more as a thought experiment than 
a practical possibility, I toy with the idea of decoupling matriliny altogether from any 
sense of it as a category/matrix. What might it mean (both theoretically and politically) to 
behold it purely (however momentarily) as a way of life, where the ‘itness’ of matriliny 
might itself end up getting scattered? 
Of course this separation between matriliny as an analytical category and 
matriliny as a lived reality cannot be consistently sustained; anthropology relies in a large 
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part on ‘real life’ for its production of knowledge and (particularly in the Northeast) 
people’s understandings of their everyday life are deeply structured by anthropological 
theories and categories. As discussed in the previous chapter, contemporary research has 
demonstrated powerfully that colonial efforts to ‘scientifically’ apprehend the subject 
population, despite their blatantly racist assumptions and assertions, have been 
internalized not only by subsequent postcolonial regimes in their attitudes and techniques 
of governance but also within modes of self-understanding for the colonized people, 
having made a robust imprint on individual and collective psyches. I have shown that in 
the Northeast, already under erasure by the mainstream/land, the Indian government’s 
policies have promulgated a system/ethos where marginalized communities, particularly 
the hill-tribes, fall back on colonially produced knowledge (that consolidates them as a 
“tribe” or “race”) in order to express their vulnerability and demand rights that are deeply 
fashioned by ideas about nationalism and patriotism, which draw freely on rhetorics of 
community qua identity, belongingness and difference/uniqueness. 
In this context matriliny names and distinguishes the Khasis within a national 
framework where otherwise they are oppressed or simply overlooked. One informant 
identified the “matrilineal system” as the “main feature about the identity of the Khasis,” 
and many others endorsed this sentiment. Of course the contemporary marginalization 
and alienation of the tribal societies of the Northeast is merely an echo of the unfair 
treatment meted out to them since colonial times. This thorny history of tribal 
experiences with exploitative and supremacist outsiders is crucial to bear in mind; it is at 
the heart of the acute vulnerability that the Khasis experience and shapes their desire to 
retain their cultural uniqueness even as they aspire to a spot within a larger national-
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international paradigm. Therefore, the uniqueness of the matrilineal social formation 
makes it a pivotal marker of identity, not just for the Khasis but also for the entire state of 
Meghalaya, seen as home to the matrilineal tribes of the Northeast. 
What we find here thus is the emergence of a third axis upon which Khasi 
matriliny turns – along with it being an anthropological category and a (constantly 
changing) series of lived realities, matriliny must necessarily be recognized as a crucial 
locus of Khasi identity and politics. It might become apparent here why the contrast 
drawn by Peters discussed above (kinship as “totality” v. “series of characteristics”) is as 
useful as it is vexing. While it is certainly clear that early structural-functionalist 
understandings of kinship as a core scaffolding of society with an essential kernel of 
meaning and a unique grammar, or even as “an aftereffect of the natural facts of sexual 
reproduction” (Franklin and McKinnon 2001:2) are no longer viable either theoretically 
or methodologically, yet their imprint on non-Western or “kin-based” societies (given the 
collusion between early field-anthropology and colonialism) has been decisive and very 
real.  
As exciting as the new courses being forged within kinship studies are (that my 
chapter seeks to build on), these older models of thinking kinship cannot simply be 
squished into a musty corner of the discipline’s closet, for they continue to have purchase 
on contemporary life and their diverse ramifications ought (an ethical injunction?) to be 
confronted and accounted for. In this chapter I examine closely the colonial discourses 
within which Khasi matriliny is first named and examined (with the goal of properly 
administering the local people) such that they become the basis upon which the very 
identity of the tribe settles. The next chapter examines how matriliny has become 
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solidified for Khasis and come to be seen as a principal legacy of their ancestors, and thus 
fundamental to their very existence as a social collectivity, enabling for instance, many to 
dismiss disdainfully any calls for radical social changes like a shift to patriliny. One of 
my key concerns in the next chapter then is: how does a category, once so foreign and 
etic to the Khasis as matriliny, come to resonate so strongly with their identity, which, in 
the contemporary moment, seems to hinge on this very difference, now reconfigured as 
alternative and exotic, becoming the terrain upon which multiple politics are being 
articulated.  
Across Chapters 2 and 3 I consider closely this ‘uniqueness’ of matriliny 
elaborated through both post/colonial and Khasi national narratives. In these chapters I do 
the opposite of what narratives about Khasi matriliny are typically prone to do viz. seeing 
matriliny as an entrypoint into understanding and describing the Khasis. Instead I take 
that same ‘signpost’ of matriliny to start understanding the gaze which created/read the 
term, and set up the lens of looking at Khasis thus. In that way I turn the term inside out 
to work out the kinds of frameworks, attitudes and ideologies that went into its making 
and in this way my research could be seen as a witnessing of a displacement of that term, 
which accounts for the unwillingness of (some) subjects to be enclosed by it.  
In 2007, while I was doing a part-time summer internship with a reputable non-
government organization (NGO) working on women’s rights and empowerment in the 
region, I had the opportunity to sit through a meeting between this NGO and the 
Meghalaya Police. It was one of those routine summer days in Shillong where the sun 
shines so hard and the sky shines so blue that your brain is boggled when a downpour hits 
without a single warning sign – consequently you learn quickly to become best friends 
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with your umbrella. In true Shillong style everyone (but myself and the Khasi police 
officers) was thoroughly late. The workshop was part of this NGO’s larger project of 
building alliances and capacities towards gender mainstreaming within the police and 
health departments, two key state agencies that women dealing with violence most often 
come in contact with. A similar project had been undertaken in another big city in south 
India, and a senior police officer from there had come to share his experiences with the 
local police personnel. Resource persons from a women’s organization there also spoke 
about the problem of violence against women and a lot of information, strategies and 
stories were shared. Finally, a few NGO employees spoke about this issue from a Khasi 
perspective after which the floor was opened up for questions. The (mostly male) Khasi 
police officers had been listening attentively but didn’t seem very moved by the 
discussions. When asked to share their views they argued that since Khasi society was 
matrilineal, the issue of gender-based crimes was not significant enough to warrant their 
serious attention. “It might be true…in other parts of India…women suffer a lot, but in 
Meghalaya…women are very well off,” said one. “In fact, it is the men who get beaten 
with brooms in their own homes,” supplemented the second. 
These statements strategically mobilized popular notions (with a long history) 
about the social dominance or “rule” of women in matrilineal societies, and were 
primarily oriented towards the mainland speakers largely unaware of Khasi gender 
dynamics, to whom they had been listening patiently to all morning. As discussed in the 
introduction, the question of the status of women in matrilineal societies has been a 
somewhat fraught one. Peters (1997) highlights what she calls the “older view” held by 
British social structuralists who, vehemently rejecting social evolutionary ideas about 
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“matriarchies” and “mother-right,” insisted instead that in matrilineal societies power 
changed hands from the father to the mother’s brother, bypassing women entirely. Peters 
argues thus that, “…in their desire to scotch the figment of matriarchy, the differences 
matrilineal organization entailed for women’s lives were pushed aside” (134). However, 
she notes that this earlier view starts to fall out of favor from the late 70s, with feminist 
influences calling for a more attentive look at gender differences within matrilineal 
societies. What we find then is an efflorescence of research that emphasize “the greater 
degrees of independence, autonomy, formal authority in local politics and ritual, control 
of income, decisions concerning child-bearing, family relations and so forth enjoyed by 
women” in the societies being studied (134). 
The tension between these two views is perhaps encapsulated in the ensuing 
exchange between the Khasi police personnel and the NGO employees, both of whom 
accepted the relatively privileged position of women in matrilineal societies like theirs. I 
interpreted this as partly a strategic move (to not seem disrespectful and overly 
aggressive, thus inadvertently proving the policemen right) but an equally key issue was 
that their need to position themselves as Khasi women, and consequently it was important 
to align themselves with their male counterparts, even as they challenged what they felt 
were their misplaced notions. In doing so they were both acknowledging that they were 
indeed different than women from mainland India, but also that gender is not the sole 
terrain upon which oppression is carried out and that wars have historically been waged 
against them and their community along such axes as race, tribe, class, language and 
religion to name a few. Echoing critiques of mainstream white feminism by women of 
color, indigenous, and third world feminists as well as of mainstream Indian feminism by 
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Dalit feminists (Anzaldua 1987; hooks, 1999; Lorde, 1894; Mohanty 2003; Rege, 1998; 
Spivak 1988, 1998), they too seemed to suggest that no straightforward continuum of 
women and their experiences of marginalization can be assumed, and doing so is likely 
enacting a disavowal of violence that some women experience at the hands of other 
privileged women and their communities. 
Nevertheless, even as they acceded to the policemen sitting across the conference 
table, the NGO workers argued persuasively that the idea of female empowerment 
associated with their identity as a matrilineal tribe obscures the reality of discrimination 
and violence that Khasi women encounter. Likewise, Khasi sociologist Tiplut Nongbri’s 
scholarship (2003, 2008, 2014) has persistently and rigorously elaborated the 
predominantly patriarchal ethos within Khasi society arguing most recently that Khasi 
“matriliny is by no means antagonistic to men” (2014:53) and promotes instead “a strong 
gender ideology that subjugates the female (daughters in particular) to the male” (55). In 
a similar vein the speakers at the meeting also cited examples of the specific problems 
that Khasi women face, contending that despite being matrilineal, Khasi men and women 
are nevertheless afflicted by patriarchal values and modes of thinking and cannot thus be 
characterized as emancipated from gender-based violence. They offered statistics 
demonstrating increasing crimes against Khasi women and insisted there was a dire need 
to take cognizance of the situation. A recent sample study conducted by North East 
Network’s Iohlynti (a Support Center at the Ganesh Das Hospital) across three localities 
– Lawjyrnriew, Jaiaw Laitdom and Lawsohtun – revealed that three out of every five 
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women reported having been victims of domestic violence.19 By the end, the Khasi police 
officials looked convinced, expressing interest in the upcoming trainings and workshops. 
In the conference room that afternoon, then for perhaps the first time, I became 
attuned to the possibility that Khasi matriliny came in many versions (depending on 
individual experiences and sensibilities) and manifested in fairly disparate visions. For 
many of the police personnel their matrilineal system engendered a world where women 
wielded unfettered power, sometimes exposing men to violence, while for the women’s 
organization, being matrilineal did not vaccinate Khasi women against patriarchal 
misogyny but further encumbered them with added and unique problems like desertion, 
alcoholism and denial of maintenance for children. Similarly, some Khasis talked about 
matriliny as giving women a ‘leg up’ in a harsh, patriarchal world, whereas for others 
matriliny boiled down to the two concepts of kur (clan) and kha (the father’s side of their 
family), while still others pointed to internal differences between sub-tribes in order to 
make the argument that the notion of Khasi matriliny is so heavily reliant on British 
anthropology that Khasi matriliny is conflated with the set of practices followed by Sohra 
Khasis (Sohra was the first British capital in the region), erasing the realities of other 
Khasis like the Jaintia, War or the Bhoi. I realized through conversations I was having 
that even though the community being referred to was ostensibly the same, the ways in 
which its people apprehended and spoke of one of its defining features could be very 
dissimilar and were often shaped and sharpened by political affiliations and agendas. 
Despite these complexities Khasi matriliny is routinely perceived of and referred 
to as a solidified concept, rather than as an assorted array of possibly discontinuous and 	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  http://www.theshillongtimes.com/2014/12/16/meghalayas-matrilineal-society-also-tops-in-domestic-
violence/ 
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fractured customs and practices that have multiple meanings and resonances. It is 
important to explore the complexity of these practices, as I shall do in the next chapter, 
while at the same time grappling with the role played by the analytical category of 
matriliny, proffered by colonial anthropology to mark a system different from dominant 
gender stratifications across the world. This category now assumes the status of a natural, 
pre-given entity, the very essence of a community upon which its politico-cultural 
identity hinges. It is the undeniable overlap between ‘matriliny’ and group identity that 
perhaps speaks to the mysterious ways in which this category, with its limited semantic 
repertoire, assumes a multivalence that is able to mobilize miscellaneous politics and 
encompass diverse perspectives. 
However, something significant is elided in reading matriliny as coterminous with 
the Khasi people. There is a palpable difference between an individual’s everyday 
engagements, struggles, understandings and critiques of gendered life in Khasi society 
and their sense of identity within a pervasive, all-explaining ‘matrilineal’ system such 
that the former seems to spill out of the stronghold of the latter while continuing to 
remain nimbly within its frame. Just as categories confer on us a sense of identity, a 
structure through which we can understand and interpret our experiences, they also 
alienate us from those very experiences – they most often (and at critical junctures) fail to 
fully or meaningfully take them into account. Embracing the stripe of matriliny while at 
the same time acknowledging its inadequacies and transgressing it, the subject is caught 
in a knot that only too easily accommodates, even as it elides its confusions and 
disquietude. 
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The question ‘what is Khasi matriliny?’ is therefore a fraught one that I try to 
grapple with in this and the following chapter. While there clearly exists a discursive 
field upon which it has been objectified and elaborated and thus exists not only as a 
formal or conceptual category, but also in turn as a locus of self-identity, I suggest 
tentatively that Khasi matriliny isn’t merely an amalgamation of discrete and identifiable 
social ingredients (a descriptor of a pre-existing reality), but that it has been produced 
through enormous work – academic, affective and political – and finds expression 
differently in relation to multiple scenarios, discourses and paradigms, often moving 
along the three axes outlined above, and sometimes straddling them. Through my 
discussion of Khasi matriliny I hope to be sensitive to the complexity of this dynamic: if 
(as I shall show) Khasi matriliny isn’t any one thing or even a set of known things but 
instead is projected differently in different situations or by different people then how can 
it simultaneously hold the weight that it does and in fact be the cornerstone of communal 
identity, the bearer of multiple politics?  Across this chapter and the next, I will attempt 
to engage with the range of invocations of matriliny in the city of Shillong and trace the 
movement of this category in order to argue further that it is this very instability that 
makes the category both possible, and impossible. 
Of Anthropology, Truth and Inhabitings 
 
The accent on matriliny as a distinguishing facet of Khasi society began notably 
with the advent of colonial agents in the region and, like elsewhere around the world, 
military officials, administrators and missionaries were keen to study and comprehend the 
cultural life and social organization of the local people in order to better facilitate 
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interventions into their lives. Sir Charles Lyall, a prominent English civil servant who 
served as secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam in the 1880s, in his introduction 
to P.R.T Gurdon’s monograph The Khasis surveys the early literature describing the 
Khasis and notes: 
In 1840 Capt. Fischer, an officer of the Survey Department, published in the Journal of the Asiatic 
Society of Bengal an account which showed that the leading characteristics of the Khasi race had 
already been apprehended; he mentions the prevalence of matriarchy or mother-kinship, notes the 
absence of polyandry, except in so far as its place was taken by facile divorce, describes the 
religion as a worship of gods of valleys and hills, draws attention to the system of augury used to 
ascertain the will of the gods, and gives an account of the remarkable megalithic monuments 
which everywhere stud the higher plateaus. [1975(1907): xix] 
Early colonial accounts thus make mention of aspects of Khasi life but it is Gurdon’s text 
– The Khasis – which has acquired canonical status and is the solitary ‘comprehensive’ 
colonial anthropological account of the Khasi people available. I found this book on the 
shelves of several people whose homes I visited in Shillong and many evaluated my 
abilities as a researcher on the Khasis by ascertaining whether or not I had read this book 
and how thoroughly. The author, Lieutenant-Colonel (Major at the time) Philip R. 
Gurdon, was not a professionally trained anthropologist but belonged instead to the ilk of 
what Henrika Kuklick calls “practical men” or “a man of action, akin to the field 
naturalist…[whose] rapport with his subjects was developed during the course of 
constant touring…[which] was termed “tact” in colonial parlance” (1991:199). Practical 
anthropology was endorsed by many within the Indian Civil Service from where some of 
the most prominent people within the anthropological community (like Sir Herbert Risley 
and Sir Richard Temple) were extracted, and who in turn extolled the virtues of the 
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colonial agent with “long experience of life in the colonies” over the bookish, intellectual 
knowledge of the professional anthropologist. Gurdon, who was the Superintendent of 
Ethnography in Assam, was also the editor of a whole series of monographs on the more 
significant tribes of the region, commissioned in 1903 by Sir Bamfylde Fuller, the Chief 
Commissioner of Assam. Gurdon’s monograph was the first in the series that were 
undertaken by officials who had “special and intimate experience of the races to be 
described” (xv) and a uniform template was prescribed for all the monographs. Gurdon 
had been the Deputy-Commissioner of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills for three years, had 
travelled extensively and was said to be familiar with the Khasi language.  His 
monograph outlines various aspects of Khasi life under section headings – General, 
Domestic Life, Laws and Customs, Religion, Folklore, Language and Miscellaneous. 
However, within these rubrics Gurdon describes not only broad social phenomena like 
marriage, burial, divination and so forth but he also catalogues minute and sundry details 
such as the highly-developed calves of Khasi men and women, the kinds of clay used by 
potters, measurement units in Khasi markets and various methods of distilling local 
spirits. The use of a common template mandates that there is no separate section on 
matrilineal principles or practices, but these are explicated principally in his section on 
Laws and Customs, under sub-topics like Tribal Organization, State Organization, 
Marriage, Divorce, Inheritance and so forth. 
For a student of Khasi kinship the other key text available is Chie Nakane’s Garo 
and Khasi: A Comparative Study in Matrilineal System (1967). Nakane prefaces her work 
by highlighting her explicit interest in a comparative analysis of the Khasis and the Garos 
(the other major tribe within the state – also matrilineal) rather than in “preparing a 
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complete monograph of the cultures of the two peoples” (14). Nakane, a Japanese 
anthropologist trained at the University of Tokyo and the University of London, 
conducted fieldwork in the Khasi and Garo Hills between October 1955 and February 
1956, upon which this book is based. This is a key difference between the two works – 
while Gurdon’s monograph emerges from his administrative work in the state and his 
data likely drawn from information provided by elite/educated Khasi (possibly 
predominantly Shillong and Sohra based) informants, Nakane’s writings are based 
principally upon fieldwork in four different villages (though it is likely she interacted 
with the Shillong/Sohra elites as well). It is for this reason that her work speaks much 
more to the rustle of rural Khasi life and its unique realities. Even though both begin with 
highlighting the crucial fact that Khasis are organized into different kurs or clans that are 
strictly exogamous, Nakane is able to pick up on the centrality of village endogamy 
where affinal and cognatic ties across the clans far outdid any notion of clan solidarity in 
importance, making the unique point that for rural Khasis, the idea of community relies 
much more on locality rather than on the matrilineal descent link. In Shillong of course, 
where I did most of my research, the importance of village endogamy is not so palpable, 
though people certainly retain emotional and sometimes material (if they are more recent 
immigrants) attachments to their village of origin, but here it is easier to revert to the 
more Gurdonesque emphasis of clan affiliations over village community in one’s 
understanding of Khasi identity categories. 
While Nakane’s research was conducted in the post-independence period, her 
work nevertheless reveals thematic, stylistic and ideological consistencies with the 
colonial account of the Khasis that Gurdon’s monograph offers. Indeed, they both rely on 
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cultural evolutionary ideas about tribal primitivism and on the assumption that with 
modernity comes advancement and complexity. Gurdon for instance writes: 
Khasis of the interior who have adopted Christianity are generally cleaner in their persons than the 
non-Christians, and their women dress better than the latter and have an air of self-respect about 
them. The houses in a Christian village are also far superior, especially where there are resident 
European missionaries. [6] 
These modes of thinking, long debunked and outmoded, have not left us completely and 
even contemporary scholars implicitly end up invoking the knowledge they produced in 
their writing. Further, both Gurdon and Nakane seem to share a curious interest in 
elaborating some sort of an account of a Khasi past, despite the veritable paucity of 
historical records or data, which they themselves acknowledge. They circumvent this 
problem however, by (in a move quite akin to what Fabian calls the ‘spatialization of 
time’ discussed in the previous chapter) studying the lives of those living in more remote 
and isolated villages, believing that the dramatic changes brought about by modernity 
could somehow be negated by moving away from more cosmopolitan centers like 
Shillong. Nakane’s research relies upon data from two models of Khasi villages – the 
first one being from two villages where the “people are one of the most backward in the 
Khasi hills…[and which lies]…in the innermost parts [where] more traditional economic 
and social settings have been preserved than in other villages” and the second (for 
“comparative purposes”) being from two villages, one close to the border with 
Bangladesh (then Pakistan), and the other in the north Cachar Hills, but together being 
“unique among Khasi villages, and quite sophisticated” (101) for having a developed 
trading economy, with strong influences of Christianity and Hinduism. She writes thus: 
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The history of the Khasi Hills had been shrouded in darkness till the beginning of the 19th century, 
except for fragmentary stories such as Khasi raids on the Sylhet people…the history of the Khasi 
Hills during the last hundred years has changed a great deal. However, dark corners still remain in 
Bhoi, War and in the area bordering on the Garo Hills. These have been kept in a vacuum between 
the Hindu civilization of the bordering plain and the modernization of the uplands centered in 
Shilong. [97] 
Even in more specific discussions about different aspects of Khasi social life we find a 
desire to elaborate on the past based on extrapolations from the present. The question of 
residence after marriage is a good example. The fact that newly wed husbands move into 
their wives’ maternal home is flagged by Gurdon as “the most remarkable feature of 
Khasi marriage” and he lays the groundwork for the discussion on locality by explaining 
how after a few years of living with his in-laws post marriage, a man (except those who 
marry the khadduh [youngest daughter] who are expected to live permanently in their 
wives’ family home) moves his wife and children to a new residence bought and 
supported by their collective income, once it is established that they are compatible and 
children have likely arrived on the scene (76). Nakane furthers this discussion by 
identifying four types of co-residential units – 1) where wife, husband, their children, and 
wife’s unmarried, widowed or divorced siblings live, 2) a larger household where all 
progeny of one woman, spanning three or more generations, live without their spouses, 3) 
a cross between 1) and 2) where husbands live in their wife’s house, but eat and 
frequently sleep in their natal home. They work in their wife’s fields primarily but 
sometimes for their mothers too, and 4) where only one elementary family lives (often 
when a man marries a non-heiress). Nakane claims that within a single village it is 
common to find households of types 1), 3) and 4), but according to her information, type 
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2) was less common and found among the Jaintias but even there it was currently under 
decline (122). 
Writing about Kongton, one of the villages she studied, she says that as close as 
their fathers’ generation, husbands frequently lived with their mother and only visited 
their wives at night, but this practice was currently very uncommon in the Khasi Hills. In 
Jatinga though there were several instances of visiting husbands, as the inhabitants 
(originally from the Jaintia Hills), had “retained this custom,” despite converting to 
Christianity. One might be led to believe from her text thus far that Kongton represents 
Khasi customs while Jatinga more closely follows Jaintia customs. However we find out 
a little later that according to stories, the people from Kongton too came from the Jaintia 
Hills, so when she says in a footnote that all the information she collected in the upland 
Khasi Hills indicates uxorilocal residence pattern has been practiced for a long time, it is 
unclear why there is even an assumption that the Khasis were once duolocal. She writes 
further: 
It is difficult to determine at what date the Khasi people have changed from duolocal marriage to 
uxorilocal marriage. However, the present dwelling unit, with its fluid relationship between 
husband and wife (in fact, there are many cases of category 3), suggests a situation linked with the 
duolocal residence pattern. The fragmentary historical information available and the present Khasi 
residence pattern suggest that the duolocal arrangement may be an older pattern of marriage. [123] 
Gurdon too had observed that the practices among the “Syntengs” (colonial name for 
Jaintias or Pnars) are different as a husband does not cohabit with his wife’s family but 
only visits her there. This practice is called thiah chlur in the Jaintia language where the 
husbands are said to arrive at the mother-in-law’s house only after dark and leave in the 
morning. It is improper for them to eat or drink in this house since no part of their 
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earnings goes to this household. He asserts, “the Syntengs seem to have more closely 
preserved the customs of the matriarchate than the Khasis.” He takes this a step further 
saying “they…claim that their niam or religious ceremonies are purer, i.e that they more 
closely correspond to what they were in ancient times than those of the Khasis” (76). The 
“claim” to the relative purity of Jaintia Niam Tre is simply a claim (no evidence of what 
social customs were like in “ancient times” exists), but routed through the text of Gurdon, 
it attains a facticity that continues to shape public opinion. Further, even a subsequent 
“professional anthropologist” like Nakane doesn’t think to question it but in fact is more 
prone to find the “evidence” that supports this theory, despite acknowledging that she has 
little real data to work with. 
She adds thus that in the Khasi Hills, the transition period between duolocal and 
neo/uxorilocal residence “seems to have been shortened during the last forty or fifty 
years,” which “might have been effected through the influence of Christian marriages, 
which start cohabitation of the wife and the husband immediately after the marriage 
ceremony” (122). It is important to note the inordinate reliance on expressions like ‘may 
have,’ ‘seems to have’ and ‘must have,’ based on a skewed teleological model of History 
that is seen to begin with the primitives and end in Europe. Papori Bora, in a stimulating 
discussion of “iterative sequences” within Edward Gait’s History of Assam, shows how 
“generalization” and “probability” become two modes of argumentation through the 
sheer force of repetition, such that the “probable statement becomes performative, in the 
sense that it makes true what it states” (2011:62). Speculative statements accrue the 
semblance of truth and over time come to be understood by all as objective or scientific 
knowledge, statements of fact. Further, bolstered by claims to authority and expertise, 
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such texts writes Nicholas Thomas “created a reality that it appeared merely to describe, 
and thus acquired ‘material presence or weight’” (1994:5-6, emphasis added). 
Understanding the creative aspect of these texts, their role in producing Khasi social 
reality (even as they claimed to simply be neutral representations) is crucial to our task, 
especially since it is upon the pedestal of these fraught realities that contemporary Khasi 
identity has (at least in part) been sculpted. 
Therefore, the significance of the “truth” of these statements emerging out 
colonial (style) scholarship in the Northeast must not be discounted since they continue to 
frame (self) understandings of the tribal subject. Indeed many of my interlocutors, 
particularly the more educated Khasis, often referred to these materials while elaborating 
accounts of their culture or history. A well-educated, well-travelled administrative officer 
for instance spoke to me at length about the shifts in tectonic plates that allowed for 
Khasis to have come from Southeast Asia originally but be unique in that (unlike other 
tribes from the Northeast) they have not physically migrated and continue to live on the 
same land that their ancestors did for millennia. Thus, the repetition of the performative 
that Bora writes about extends from the past into the present, not only informing people’s 
narratives of their history but in a circular mode having the power to shape their 
experiences and understanding of contemporary lived realities. 
I will elaborate on this idea further in Chapter 5 dealing with the concerns many 
expressed regarding the vulnerability that Khasi men encounter in contemporary 
Meghalaya. My experience of the intimate relationship between colonial knowledge-
making texts and various aspects of tribal identity underscored to me the significance of 
going back to these texts and theories for a close reading of the ways in which this 
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knowledge was put together, the assumptions upon which they were founded and how 
they came to be understood as truth, in order to better assess the gifts of this scholarship. 
Even more significantly, debunking or even calling into question some of these taken-for-
granted truths might be a first step in better understanding the ‘difficulties’ of the 
contemporary period, grounded as they are in hegemonic ideas configured by these texts 
in possibly problematic ways, enabling us perhaps to look at the same issues but with 
significantly different eyes. 
Matrilineal Frames, Patrilineal Eyes 
 
Texts like Nakane’s for instance are built upon a series of claims that appearing in 
a published work by an anthropologist (particularly a foreigner-outsider) more easily 
gains legitimacy and authority. Sometimes these claims are supported. For example when 
she postulates, “Children are more attached to and obedient to the maternal uncle,” she 
explains this by giving an example of the relative insignificance of the husband who, 
when she visited his home, would always welcome her with a “please wait, my wife, or 
mother-in-law is coming” (125). She tells us that in the house she lived in, the husband 
worked all day in the field, and even when he returned “he was always somewhat outside 
the family conversation, which was centered on the maternal uncle and his sisters, 
nephews and nieces” (125-126). Even though we could (and should) question her 
inference about the quality of the relationship between the children and the father on the 
basis of this observation, she is nevertheless attempting to substantiate her claim. 
However, when she says that the tension between the husband and the wife’s 
maternal uncle and in-laws makes his life very uncomfortable it is just her statement that 
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we have to rely upon, since she doesn’t provide us with any ethnographic examples that 
might illustrate her claim. Instead she offers the statistic of divorce rates, which her 
research showed to be fairly high, but she doesn’t really demonstrate that these high 
divorce rates are directly caused by or even correlated with tension between the husband 
and his in-laws. And more often in the text, statements (many of which are speculative) 
are made with no explanation whatsoever of how she came to know what she does, who 
she talked to, or what as an anthropologist she observed that led her to a particular 
insight. This mode of writing relies exclusively on readerly deference both to scholarly 
authority and the printed word, often inadvertently making claims to generalizable 
knowledge about the entire community based in fact on fairly delimited and sometimes 
questionable data, with little elaboration of or reflexivity around pre-existing authorial 
assumptions and choices regarding analytical lenses being deployed. 
Thus, while both Gurdon and Nakane’s accounts go over key aspects of Khasi 
matriliny such as kur (clan), kpoh (lit. womb), ïing (lit. home), role of the kñi (maternal 
uncle), restrictions surrounding marriage (particularly of the patrilateral cross-cousin 
kind)20 and so forth, they both also invariably return to the question of what happens to 
the man as a father within the Khasi matrilineal system. While many Khasi men I spoke 
to expressed little conflict around their dual obligations to and emotional bonds with their 
families of orientation and procreation, we find in both these works a continual return to 
the question of the role of the father and whether or not it is called into question or 
compromised by the matrilineal emphasis on the authority of the kñi. In making this 
return they replicate the historic preoccupation outsider-anthropologists have had with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Nongbri (2014; 46-50) for a useful analysis of the significance of this restriction with regard to the 
symbolic importance of the father.  
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‘differential power’ of the husband within matrilineal systems. The literature on matriliny 
attests to the inordinate concern anthropologists have shown toward the relative lack of 
authority matrilineal men wield over their wives and children, unsurprising given their 
own patrilineo-patriarchal values and worldview, which is perceived as a problem to 
begin with, a problem that only then gets heightened with matriliny’s interface with 
modernity. 
A close reading of Nakane, in my analysis, reflects a fraught ideological stance 
towards aspects of the matrilineal system that deviate from patrilineo-patriarchal norms 
(where it is a man’s prerogative to be the ‘lord and master’). To give an example – while 
writing about how Khasi men are free to visit their family ïing Nakane says: 
These constant matrilineal contacts offer husbands chances of escaping from even the slightest 
matrimonial tension. Whenever a Khasi man feels uneasiness, he will return to his sister’s house 
rather than face a difficult situation with his wife. [135] 
While it is entirely possible to interpret this access Khasi men have to their natal homes 
in a somewhat positive manner, as a safe haven for them to go to in order to blow off 
some marital steam for instance, Nakane interprets this as a structurally sanctioned 
avenue for married men to eschew their responsibilities and engage instead in moral 
turpitude. Her word choices further suggest that Khasi men are always already prone to 
such an attitude, since faced with ‘even the slightest matrimonial tension’ they would 
naturally slink off and avoid difficult interactions with their wives (as opposed perhaps to 
patrilineal men who never need fear conflict since their authority is unquestioned). 
Similarly, her work demonstrates a tendency to problematize a man’s authority as 
a brother or maternal uncle whereas his dominance as a father is pitched as something 
inherently more valuable. The fact that the Khasi social structure obligates men to 
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continue maintaining ties with their natal families (while their wife and children belong 
to a different clan) is read as a dilution of their parental rights and a weakening of the 
marital relation, which is only intuitive to someone who has been nurtured within a 
patrilineal system and cannot imagine alternative models of gendered life that perhaps 
emerge from a different mode of social organization. 
Indeed sometimes a man cannot find his iing because his mother died leaving no daughter to 
succeed her, or his sister died leaving no successor, and his iing becomes extinct... Then he has to 
face a serious social and economic condition. In divorcing he has to leave everything he owned, 
his earnings including the house which he built, and even children…really he has nothing left him 
except his body (widower can choose to remain in his late wife’s household till he remarries, 
though his position is not comfortable there). Such a wretched man collects some timber and 
makes a small hut for himself, though sometimes lads who sympathize with him help him to build 
it. Unless he finds some woman to marry he has to endure this miserable lonely life, while often in 
the same village his former wife is living in a well-built house with her children and her 
matrilineal relatives as before. It is really a pitiful picture to see such a man, aged and poor, living 
all alone. [128-129] 
Studying Khasi matriliny then becomes a project of pointing out structural flaws in the 
matrilineal system with the assumption that men’s attitudes, emotions, practices etc. itself 
remain constant even though they were raised in a significantly different world where 
gender and kinship were possibly imagined, practiced and negotiated differently. 
Further, an analysis of the content that Nakane selects to write about reveals not 
just a definite patrilineo-patriarchal bias, but also an implicit invisiblization of internal 
variations and hierarchies. So while she details the “wretched” situation a 
widowed/divorced man, who does not have a mother or a sister, finds himself in (since 
structurally speaking he won’t have a home to return to), she doesn’t concern herself with 
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the plight of a similarly placed daughter, particularly if she is from an impoverished 
family, which does not possess the means to acquire or maintain “ancestral property”. 
Coming from a patrilineo-patriarchal worldview, where a man’s authority over his 
nuclear family is practically divinely sanctioned (the role of Christianity in the shaping of 
contemporary Khasi gender ideologies and practices is crucial here and will be discussed 
at length later) Nakane, like other social chroniclers before her, is primed to look for 
conflict between a woman’s husband and her maternal uncle, which according to her 
makes the husband’s life “extremely uncomfortable,” precisely because it is what would 
be expected from a patrilineal perspective. So moved is she by this that she formulates an 
entire set of gradations around varying (structural) circumstances which would determine 
when the father’s authority is most severely challenged or then when the marriage bond is 
most stable. So by her account then the most fragile marital relationship would be 
between a kñi (oldest brother/maternal uncle who has a role of authority to play in his 
ïing) and the khadduh (youngest daughter who inherits responsibilities to her family 
along with the property), and the most successful marriage would be one between a “non-
heiress” and a “non-authority” male. This is what she writes about the latter scenario: 
In such a marriage the children love and obey their father. The management of his acquired 
property will be taken over by his son and the property will be handed over to his daughter. Thus 
the paternal authority is as well established in this form of domestic family, as in a patrilineal 
family. However, the great difference from a patrilineal case is that the husband/father status is not 
permanent as the authority of the family. Theoretically he exercises it in the absence of a male 
adult member of his wife’s iing (actually founded by his contribution), in other words, till his son 
has grown up. In the next generation this will form an established iing in which the husband of his 
youngest daughter will suffer again. [129] 
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Here we find not only a direct comparison to the patrilineal way of life but a fairly 
explicit ethnocentric position, which is unable to account for the fact that for a matrilineal 
man it might be just as, if not more important for his nieces and nephews to “love and 
obey” him as for his biological children to do so. Nakane argues that the latter type of 
arrangement is the most desirable since it comes the closest to the patrilineal model. It 
proves to be the most successful type of family she posits (following Audrey Richard) 
since it is at a greater physical remove from the main ïing, thus allowing the father to 
effectively govern his family with least interference from his in-laws, particularly the 
maternal uncle. 
In brackets here she casually inserts something that is actually a key part of her 
discussion, which is the ignominy that despite contributing materially and financially to 
his wife’s ïing (in this case his own home), a man does not have complete control over it 
and that it continues to belong to his wife’s clan and will in theory go down to his 
daughters. Nakane is arguing that the system is set up to fail men (as fathers); even in this 
ideal scenario (as opposed say to a marriage with the khadduh) where the father is loved 
and respected because of his overt contributions to the family, the next male in his 
position (as the non-clan male), i.e. the husband of his youngest daughter, is going to 
“suffer again” as is ordained by the social structure. At no point does Nakane try to 
grapple with what masculinity might mean from within the logic of matriliny – men are 
necessarily compromised within such a system, simply because a Khasi father does not 
enjoy the same ‘rights’ that a patrilineal father does. This position must be recognized as 
the direct antecedent to contemporary claims that Khasi fathers are merely “breeding 
bulls” with no role to play within their family of procreation, but are in fact subjected to 
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shame and suffering in that space. In fact a leader of one of the men’s group that I spoke 
to drew on this concept forwarded by Nakane above, saying that he would tell his friends 
provocatively that he considers himself to be equal to his father-in-law. He described 
with amusement the shock his friends would express (“He’s a father-figure, how can you 
say that…?”), but the point that he’s trying to make is that as men who have married into 
the same clan they are disenfranchised in exactly the same ways – “he has no power 
whether to sell the house or keep it [since it belongs to his wife even though he has lived 
in it for decades], he has no decisive power at all. Nor do I as a person who’s married into 
the house. I have no power to poke my nose into a decision of the house. In that way it 
makes Bah August equal to me, because I have no power and neither does he. He is as 
good as I am, or as weak as I am,” he finished on a sad note. 
In a sense Nakane takes the patrilineal bias already evident in the work of Gurdon 
and builds heavily upon it. In fact even as she engages some of Gurdon’s claim in her 
writing she strikingly omits referencing a key point that Gurdon makes on this subject 
(which was oft-quoted to me by supporters of Khasi matriliny): 
Notwithstanding the existence of the matriarchate, and the fact that all ancestral property is vested 
in the mother, it would be a mistake to suppose that the father is a nobody in the Khasi house. It is 
true that the kni is the head of the house, but the father is the executive head of the new home, 
where after children have been born to him, his wife and children live with him. It is he who faces 
the dangers of the jungle and risks his life for his wife and children. In his wife’s clan he occupies 
a very high place, he is second to none but u kni, the maternal uncle, while in his own family 
circle a father and husband is nearer to his children and his wife than u kni. The Khasi saying is, 
“u kpa uba lah ban iai, u kni uba tang ha ka iap ka im,”which may be translated freely as, “the 
father bears the heat and burden of the day, the maternal uncle only comes when it is a question of 
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life or death.” The Khasi father is revered not only when living but also after death as U thawlang, 
and special ceremonies are performed to propitiate his shade. [Gurdon 1907:79] 
While Nakane deviates from Gurdon in not acknowledging the role of the father in any 
real/positive terms, she follows him methodologically in advancing an account of the 
Khasi family that is apprehended in purely typological terms (even as she attempts to be 
more detailed). Though their goals are different – Gurdon wishes to write a 
“comprehensive account” of Khasi sociology while Nakane is upfront in her interest in a 
comparative study between the Garos and Khasis – they both converge in their preference 
for outlining the structural nodes along which matriliny/social life is being organized with 
only passing references to ethnographic stories/encounters that might highlight aspects of 
people’s actual lives. 
 In her provocative book G. Arunima (2003) undertakes an ambitious engagement 
with the historical metamorphoses of marumakkathayam or matrilineal systems in the 
province of Malabar (a district of the colonial Madras Presidency), culminating in its 
legal abolition in the 20th century. Researching matrilineal systems in Kerala was 
impossible without encountering anthropological research on the subject and Arunima 
both draws upon and takes issue with it. She points out that the work of anthropologists 
like Kathleen Gough, C. J. Fuller and Melinda Moore was based on fieldwork conducted 
in the 50s and later, which was after the legal amendments enabling the dissolution of the 
matrilineal properties had already been mobilized. These changes were really important 
and yet, she argues, anthropologists have not taken them seriously in compiling and 
analyzing their data. Instead they have, through their observations, abstracted concepts 
about what matrilineal kinship means and entails in colonial Malabar. This work, she 
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argues, has resulted in the construction of an “ideal type” of Nayar matriliny – normative 
formulations of matrilineal kinship which are excellent for cross-cultural comparisons but 
highly inadequate to any attempt at “understanding the social history of colonial 
Malabar.”  
This is a particularly insidious predicament because, as she highlights, Gough’s 
‘ideal-type’ for example (based only on information from south Malabar), has been taken 
up as the ‘blueprint’ for Nayar matriliny even by historians and other scholars studying 
Nayars across the colonial rule. She stresses the importance of recognizing and tracking 
the significant differences between matrilineal systems across time and regions in this 
context. Even today the Nayars are most commonly associated with matriliny in Kerala, 
invisibilizing the numerous other communities that have also had a matrilineal past. K. 
Saradamoni’s book Matriliny Transformed: Family, Law and Ideology in Twentieth 
Century Travancore (1999) provides fairly elaborate descriptions of these communities, 
pointing to the fact that matriliny as a system was followed by almost half the population 
of the region (predominantly present day Kerala, but also from parts of Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka) spanning diverse caste, class and religious groups.  
We will return to the Kerala example subsequently but in this chpater I have 
drawn on Arunima’s work to argue that there is a serious problem in trying to understand 
social relations solely in structural terms particularly when the structures are not being 
studied on their own terms but necessarily through the patrilineal filter. The 
anthropological mode of studying Khasi society has, to my mind, been particularly 
insidious, in that it has been instrumental in molding people’s understandings of 
themselves through two skewed lenses – by emphasizing the patrilineal-outsider gaze, 
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and in promoting a static, structure-based mode of apprehending their own social 
realities. The latter has had an enormous impact on people’s way of thinking where, in 
public discourse in Shillong today, there is an inordinate reliance on identity categories 
like man, woman, khadduh (youngest daughter), kñi (maternal uncle), tribal, dkhar 
(outsider) and so forth and it is exclusively along these lines that politics are being 
mobilized.  
Rather than looking at problems within the home for instance as being products of 
what social class one belongs to, whether there have been inter-faith marriages, what 
kinds of personalities inhabit that space, how children are being raised, what hardships 
are being dealt with and so forth, and then trying to understand if these map on to social 
patterns related to structural issues, there is a tendency (harking back to colonial and 
colonial-style accounts) to first identify patterns and then to check whether individual 
examples bolster these claims. Strikingly in Khasi public discourse, the only individual 
voices that seem to circulate are those of a few men/groups of men who (echoing Gurdon 
and Nakane) are speaking out against the structural flaws emerging out of Khasi 
matriliny, particularly in its contemporary moment as it collides against both Christian 
patrilineo-patriarchal values and modern, global hegemonic masculinities. These will 
come up for detailed analysis in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3 
Matriliny Matters: Performance and the Colonial 
Contemporary 
 
 
Anthropology, in my view, is a sustained and disciplined inquiry into the conditions and potentials 
of human life. Yet generations of theorists, throughout the history of the discipline, have been at 
pains to expunge life from their accounts, or to treat it as merely consequential, the derivative and 
fragmentary output of patterns, codes, structures or systems variously defined as genetic or 
cultural, natural or social. 
Tim Ingold Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description (2011) 
 
In my conversation late one evening, with Bah Wallam Lynrah, an elderly gentleman 
from Malki, I became alerted to a slightly different way of thinking about matriliny. We 
were sitting in the outer room of his house, fortified with tea and jingbam (Khasi snacks), 
while his grandchildren played noisily outside. He wished to impress upon me the deep 
interconnections between the Khasi religion and matriliny. Rolling his R’s (particularly 
when he would say ‘great grandmother’) and inserting dramatic pauses as a storyteller 
might, he explained: 
This matrilineal system is based not only on the social structure but also on the religious, because 
the indigenous religion is very much bound with the family. I think like Hindus also, religion is a 
family matter, not a social matter. Christianity is social in nature. In the Khasi religion we have the 
family and generally the religious ceremonies used to be performed from time to time. There is 
certain kinds of religious ceremonies… say if somebody is sick, suffering from some disease, 
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there will be some sacrifice to be performed. When we talk about religious performance or 
religious rites, there are those being done by the family. Family doesn’t mean individual families. 
They are those have been bound together by the great grandmother…great grandmother say four 
five generations or even more. They will be one unit. So there they used to do this religious 
ceremony, they call it thep mawbah, where the bones will be collected from different places, even 
gents when they have got married somewhere, their bones will not be left, they will be brought to 
the mother’s place, that great grandmother’s, and put there. I don’t know has anyone told you this 
– there are three important persons in the Khasi family – one is the great grandmother, this is 
Iawbei, the other one is the great grandfather, he is known as Thawlang, and then the great uncle, 
maternal uncle, he is Suidnia. So these are the main persons referred to whenever they have to 
perform the religious things. And then all those bones brought together and a grand function will 
be there. Those relatives, not only those belonging to that family, but those who are related by 
marriage you know, their children, their male members, they will come… as a mark of 
respect…And the one living…the great grandmother might already be dead, but the youngest 
daughter of the family, she is the one recognized and have all those things done, so she’ll be 
thought as bringing them all to live together again. 
In this fragment of the stories he told me, various aspects of Khasi matriliny come to the 
fore. One of the first few things you learn from any book about Khasi matrilineal kinship 
is the way in which society is broken up into kurs or clans and each kur is divided into 
numerous kpohs or wombs.21 So while there might be two Diengdohs who live in 
different parts of the state, and can trace no common blood relationship they still, on the 
basis of fictitious consanguinity, consider themselves to be the progeny of a single great 
grandmother from whom the Diengdoh clan issued forth. Bah Wallam highlights how for 
Khasis, the family or the ïing (literally house) is not limited to the nuclear or immediate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For more contemporary accounts of Khasi matriliny see Bareh (1997), Nongkynrih (2002), Nongbri 
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family, but consists of all those people who draw their lineage back to an ancestral 
mother Ka Iawbei Tynrai. It is interesting that he begins talking about these central facets 
of Khasi matriliny by asking rhetorically if I had already been told about the three key 
figures in the Khasi family. This reveals a consciousness of his role as an informant to me 
(an outsider), but also perhaps of his preapprehension that being interested in matriliny, I 
have likely already received this information. His way of telling me “there are three 
important persons,” and “so these are the main persons,” suggests the pedagogic tone that 
is appropriate for a student of matriliny, indexing not only concrete information on the 
subject, but also a mode of apprehending what Khasi matriliny is. In this way he aligns 
himself with an anthropological or structural conception of matriliny as a recognizable 
form of kinship, which for Khasis has certain distinctive features. 
But another vein runs prominently through his speech, and that is his suggestion 
that matriliny is in fact fundamentally bound up with Ka Nïam Khasi or the indigenous 
religion. One aspect of this is a deeply political one, exposing the rift between Khasis 
who follow the Nïam Khasi and those who have converted to Christianity (the majority). 
Many of the former group believe that in order to truly be Khasi you need to believe in 
and live according to the indigenous religion, while Christians often feel that their 
religious beliefs in no way hinder them from being a true Khasi. While this is definitely a 
crucial dynamic playing out from within Khasi society, I’d like to suggest that what Bah 
Wallam is highlighting goes deeper. In pointing out the rootedness of Khasi matriliny in 
religion he displaces an understanding of it as a mere manifestation of “social structure.” 
But much like kinship, religion too is an anthropological category, so what might 
be gained by replacing one category with another? This objection hits straight at the heart 
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of the tension I am grappling with in the chapter – how does one push back against an 
analytical category that becomes so weighty that it erases the work that went into its very 
creation – developing a life of its own, divorced from the conditions of its possibility – 
without coming up against other conceptual categories? After all, all thinking happens in 
language, and in order to make sense of lived realities, we have to apprehend them 
through linguistic and conceptual abstractions. As David Valentine lucidly explains, 
categories “are linguistic tools which extract certain information, experiences, and 
feelings about ourselves and others from the stream of daily life for the purposes of 
making meaning about, and representing, ourselves and others. But the absorption of 
certain meanings by these terms is not a natural fact: it is the product of a constant, social 
reiteration (and contestation) of those meanings in a range of contexts…” (2007:31). As 
specific experiences are extracted and arranged under a discrete sign, not only is a new 
analytical category produced, but the experiences themselves develop new resonances, 
and new meanings accrue upon them; in that way too, categories don’t merely represent 
‘natural facts’ or pre-linguistic realities but are equally involved in their production and 
alteration. These mutualities or imbrications of reality and representation are often 
neglected particularly when categories become reified, and construed as cause rather than 
an effect of the ongoing relationship between everyday practices and human efforts to 
make sense of them. 
In highlighting Bah Wallam’s invocation of religion my purpose is not to endorse 
another category as a superior explanatory framework, or suggest that the two are not 
interrelated. Rather I’m interested in what he enables by decoupling kinship from ‘social 
structure’ (even as he recognizes that relationship as a meaningful one) and nudging it 
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towards another domain, one that is manifested (in his explication) through everyday 
practices. One of the things I urge us to do in this chapter is to consider kinship from 
outside an exclusively structural framework, finding its expression or echo in fleeting and 
mundane lived realities, in automatic behaviors, ritualized actions and subconscious, 
barely thought decisions or interactions, so as to differently understand how social life is 
both rearranged and replicated, while also being attentive to the broader trends of 
variation and the more subtle often whimsical changes instituted by individuals or 
individual families. 
Within the realm of religion Bah Wallam emphasizes the role of religious 
performances – rites, ceremonies, ritual enactments and so forth – gesturing to the routine 
and quotidian ways in which Khasi matriliny plays out. Not only major clan events like 
the thep mawbah, but also everyday occurrences, like someone in the family falling sick, 
which necessitates the enactment of specific rituals, maybe a sacrifice, and it is in these 
everyday practices also that we can catch a glimpse of the matrilineal life of the Khasis. 
In the physical absence of the great grandmother at a clan function, it is noteworthy that 
family members look at and connect affectively with the youngest daughter not only as 
someone organizing the event because of her location within the family structure, but also 
as a representative, a symbol of their ancestress, who engenders deep bonds and 
attachments between relations, which are fostered by the communal performance of 
Khasi rites and ceremonies.22  
In the first part of this chapter, then, I turn to some of the everyday practices 
through which kin relations are made and unmade on the ground in Shillong, and which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Even though the Khasi majority no longer follows the indigenous religion, many of the customs and 
rituals, albeit in syncretic or selective ways, continue as a significant part of everyday life. 	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implicitly or explicitly problematize anthropological and structural accounts of Khasi 
matriliny. I begin trying to unravel the solidity of matriliny by looking at routine aspects 
and enactments of relationships where the ‘category’ doesn’t have that shaping force. In 
the second half of this chapter I analyze the ways in which matriliny has come to be 
conflated with Khasi group identity by members of the tribe and the implications that 
follow from it. One of the consequences of placing kinship in the crossfire of debates 
around (sub)national identity is the production of a different order of ‘denizens,’ 
construed as disloyal subjects, but who in fact enable a turning of the modernity/tradition 
dynamic on its head through which we have the beginnings of a new/alternative ground 
of thinking or producing ‘knowledge’ about the Khasis – a much more complex, local-
specific knowledge, and one that is very different from the modes discussed in the 
previous chapters.  
Outside the Front Door, Inside a Social Structure 	  
I was with Esther Warjri, a close friend who often rescued me from days (of 
which there were several) when all my ‘engagements’ fell through, leaving me 
disappointed and downcast. We were driving around the city in endless loops, listening to 
music silently. It was already dark, the traffic had eased up and most people had returned 
home. We watched the stragglers hurrying about, diving into taxis, or buying last minute 
things from street shops. Esther remembered that she needed to pick up a couple of CDs 
from one of her fellow musicians, so we headed toward his house, which was in 
Lachumiere. An old friend of hers, Paul had got married a couple of years ago and moved 
in with his wife into her family home. We pulled over right outside his house and Esther 
called him on the phone asking him to come out with the discs. We just had to wait for a 
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couple of minutes when Esther started to put the car in first gear saying she was going to 
go up ahead a bit and stop there. Esther was often nervous and fidgety those days and 
watching her jerky actions would sometimes trigger my own anxieties. Pegging her move 
as yet another sign of restlessness I found myself quickly annoyed. We were on a narrow 
lane, but there wasn’t any traffic and moreover we were waiting in the car, so I asked her 
testily what the need was to move. Pointing to a sign I hadn’t noticed up on the big black 
gate in front of us that said ‘no parking in front of gate’ she responded in a matter of fact 
tone: 
No, it doesn’t look good mo? We should follow their instructions – it’s his wife’s house after all. 
If it was his place toh ym lei lei (then no problem), but this is his in-laws [sic] so we should behave 
properly. 
Along with contrition for my irascible behavior and embarrassment about the lapse in my 
observational skills I was overcome by a feeling that I was unexpectedly encountering a 
learning moment in my research. The draw of classical anthropology is a strong one, and 
I found that I too had partly internalized the imperative to produce knowledge that could 
be recognized ‘as such,’ especially as this knowledge was valued by many of my 
interlocutors in the field. This often translated into a two-pronged effort – on the one 
hand an attentiveness to kinship structures as elaborated in the work discussed in the 
previous chapter and a genuine interest in both checking the veracity of the existing 
knowledge and building on it, and on the other an investment in the possible 
contingencies of that knowledge but also in the kinds of assumptions that underlay the 
questions being asked and the circumstances under which that body of knowledge was 
being constituted.  
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What Esther said in that moment however really underscored the point that 
kinship was more than structural principles in a way that even seemed to be in excess of 
the structuralist-deconstructionist debate, which pivots on the question of the integrity of 
kinship structures given that reality is messy and people often fashion kin relations in 
personalized and sometimes unruly ways. Sahlins for instance dismisses the 
deconstructionist critique of kinship that proliferated from Schneider’s now canonical 
postulations by arguing, “Many differences in practice may be as insignificant for the 
integrity of the kinship relation as variations in pronunciation are for the integrity of 
phonemes” (2011a:6). What I was forced to realize at this point however was that a 
discussion of kinship in terms of principles of descent, laws of inheritance, residence 
after marriage and so forth tends to miss out on lived realities, not only in terms of 
whether prescribed kinship norms are adhered to or not, but as more subtle iterations of 
the way in which kinship relationships are organized and how they play out in routine 
decisions like where to park one’s car when waiting for a friend. 
Or what to do when confronted with an unresponsive front door. When I first 
arrived in Shillong for the main segment of my fieldwork, I hadn’t realized exactly how 
difficult it would be to find myself a small place to rent. The nicer hotels were 
prohibitively expensive (for an extended stay) and the more affordable ones were frankly 
dingy and dilapidated. All day I would hunt about for lodgings, scoping out hostel 
facilities (catering to the many undergraduates in the city), scanning newspapers for 
rental ads and then chasing up landladies and so forth, but nothing seemed to materialize. 
Even though one is tricked discursively into thinking of Shillong as a ‘small town’, a 
‘hill-station’, I was struck then by its urbanity, its sprawl, and experienced the familiar 
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sensation of insignificance and solitude that accompanies wanderings in a big city. My 
friends there were concerned too, and I was secretly hoping that one of them would offer 
to open up their home to me. 
I realized though that this was perhaps unrealistic of me. I had noted previously 
(to indulge shamelessly in a generalization), that the Khasis were a relatively private 
people, compared to most of the families I’d grown up around or other locals like the 
Nagas and the Mizos even. In a sense they reminded me of the white Minnesotans I 
encountered during my graduate studies in the US, distinguished for being perfectly nice, 
polite and helpful, but who held you somewhat at an arm’s distance, especially if you 
were unrelated or an outsider. The Khasi expectation of privacy and respect for personal 
(and familial) space was always reciprocated however, which I appreciated greatly. So, 
for instance, I was never asked directly (even by my closer friends), for details about my 
life that might be considered delicate, no one ever showed up at my door unannounced, 
or gave me advice unsolicited. 
Traditionally Khasi homes tend to have an outer room, where guests are plied 
with kwai (betel nut), tea or snacks and made to feel welcome. One didn’t immediately 
get invited to a person’s home. It often took a few meetings before such an invitation was 
extended. During one such early visit to my friend Hazel’s home, we were sitting in the 
outer room and discussing all sorts of sundry things, when she got up and said she would 
bring us some lunch. Doing what I considered to be polite (and gender-appropriate), I 
sprung up, offering to go in with her to the kitchen and ‘help out.’ She looked startled and 
quickly ushered me back into my seat, saying it would be better if I waited for her there 
and that she would bring the food. I realized then that the space of this outside room was 
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a liminal one, where you were recognized as a person of some significance, but the 
threshold between the outer room and the inner space was perhaps a more sacred one, not 
to be traversed thoughtlessly and without an appeal. 
Being confronted thus with people’s reclusiveness (to return to the story of my 
homelessness) I finally felt desperate enough to just come out and ask if any of my 
friends had a spare room that they might consider renting out to me for a few months. 
One person obliged. And in those few months that followed I struck up with her what I 
considered to be a deep friendship. I hadn’t anticipated it, perhaps due to our age 
difference (maybe around thirty years), but we became close nevertheless. We shared 
certain ways of thinking and being but still we were more different than alike, and yet I 
grew exceedingly fond of her. Our time together had a quiet intensity that I think (or at 
least would like to think) she too enjoyed, but at any rate she taught me a great many 
things, both through explicit instructions and more inadvertently in our everyday 
interactions with each other, with other family members and the outside world. 
Anthropologists (classically speaking) were unable to ‘study’ smaller-scale societies by 
retaining their status as complete outsiders and were often obliged to be ‘adopted’ by a 
family (thus being bound more formally by the existing social norms) with whom over 
time they developed bonds. I couldn’t help note the difference in my situation, where I 
was accepted into this home as a friend/paying guest, but when the time came to leave, I 
found myself yearning for the status of a family member, who would not have to leave 
and for whom the special intimacies might be reserved. 
And we did share many intimacies. An early morning (7am was early by my 
nocturnal standards, but most of my Khasi friends were up by 5:30-6:00 if not sooner) 
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ritual of washing the teapot with warm water before steeping the leaves and talking about 
our plans for the day over breakfast, awkwardly (we were invariably a little late) sliding 
into a church pew with her and her daughter every Sunday and analyzing the sermon 
(among other things) over coffee right after, longish drives with her daughter and future 
son-in-law, through the golf course and beyond, or to Mylliem once in a while to eat their 
famous smoked meat and doh shaiñ (meatballs), following her through the endless maze 
that Motphran market is, learning what to find where and watching closely for 
appropriate ways to bargain, climbing the roof to pick oranges in the winter and eating 
them later in the evenings huddled over a space heater, playing scrabble or then hovering 
around her as she cooked, making notes while being teased about how even if I didn’t 
finish my dissertation I could at least bring out a book on Khasi recipes. 
Happily for me, the tentativeness that accompanied the initial invitation into 
Evaliza’s home faded away quickly, and I found myself being ushered even more 
generously into her life, her extended family, her social networks, but also her everyday 
routines, her intellectual concerns, her leisure activities and so forth. Everyday with her, 
in her world, I learned enormously, even when I had nothing specific lined up, and not 
just about things research related, or even more broadly about Khasi life, but about 
myself, about bonds and feelings, about kinship, relationships, belongingness and so 
forth. When it came time for me to leave (she was going to Calcutta for a month, maybe 
longer, to be with her daughter who was expecting a baby and anyway our arrangement 
was only supposed to be temporary), my heart sank mightily and I felt a little like the 
baby bird being pushed out of its nest, to find its own way. In fact she adroitly made a 
case for why it would be good for my research to take up my own place as I tried hard to 
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swallow the logics she offered up. The goodbye was emotional, even though I was only 
moving to another locality not terribly far away. I resumed the house hunt process in 
advance though, knowing how difficult it was this time, and was experiencing similar 
troubles. 
One evening Evaliza took me along to visit someone she knew who had rooms 
they were renting to students to see if there was any scope for me to find a place. When 
we got done there (nothing was available) we decided to pay a quick visit to a distant 
relative of hers who lived right there, but we hadn’t called in advance and didn’t know if 
they would be there. It was here that we encountered the aforementioned front door. It 
was half-open and even as we knocked no one responded. Having lived around Evaliza 
and her sister next door, I was used to people at each other’s doors calling out “Mano?” 
or “Mano ba don?” (variations on ‘who’s there?’) so I asked her – why not call out 
“Mano ba don ha iing?” (a slightly more formal ‘who is there at home?’). She quietly 
shook her head saying that was a liberty that only close family members take and that it 
was not proper in this context. Somewhat subdued I waited at the door, watching her cut 
across the side of the house to see if she could spot someone in the back, as the question 
of what (all) kinship is turned around in my head. 
Here too, it occurred to me, ideas and understandings of how people are related to 
each other are summoned up much more frequently than we perhaps realize or are able to 
keep a track of and have real/tangible implications for the minutiae of everyday life. 
Where routine and seemingly unimportant considerations, where to place oneself, 
whether to follow someone or not, decisions around verbal utterances, volume and tenor 
of voice to be adopted and so forth are made against the backdrop of kinship relationships 
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and norms. The missteps I took as an outsider, as I attempted to fit myself into this social 
matrix, in fact made apparent the enormous work, the endless preconscious calculations 
around relational expectations that must necessarily be made in order to effectively 
navigate civic life. 
The concept of in-law formality steering Esther’s parking decisions, Hazel’s 
polite declining of my exuberant offer to help in the kitchen, and my friend and host’s 
sense of propriety at a relative’s front door should not however be pinned down merely as 
aspects of Khasi kinship/matriliny. They are simultaneously an expression of other forms 
of practical sociality that cannot be circumscribed within kinship per se, such as the 
Khasi emphasis on akor-burom (respect/propriety), a “phrase [which] covers the rules of 
etiquette and good manners” (Nongkynrih 2002:56) that one is socialized into as children 
in the ïing (home), which has in turn been one of the primary sites of an elaboration of 
Khasi kinship. This is to say that it is important to note that an elaboration of social life 
under simplistic conceptual rubrics can be tricky since social realities often transcend the 
specific themes within which we attempt to apprehend them. Maila Stivens, whose 
valuable research explores the relationship between modernity and the lives of matrilineal 
Negeri Sembilan women of Malaysia, calls into question the frequent tendency to take 
the concept of matriliny at face value, as having a substantive and concrete core of 
meaning. She adds further “it would be more productive to deconstruct it [matriliny] into 
a number of discourses and practices relating particularly to property relations and 
ideologies of descent” (1996:13) Understanding matriliny becomes even more interesting 
to my mind, if one further decouples it from the structures of descent and property; no 
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longer can one be sure where to look for matriliny. And if it shows up rather in 
unexpected places then how can we think afresh about what matriliny is? 
The tension inhering within matriliny surfaced clearly one afternoon when I was 
tagging along with Pynsuklin Khonglam, a talented, somewhat reclusive Khasi graphic 
designer in her early twenties, and we were walking up to St. Edmund’s College where 
she had an errand to run. We had got to know each other fairly well, and I would often 
share with her thoughts and questions about my research. Pynsuk seemed especially 
peaceful that afternoon, humming a tune currently popular across the city as I pestered 
her with questions about whether she ‘felt’ matrilineal and if yes, then in what ways and 
so forth. Her reply was pointedly patient: 
Being matrilineal, it’s not everything you know… it’s like for you…would you…do you 
remember all the time that you’re human? So in one day how many times do you think - hey I’m 
not a bird…or I did this because I’m a human being…Here too, we have our lives, so many things 
to do…each time I go to visit my (maternal) uncle, I’m not thinking – ah this is my kñi, so I am 
matrilineal – I go because that’s what my brother and I always do, because we like him, and he is 
very nice and intelligent…So if you ask me, yes I’ll remember and of course then I’ll say we are 
matrilineal, but otherwise teh, who keeps thinking about it? 
It was not something terribly novel that she said, but her articulation was striking 
nevertheless. She was not detracting from the reality of her being matrilineal, and neither 
was she saying that it wasn’t significant per se. However, just as one remembers the fact 
of one’s humanness occasionally (and given our identities as postcolonial subjects and 
hers as indigenous it is not insignificant that she picked humanity to reference both 
commonality and obviousness), when one visits a zoo, or while watching a movie about 
the Holocaust perhaps, being matrilineal (in the sense of a consistently experienced 
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identity category) wasn’t a constant preoccupation for many of my interlocutors. Put 
differently, the solidity of matriliny (as a kind of weighty category required to identify 
and analyze the Khasis) melts away in these everyday moments she seemed to suggest, 
where people’s behaviors, their habits or routines, their emotional attachments are not 
constantly punctuated with the awareness of a larger conceptualization of kinship or 
identity categories. 
Further, I couldn’t help notice that her response was also indexing a certain kind 
of fatigue with my interest in this aspect of her social world. With what she chose to say 
in response to my questions (viz. it’s not everything) she was inadvertently alleging that 
the very concept of Khasi matriliny comes most specifically into focus when poked at 
from outside, or when an insider stops and thinks about their life from an external 
perspective, perhaps through an academic lens. In that sense her comment resonates 
strongly with Jason’s observation that I cite at the start of the previous chapter. While 
matriliny as an anthropological category (and here the difference between matriliny and 
kinship that I have been using interchangeably becomes explicit) is premised on a 
fundamental difference and gets cordoned off at the outset for being unique, the people 
inhabiting that world don’t inherently ‘feel’ that difference all the time. Even if we 
recognize ourselves to be a ‘minority’ we still feel ‘normal’ to ourselves, and the 
difference we have to negotiate is the difference the outside has ascribed to us (thus the 
overly patient “it’s not everything you know”). 
Particularly in an outside-dominated relationship our existence might ‘become’ 
that difference, making it the only path to something specific to us, as will become 
apparent in what follows. What does it mean to study that? What can this tell us about 
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how anthropology works? What is the role of the category or language in framing that 
difference and when you see that framing as transparently as possible then what else can 
you see? Yet categories never simply fall aside, leaving behind the ‘secret’ real – a 
category neither fully determines, nor acts as a superficial skin to be peeled off but, 
perhaps like sexual identity, emerges in multiple performances (Butler 1993, 2006). For 
the Khasis, as Pynsuk’s comments highlight, any attempt at examining their 
matrilineality has somehow become overdetermined, perhaps because of its ‘remarkable’ 
nature, and because it seems to have become the pivot upon which Khasi identity moves, 
both locally, but also nationally and internationally. In the next section I will explore this 
third paradigm from within which Khasi matriliny is being articulated. 
Matriliny: The Recalcitrant Modern 
 
It’s not patriarchal…we don’t have to follow the patriarchal system because the rest of the world is 
having it. We should be really happy because we have something that is unique, not like the rest of 
the world…if you take away the one thing that we have in this society and that’s the matrilineal 
society, then you know we might as well not call ourselves Khasi anymore. It is that simple. 
This was Ellie Shullai, an ambitious and headstrong entrepreneur in her late thirties, 
expressing plainly what I believe to be the majority Khasi sentiment regarding matriliny 
(like some others, she too used patrilineal and patriarchal interchangeably). For many, 
depending on the social circles they moved in, the very suggestion of decoupling 
matriliny from Khasi was ludicrous and impractical. It mostly happened that they didn’t 
interact very much with people who considered or brought up for debate the idea of 
Khasi society being anything but matrilineal. Others reflected more seriously on the 
problems being flagged by concerned parties but concluded ultimately, as Ellie did, that 
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“we need to find different solutions” since being matrilineal was an integral aspect of 
Khasi identity and simply could not and should not be dispensed with. What makes 
something as seemingly intimate as kinship a subject of such powerful and portentous 
debate in Shillong?  
Kinship can scarcely be sundered from structure altogether. The tools and tropes 
spawned by social anthropologists in order to analyze kinship frameworks of various 
societies around the world have had an enormous impact on the way these communities 
cognitively apprehend their own social existence. As discussed earlier, in the Northeast, 
the knowledge produced by ‘scientific’ disciplines like anthropology, linguistics etc. has 
been instrumental in shaping the self-understandings of indigenous communities and has 
gone hand in hand with the production and consolidation of their modern or 
contemporary identities, premised at heart on the notion of uniqueness and cultural 
difference. I have argued that anthropologists like Gurdon and Nakane (and more broadly 
colonial administrators and missionaries) did not simply record aspects of Khasi life; 
their selective (and in some instances problematic) recordings have in turn made a deep 
impression on how many Khasis today understand and analyze their own social structures 
and realities. As outlined in the previous chapter, colonial British policies and practices 
(which were adopted subsequently by the postcolonial Indian state and its Constitution) 
not only commissioned studies of each of these indigenous societies with an emphasis on 
their unique attributes, they also, as part of their “pacificatory” tactics, bestowed upon 
these “martial tribes” of the Northeast a fair amount of autonomy in administrative 
matters, cultural and economic protection from plains people and a sense of an 
inalienable territory that was to be the exclusive homeland of each of these communities. 
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Put differently, it is not a coincidence that the concept of ethnic nationalism has 
had the kind of currency it does among the hill-tribes of the Northeast, and even though 
most people in Meghalaya for instance would not endorse the principles and struggles of 
proscribed groups like the Hynñiewtrep National Liberation Council and the Garo 
National Liberation Army (fighting for separate nationhood for the Khasis and Garos 
respectively),23 there very much exists a nuclear consciousness of the uniqueness of 
Khasi or Hynñiewtrep identity and a powerful and sustained concern for the future of the 
Khasi jaitbynriew. Further, in an international arena where indigenous people are 
increasingly asserting their voices and demanding rights, being tribal has accrued 
currency in the past few decades and within this context, being ‘authentic’ and 
‘traditional’ becomes all the more crucial.24 The uniqueness of matriliny tethers it more 
tightly to that which is construed as traditional and thus becomes a lynchpin around 
which many Khasi seek to have their identity congeal. It is against this complex backdrop 
that Ellie’s exasperation (“we might as well not call ourselves Khasi anymore”) needs to 
be understood. But concerns around the future of the tribe are necessarily tied to 
perceptions of its relationship to a certain understanding of time. David Pyngrope, a 
retired bureaucrat and church elder, responded thus to my request to explain what he 
believed to be the striking differences between when he was young and now: 
First thing, we lived…we were very simple then. We were simple people. But now life is little 
more complicated than those days. See, our days what we do, I told you, we have one hall, a 
cinema hall, Calvin cinema hall, where they showed movies, so they changed their movies every 
week. Twice a week, I still remember, every Wednesday and Saturday. So you see, we have our 
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  See Karlsson (2011) for a detailed account of the development of the ‘traditional institutions movement’.	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meal, we have our dinner, we have our meal at home, after that we go to see the movie. Enjoy. 
Then come back and sleep. That used to be in our days. But now, today, now the youth of today, 
they have their meal, then come back home for the movie. (pause) You got my point?  (pause) Our 
days we have the meal first then go out for the movie, now they go out for the meal, then come 
back home for the movie. Just the opposite, don’t you understand? Means, we have the movie 
outside, the food is at home. But now, the food is outside, the movie is at home. What I mean to 
say is that home was still a home then, for us, movie is a part of outside enjoyment, this and that, it 
remains outside only. It just remains outside. When we come home, home is a home. But now it’s 
changed. What used to be outside for us has come into our bedroom, and our drawing room. It has 
entered your bedroom. So you think it should not influence you? It will definitely influence you. 
For us, when we came home we forget, but for them no they stay home. Because meals, which is 
the hearth, this is the attachment with the family. We had that attachment. Before eight we must 
reach home, we must be back home. But now it’s not that anymore. Now they started going out at 
eight, for their meal. So that is not there anymore, life has become complicated, the influence from 
outside is too much. 
Life in Shillong has changed a lot. A lot of people commented to this effect in differing 
contexts. But this particular example really resonated with me since it invokes the 
practice of eating, the collective sharing of meals around a fire in the kitchen (as the story 
goes), and the sense of intimacy, of family life that it fostered. We have already 
encountered the significance of the kitchen in a previous section, and Khasi folktales also 
suggest a special, almost sacred quality ascribed to that space. The kitchen intrigued me, 
because it made an appearance, often a vital one, in practically every tale I was told about 
familial discord, or concerns about anticipated problems. Complaints about the 
discomfort experienced by married men in their new homes, particularly those married to 
the khadduh, tended to coalesce around the kitchen, which was invariably the stronghold 
of the mother-in-law. Some of the recurring themes I encountered: new/unfamiliar style 
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of cooking (“too much oil,” “not spicy enough”), choice of things to be cooked (“in my 
house, we ate pork moh, almost everyday”), familial eating norms (“they talk talk 
nonstop”), lack of knowledge or consideration of favorite foods, allergies and so forth 
(“she knows I can’t eat dohkha (fish) but…”), but also stories about the loss of freedom – 
their ability to come and go as they please, cook their own meals, to eat late, be 
inebriated, make a mess – these underscored their feeling of being out of place, “an 
outsider inside (what was supposed to be) my own home,” being under the constant 
scrutiny of the mother-in-law, some of whom would insist on staying up because “she 
can’t sleep at night if there is a dirty plate in the sink”, or other in-laws who were more 
willing to indulge their sons but complained frequently to the daughters about their 
husbands. A male informant described his plight with dramatic touches – “When I 
become hungry also I can’t go and open the larder like I used to do in my mother’s house. 
I’m hungry, open, what’s there? Eat. Here, go tell her [wife] [in whispery, hesitant voice] 
eh, is there anything? Feeling little hungry. She’ll go and open and give me.” Many 
young wives spoke about this unmitigated tension (and their own uncomfortable position 
as go-between) around the kitchen too and some expressed their fantasy of having a 
separate kitchen unit, which would secure their needs and expectations as a couple – both 
for autonomy and privacy. 
Loss, of a past way of life, of prior attachments to family, kinship communities, of 
moral philosophies and religious cosmologies, has perhaps been a prosaic trope in 
narratives about the onset of modernity, yet it was striking to me that this observation, 
about the Khasis having become more “outside”-oriented was expressed in this manner, 
drawing on a very core “traditional” idea that, far from losing its relevance, has (in my 
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understanding) become the renewed site of cultural conflict and debate. Layers of 
meaning have been written upon this site – a literal space where families congregated 
over meals, a private domain built upon the exclusion of outsiders, a culturally specific 
symbol, a metaphor for Khasi culture and values, as well as a fraught site, a contested 
space, where a son-in-law (for instance) might come up against the authority of his wife’s 
mother, bringing families and their uniquely established rituals and practices up against 
each other, or where generations might have ongoing clashes about acceptable and 
desirable ways of life – and even as older meanings got erased, their traces continue to be 
visible, making their presence felt, and further, reorganizing and recreating meanings, 
creating shifts and juxtapositions with each click of the kaleidoscope. 
Binary ways of thinking (past/present, tradition/modernity, stability/chaos etc.) 
seem to abound in social analysis and public debate or discourse, but I submit that the 
metaphor of a palimpsest enables us to better attend to the co-existence of complex and 
contradictory social realities. This tension and complexity, where that which has been 
effaced continues to exert itself upon us; even as it has seemingly vanished it continually 
intrudes, resists a facile dismemberment of time into past, present and future, upon which 
(often charged) accounts of social realities/change/crisis etc. can then be directly mapped. 
Understanding the hearth (in this instance) as not only being a structural entity, a 
univocal symbol of Khasi life (which is either flourishing or under threat), but also 
simultaneously a living, breathing space, where individuals and groups commingle and 
sometimes collide owing to differences connected to personal eccentricities, familial 
preferences or generational habits, perhaps gives us pause before jumping to larger, more 
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systemic narrativizations and generalizations, or then to apocalyptic forecastings of social 
disintegration and catastrophe. 
The ubiquity of this analytic modality (within civil society in Shillong 
particularly) is undeniable however, and unpacking the attendant anxieties is a 
challenging task. At heart is the vulnerability experienced by a historically subordinated 
and isolated ‘tribal’ community in its ongoing encounter with modernity and its 
vicissitudes. This is perhaps the sentiment that Bah David is trying to convey in saying 
“the influence from outside is too much.” It is important to note that these external factors 
are disparate, not unitary in scope and value, and delving into them arguably disrupts the 
simplistic formulation presented above (of a marginalized ‘tribe’ floundering in modern 
times), without of course entirely discounting it. 
Forces of modernity are constantly shape shifting, sometimes showing up as 
unwelcome outsiders – dkhar entrepreneurs, laborers recruited for state development 
projects, mining and other corporate endeavors – threatening both the matrilineal and 
tribal ethos of the city, or then materializing as newer, contemporary value systems, 
aspirations, priorities, dreams and activities that wrestle with more established and 
traditional ideas about what the Khasi moral code and worldview is about. In this section 
I endeavor to parse some of the elements that infuse Khasi matriliny with the political 
energy that it so feverishly contains, in order to consider how it come to be that a 
category like matriliny, which shows itself in such different ways and means such 
different things to different people, become the focus or the pivot upon which the 
identity, and indeed the very “future” of a community has come to rest. 
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Examining deployments of ‘modernity’ in Khasi society provides fresh insights 
into the formation of postcolonial subjectivity. These have been discussed in a rich and 
sophisticated body of literature on modernity, which has elaborated on identity formation 
of ‘third world’ populations, who in unique ways ‘vernacularize’ or ‘indigenize’ the 
precepts of civil society and strategically maneuver through local, national and global 
worldviews and discourses of modernity. It is certainly productive to take seriously 
Frederick Cooper’s critique of these academic formulations of modernity, which have 
replicated the Eurocentric appropriation of the genealogy of modernity by linking it to a 
singular rise of capitalism, individualism and imperialism, and attempt to “listen to…how 
[modernity] is being used and why… [rather than] shoehorning a political discourse into 
modern, antimodern or postmodern, or into ‘their’ modernity or ‘ours’” (2005:115). This 
task of engaging modernity is central, not only as it gets invoked in multiple and strategic 
ways in the social field of Shillong, but also because it intersects in interesting ways with 
tribal status, family, gender and so on, creating newer configurations of the ‘tribe.’ 
Tracking the oscillation of matriliny along the tradition-modernity spectrum is a 
useful exercise in the study of its instability or put differently, its dynamism. For those 
critical of Khasi matriliny, it becomes construed, echoing the theories of Bachofen, 
Engels (1977) and others, as a vestige of the past. The edge of this line of argumentation 
is razor-sharp – nobody knows better than a ‘tribal’ group from the Northeast what it 
means to be accused of being ‘stuck in the past’ when, in the present, they continue to 
have to defend themselves against stereotypes of barbarism, ‘head hunting,’ being in a 
‘state of nature’ and so forth. While specifics of the problems with matriliny (along with 
its relationship to modernity) will be elaborated in a subsequent chapter, here it is perhaps 
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sufficient to note that the question of whether matriliny is compatible with a “modern” 
Khasi identity has long been put on the table for debate. People might choose to answer 
this question in different ways, but the investment in locating oneself (favorably) on this 
scale seems shared, with critical voices being few and far between. The allure of 
European modernity is powerful for most postcolonial subjects (perhaps directly 
proportional to their eliteness), and the Khasis are no exception. The slippery alignment 
of their matrilineal identity against the tradition-modernity binary raises the stakes, 
making it a subject of serious political import. I posit that the unique relationship of the 
Khasis with their ‘mainland’ Indian counterparts (and also perhaps with some of the other 
Northeast tribes) shapes the ways that they understand, imagine and plot the nature/scope 
of their own modernity. 
Contra anti-matriliny groups many urban Khasi, both men and women, expressly 
linked the matrilineal system with a more gender equitable society. Even feminist voices 
that have been tirelessly demonstrating the patriarchal nature of Khasi society (like the 
NGO activists from the previous chapter), concede the relative privilege of Khasi women 
over women from ‘mainland’ India, which is notorious for being ultra-conservative and 
crushed under patriarchal ills like female infanticide, dowry deaths, gang rapes, acid 
throwing, the stripping and parading of women and so forth. Commenting on why it is 
unsurprising that patrilineal outsiders (starting from the early British observers) 
misrepresented the Khasi as matriarchal, sociologist Tiplut Nongbri writes: 
Given the cultural importance shown to women’s reproductive role, their rights over property and 
domestic space, the relative freedom they enjoy in mixing with the opposite sex before marriage, 
absence of arranged marriage, high divorce and remarriage rates, and their active involvement in 
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the production process, Khasi society defies sociological criteria such as the invisibility thesis or 
women’s oppression, which are generally used to define female subordination. [2000:368] 
Nongbri’s work over the years has attempted to systematically dismantle the 
longstanding notion that Khasi women are invested with more power than Khasi men. 
Another sensibility was much more popular however – that in comparison with mainland 
India, which had to struggle (through various social reform movements) to mitigate 
gendered violence and injustice, Khasi society was definitely better off. Many of my 
informants would argue that when it comes to gender equality it came a little more 
naturally to the Khasis, who were, in terms of gender and sexual politics, structurally 
more proximal to what would be considered contemporary Western attitudes and norms. 
When I asked an informant whether her son had had a love marriage (I had found out that 
a couple of high profile marriages that had recently happened in Shillong had been 
arranged), she replied indignantly: yeah, yeah, it’s all love no? We don’t have arranged 
marriages…Who? Where? No way, no way! Maybe one odd…very, very few and that 
too only amongst the elite, but extremely, extremely rare.” The freedom given to young 
Khasis to fall in love and choose their own mates is an example of the (urban/educated) 
Khasi conceptualization of themselves as fundamentally more liberal than their 
contemporaries from the plains. 
This example is interesting because the popularity of love marriages is not 
understood as merely being produced by the encounter with the West (either colonial or 
contemporary), but as in fact having roots in their own indigenous customs (thus perhaps 
even predating Western modernity), where marriage could be initiated either by couples 
in love, or by their parents upon request from the couple (Bareh 1967). Many referenced 
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the ‘traditional’ custom (noted by Gurdon and others) whereby an unmarried couple 
would be considered by society to be married simply by making an announcement that 
they had become sexually involved. As one woman put it: 
See our system of getting married is also very different no, compared to others. Like you know in 
the Hindu marriage, the marriage is arranged, and it’s done in a big manner, or if you go to a 
Christian society also, you do it well, but our way of getting married is like you sleep with a guy 
and you can proclaim to the world that he’s your husband.  
While narratives of (relatively) progressive/modern values and practices circulate in 
popular discourse they nevertheless warrant critical scrutiny. Some might argue that the 
adoption of Christianity brought with it a gradual but systemic transmutation of the 
original moral outlook of the Khasis, but these accounts are possibly subject to critiques 
similar to those made against historical revisionists like Ruth Vanita (2001) who attempt 
to demonstrate an openness towards alternative sexualities within precolonial 
Indian/Hindu culture that then gets erased by puritanical Victorian values and laws. 
Gendered double-standards are not absent among the Khasis (irrespective of their 
religion) for instance, where men known to have sexual experience are lauded, while 
such women might be referred to by the macabre phrase “kha ïap saw,” invoking the 
staleness associated with a dead fish that floats up to the surface of the water.25 
Through my fieldwork I was less preoccupied with ascertaining the veracity of 
claims that Khasi society was more or less modern, than with noting the discursive and 
imaginative tropes that people drew on in order to make such claims and the stakes being 
delineated in the process. What seemed to dominate (among most of the people I spoke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Again refer here to Nongbri (2000, 2003, 2008, 2014) for detailed explanations and analyses of the 
predominantly patriarchal ethos within Khasi society. 
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to) was the idea that Khasi culture (via matriliny) jibed better with globally acceptable 
and progressive norms around gender than what was possible in ‘mainland’ India. The 
lack of any stigma attaching to divorced, remarried or widowed women is seen as another 
marker, and of course the fact that Khasi women have uncontestable claim to their 
children and access to property, protection and emotional stability (since they are never 
required to associate too closely with the husband’s family/clan) within the family gives 
them a structural status that is simply not available to patrilineal women. 
These were all distinguishing features that marked them as more liberal and 
Westernized, and fundamentally different from the people of the plains, who in turn, 
largely ignorant of these histories and dynamics that shape how they themselves are 
being perceived, persist in their blanket appraisals of the Northeast tribes as backward 
and inferior. Khasis in Shillong, however, tend to construct their identity in relation to 
larger, more global paradigms, where both their unique history within the region 
(discussed in prior chapters) and their tribal, matrilineal culture dovetail, allowing them 
to see themselves mirrored in and reflective of progressive and/or Western ideas about 
gender and sexual expression particularly. In my conversations I was often pointed to the 
alignment of matrilineal values (in opposition to wider patriarchal/patrilineal mores 
across South Asia) with contemporary women’s movements, and the increasing 
international acceptance of models of gender equality and sexual autonomy which, many 
felt, propelled the Khasis into what is idealized as a much more modern domain, in line 
with (and perhaps even foreshadowing) progressive Western values, attitudes and 
conventions. 
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State Interpellations and the Engendering of Khasi Purity 
 
While metropolitan Khasis might be successful in affiliating themselves more 
closely (and at will) with various supra-national paradigms, the Indian state is 
nevertheless insistent in its hailing of the Khasi subject into the national fold. From 
within its logic the Khasis are apprehended primarily as a Scheduled Tribe (ST) – 
indigenous groups identified by the state as socio-economically disadvantaged – the 
provisions of whose administration are outlined in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution, which deals exclusively with many of the hill-tribal groups within the 
Northeast. One of the key interventions of this Schedule is to divide states into tribal 
areas (on the basis of the concentration of the population of individual Scheduled Tribes), 
each of which is designated as an autonomous district. If multiple STs reside within a 
single autonomous district there is a provision by which the Governor of the state might 
divide each district into autonomous regions. Autonomous districts and regions are run 
by District Councils and Regional Councils respectively, which are responsible for 
various administrative activities and are empowered to make laws on diverse matters 
from land allotment, forest management, agriculture and irrigation, to appointments of 
headmen, social customs, property inheritance, marriage and divorce. Further, these 
bodies have the power to constitute village councils or courts to enforce its laws, and 
serve as the only permissible court of appeal, with no other courts apart from the High 
Court or the Supreme Court having jurisdiction over these cases. They receive separate 
funding and also have the power to levy taxes, issue licenses for mineral extraction, as 
well as regulate businesses operated by people who are not a resident ST. 
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During the meetings leading up to the drafting of the Sixth Schedule a familiar 
debate raged between the assimilationists and the integrationists. The former argued 
against the setting up of Autonomous District Councils, designed to protect the 
“traditional” values and practices of hill-tribal societies, by characterizing them as a 
continuation of the colonial separatist mentality that risked turning the region into a 
‘Tribalstan.’ Their desire for tribals to eventually be assimilated into non-tribal society 
drew however on imperialist ideas of a mainstream culture within which such marginal 
communities would be subsumed, which in turn was premised on ideas about the 
civilizational superiority of the dominant Hindu culture. Rejecting the cultural loss 
associated with such assimilationist moves were integrationists (key figures here being 
Rev. Nichols Roy and Gopinath Bordoloi) who argued not only for the importance of 
safeguarding the traditional institutions of the tribal societies, but also suggesting that it is 
precisely in adopting this stance (rather than risking further alienating these communities 
by forcing them to assimilate) that the hill-tribes could be allured by the newly-formed 
nation, thus choosing to integrate themselves into its fold. This logic was accepted and 
Autonomous District Councils were approved. But Sujit K. Dutta (2002), whose work 
I’m drawing on, argues that the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC), 
which was meant to preserve the traditional way of life for the Khasis, ended up 
supplanting existing local politico-cultural institutions and in fact undermined the work 
already being done by the Syiems (chiefs) of the twenty-five Khasi states. 
The decision of the postcolonial nation however (in keeping with established 
British policies) to permit the hill-tribes of the Northeast the right to govern themselves 
according to their own customary laws, thus theoretically enabling them to preserve their 
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cultural heritage and ethnic identity, has had an enormous, wide-ranging impact on the 
lives of tribal people in the Northeast. Since these laws tend to be customary and 
variegated, many debates around their codification have proliferated in Meghalaya (with 
no concrete outcomes arguably). Coupled with the fact that STs within their “exclusive 
ethnic homelands” (Baruah 2005) enjoy Constitutional safeguards like reservations in 
government jobs, educational institutions and elected office, exclusive rights to own land, 
establish businesses (not permitted to ‘outsiders’), relief from paying taxes and so forth, 
this makes for a framework where the stakes upon which tribal identity hinges are 
extraordinarily high. The KHADC for instance is entrusted with the responsibility of 
issuing ST certificates, and they have been fully empowered to set the parameters that 
determine who will be considered Khasi and who is to be excluded. 
Here too matriliny is crucial. Tightly knit into Khasi political identity, matriliny 
has come to be understood as one of the principal “customary” institutions thus most in 
need of safeguarding. By contrast, the idea that matriliny is the chink in the armor of 
Khasi society, making it more prone to exploitation by outsiders (read dkhars), has been 
in circulation for several decades now, and one could argue that it is primarily in response 
to this perception that the Khasi Social Custom of Lineage Act (1997) was passed, which 
came into effect as “law” after it received the Governor’s assent in 2005. This was a 
landmark legislation, whose most crucial intervention arguably, is the setting down of 
concrete parameters that serve as a means of ascertaining whether a person is to be 
legally considered Khasi or not. Deviation from ‘traditional’ social norms around 
descent, nomenclature, inheritance etc., both by people ideologically espousing an anti-
matrilineal stance but also individual aberrant cases, can now theoretically be legally 
	  	   149 
disciplined. Section 3(1) of the Act states that a person who is born of two Khasi parents 
will be considered a Khasi of the kur or clan of his mother. If however, the mother is 
Khasi and the father non-Khasi, then the child will only be considered Khasi if – i) they 
speak Khasi, ii) follow the matrilineal system of lineage, inheritance and so forth, iii) 
have not at any time renounced their Khasi status, iv) not adopted any personal laws of 
the non-Khasi father that are “incompatible” with Khasi personal laws and customs and 
finally v) have not lost or been deprived of their Khasi status by any competent court or 
judgment. 
It is interesting to note that these stipulations are first formulated in the context of 
a child born of a Khasi mother and non-Khasi father and then also applied to the case of a 
Khasi father and a non-Khasi mother. If this latter is the case, the Act states that in order 
for the child to be considered Khasi, the above-mentioned criteria must be fulfilled “by 
the Khasi father and every such person”, but the wording of the Act is less explicit here. 
It is left up to the customary and/or religious practices of the father’s clan/kpoh whether 
the child be incorporated into his clan (not conceivable traditionally from within the logic 
of Khasi matriliny since children cannot be a part of the father’s clan) or if s/he must 
adopt his mother’s clan name, after a ceremony called tang jait where a non-Khasi 
woman takes up the clan name Dkhar, Khar or a variation of that and is thus formally 
incorporated into the Khasi fold.  
Even in this explicit attempt to reconfirm traditional principles within the Lineage 
Act, we find the quiet and selective incorporation of practices that have become common 
in the contemporary context, bestowing upon them the legitimacy and legality solely 
reserved for that which is traditional. Of course as should be apparent here, only certain 
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practices are allowed to become part of this assemblage, and it is not a coincidence that 
these overlap with the needs of Khasi males, many of whom are unwilling to undergo the 
tang jait ritual and would prefer to give their children their name (if their clan agrees 
which is fairly common). 
This move is perhaps also an acknowledgement of forceful arguments made by 
groups like the SRT and the Khasi Students Union who claim that children of a Khasi 
father and a non-Khasi mother are automatically Khasi, therefore making the tang jait 
redundant. The rationale behind this differential attitude is at heart a patriarchal one, 
which assumes that a non-Khasi or patrilineal mother (who relies on her husband for her 
own identity) would have no power, interest or even ability to assert her laws/customs 
upon her child, whereas a patrilineal father would naturally want ‘his’ children to 
relinquish their matrilineal heritage, and would exert pressure upon his wife and children 
to do so in one shape or form. The only reason a non-Khasi father would restrain himself 
therefore, is for purely instrumental reasons, such as being able to accrue the benefits 
attached to the tribal status of his wife and children. Within this framework, women are 
stripped of all agency and not only become valued merely as reproductive engines for the 
community, but also perceived as less rational, myopic or even plain selfish. In marrying 
non-Khasis they are shamed for either wantonly or unwittingly compromising the 
interests of the community at large. 
This way of thinking, premised upon both patriarchal and xenophobic biases 
(mostly towards the category of people called dkhars), might seem logical or 
commonsensical since these biases tend to underlie our very modes of thinking, but 
unfortunately erases the experiences of many real families with non-Khasi fathers, who 
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simply don’t fit these stereotypes. One Nepali man for instance, spoke of his own 
loneliness after migrating to Shillong, orphaned at a young age, and the sense of 
acceptance and recognition he received from his Khasi wife’s family. Saddened by the 
increasing intolerance towards non-Khasi fathers, he insisted - “we are not all like they 
say.” Another Assamese man, raised in Shillong and married to a khadduh exclaimed – 
“why not my children take my wife’s title…it is how it is done here, so why not?” My 
endeavor here is not to either romanticize such relationships, or generalize about them in 
a reactionary manner. As noted earlier, my research methods are not designed to make 
definitive statements about social reality. But I wish to point out that many such families 
in Shillong, some that I interacted closely with, defied the public rhetoric against non-
Khasi men. With the exclusive focus in public discourse on miscreant non-Khasi 
husbands and fathers (even if they exist in large numbers) so as to consolidate 
discursively the identity of the tribe, these stories are rarely told, and such relationships 
become stigmatized, often retroactively. 
Additionally, what is elided in this mode of thinking, which has led to numerous 
debates culminating in this Act (and continuing), is an acknowledgement of the historical 
role of non-Khasi men and women in the constitution of the contemporary “pure” or 
“pukka” (full or both parents) Khasi. Virtually every Khasi person I got to know well 
enough to ask details about their family histories spoke of at least one ancestor who 
would not have been considered Khasi at the time – a Muslim grandmother from Assam, 
a Pathan grandfather from Afghanistan, a Bengali great grandfather from Sylhet, a 
Scottish or Portuguese ancestor, a Mizo grandmother – the list is long and diverse. Also 
as mentioned above many Khasi clans are structurally recognized to have a non-Khasi 
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ancestress – most notably perhaps the Kharkongors, one of the most powerful, 
landowning clans in the Khasi Hills. The Khasi matrilineal structure has historically 
catered to the formal incorporation of outsiders (both men and women); these 
relationships were socially accepted, even if not formalized through marriage, bearing 
progeny who today consider themselves thoroughly Khasi and are in turn treated that 
way. 
The rules formulated by the KHADC (authorized or one could perhaps say 
mandated by the Constitution) aim ostensibly to regulate alliances along ‘traditional’ 
lines, but this is a thoroughly modern conceptualization of ‘tradition.’ It creates a “public 
secret” of sorts (Taussig 1999), casting a shadow on what everyone knows to be true – 
that a public hunt much like the hunt for the legendary U Manik Raitong26 would be 
necessary to come up with a certifiably ‘pure’ Khasi – yet this knowledge is strategically 
eclipsed creating a mythical notion of a once “pure” jaitbynriew, that is only now being 
polluted. Further, as we shall see, this idea of “tradition” is unfolding in relation to 
intense ideological and political debates that are very much a product of contemporary 
concerns and negotiations and need to be understood and analyzed as such. The 
Constitutional framework however, empowers the KHADC to legislate on contemporary 
Khasi citizenship, which then both crucially facilitates citizenship into the nation (in 
order to be a ‘proper’ Northeast tribal citizen-subject of the Indian nation-state you have 
to fit into the ‘traditional’ tribal mold), while also being a source of conflict toward that 
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  A famous tragic hero who, after seducing and impregnating the Syiem’s beautiful wife with his exquisite 
music, is ordered to death by fire after a nationwide search. As the Syiem intuits, the baby happily 
recognizes U Manik Raitong as his father and offers him a banana.  
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end (in being a ‘traditional’ tribal you can hardly claim the position of an unmarked 
Indian citizen or alternatively you might be forced to give up your ‘modern’ rights). 
A striking example of the complex political ramifications of this legislation was 
the KHADC ruling in February 2008 in response to an objection raised initially by then 
KHADC Chief Executive Member H.S. Shylla (who was vying for the same Congress 
ticket to stand for elections from Nongkrem, a constituency reserved for tribals) that 
politician Waibha Kyndiah had ceased to belong to the Khasi tribe. Kyndiah, son of the 
influential Union Minister of Tribal Affairs P.R. Kyndiah, was dismissed27 for taking his 
father’s last name, conforming with national-international naming conventions but in 
violation of rules laid out in the Khasi Lineage Act. Being banished from his tribe 
jeopardized his tribal status and consequently, his ability to contest elections from a tribal 
reserved seat. Here the irony becomes explicit – while for the ‘modern’ matrilineal tribal 
subject, assimilation and full/unmarked citizenship is (only/primarily) obtainable by the 
abdication of his/her ‘traditional’ tribal identity, this abdication undermines their very 
identity within the modern nation, which legislates on the parameters of being tribal – 
they now become unreadable even as ‘modern’ (non-tribal) subjects. 
Indigeneity in (Post)colonial Ruins: The Materiality of Kinship 
 
Laws like the Khasi Lineage Act, or the more recent Meghalaya Compulsory 
Registration of Marriages Act (2012), formulated to tackle problems encountered by 
contemporary Khasi citizen-subjects so as to better facilitate their move into/experience 	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  This decision was subsequently appealed and revoked, but it caused a fair amount of political 
controversy at the time, with Shylla claiming he was only following the letter of a law that preceded him 
(but being ousted from the KHADC by a no-confidence motion) and Kyndiah (backed by the Congress) 
challenging any interrogation of his tribal identity being the son of two ‘full’ Khasi parents, despite having 
taken his father’s name. 	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of ‘modern’ realities, thus ironically end up formally legalizing norms that from a 
‘modern’ perspective would be considered regressive. These laws then arguably dissolve 
the freedom of ‘modern’ Khasis to make very personal choices (such as what name to 
adopt, who to be in a relationship with, what contours that relationship should take, to 
name just a few), instead holding them at bay from many of their ‘modern’ rights as 
(non-tribal) Indian or even global citizens. We can see here how Khasi kinship is deeply 
imbricated in the project of postcolonial modernity, which has been recast into a critical 
locus of citizenship and identity. 
This rerouting of Khasi subjects through ‘tradition’ in order to become more 
‘modern’ produces strange scenarios – on the one hand bestowing the state and its 
various agencies with enormous influence over the private life of a Khasi citizen, which, 
because it is now heavily saturated with multiple political meanings, legitimately 
becomes a matter of public concern and scrutiny and on the other, posing thorny 
questions for social justice movements trying to combat inequities or violence stemming 
from traditional Khasi institutions and practices. Nongbri’s (2000, 2003) illuminating 
analysis of the debates leading up to the passing of the Khasi Lineage Act offers a 
compelling argument for how questions about Khasi identity, legitimacy and belonging 
are made to play out on the bodies of Khasi women who, much like their patrilineal 
counterparts around the world, become the repository of authentic Khasi traditions and 
cultural/ethnic purity, upon whom the future of the jaitbynriew exclusively rests. Women 
are doubly displaced from their own destinies – i) their traditional exclusion from all 
political spheres creates a predominantly masculine state that has historically neatly 
sidestepped the specific needs, demands and perspectives of women and ii) even as 
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members of civil society they are rendered impotent and unable to resist because “by 
projecting the lineage bill as a ‘nationalist’ agenda, directed at saving Khasi culture and 
tradition from the threat of extinction under the influence of the cultural ‘other,’ the state 
is able to stifle potential dissenting voices, who from fear of being branded as anti-
national and/or unpatriotic, have resigned themselves to the regime of patriarchal control” 
(2000: 391). 
As Nongbri powerfully demonstrates, two sparring groups with seemingly 
antagonistic ideologies – the KHADC (with its investment in mandating Khasi traditions) 
and the SRT (with its militantly anti-matrilineal stance) – both share in common this 
fundamental anti-woman stance, with the Act becoming a means of controlling women 
and pushing the agenda for masculine privilege and domination. She argues thus that, 
“sandwiched between the two, women have little choice but to comply with the dominant 
ideology, which means that they either have to curb their personal freedom and reproduce 
for the community, or run the risk of being dispossessed of their social, economic and 
ethnic rights” (382). The main problem – which is the manipulation by non-indigenous 
people of loopholes that allow them to take over resources exclusively allotted to the 
community – could be easily fixed, she points out, by a strict enforcement of existing 
anti-benami (fake transactions) laws, which would vitiate the very need for problematic 
laws like the Lineage Act. “It is a well-known fact,” she writes, “that a large number of 
persons, many of whom hold important positions in the government, engage in illegal 
transactions with outsiders, allowing them to escape the arm of the law by lending their 
names to the latter’s business.” “Apparently the fact that it is primarily men who engage 
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in this illegal practice may be responsible for the state’s inaction,” she concludes 
scathingly (2000:390). 
My fieldwork, conducted some years after this article by Nongbri was published, 
clearly validates her critique– persons in power (mostly men) have been successful in 
shepherding public discourse around concerns for the “future” of the tribe in very 
strategic ways that have now almost entirely taken over the imagination of civil society, 
including those critical of groups like the SRT. Of the scores of people I spoke to, I rarely 
(if ever) heard anyone highlight the serious role that proper enforcement of these anti-
benami laws might have in combating economic exploitation by outsiders. This reshaping 
of the Khasi intellectual horizon is premised upon the normalization (over time) of the 
problem of corruption and the illegal appropriation of wealth by private individuals, thus 
justifying the patriarchal impulse of both state and non-state actors to steer consensus, 
discourse and decision-making towards an increased scrutiny and disciplining of Khasi 
women instead. An SRT member explicitly attributed the problem of corruption to the 
matrilineal system saying, “they [the men] don’t get anything from the house, so when 
they have a chance to sit in a seat where they can make money, they make the most of it. 
They’re not used to owning wealth, so when they get a chance, they make it and they 
make it good. Being corrupt.” 
More broadly though, the tendency of tacking through tradition in order to get at 
the problems faced by ‘modern’ Khasis (discussed above) means that a host of perceived 
contemporary social problems – from outsider incursion to environmental degradation – 
are now invariably traced back to intimate aspects of people’s lives, legitimizing 
intrusion of the state and its agencies into this domain. While in theory this impacts both 
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men and women, the predominance of Khasi men across political, social and religious 
spheres ensures that masculine interests are safeguarded one way or another. As Ellie 
Shullai put it, “when it comes to it, men all stick together somehow.” Even groups like 
the SRT or the MSM that are lobbying for a transformation of traditional kinship-related 
practices in order to better cater to contemporary social conditions do so ultimately in the 
name of safeguarding the ‘traditional’ or ‘pure’ character/ethos/values of Khasi society. 
Further, laws like the Khasi Lineage Act become shrouded in a certain kind of 
mystery – even as they are passed, they are either not enforced consistently, or are 
challenged by opposing groups and amendments proposed – such that many of my 
informants were unclear as to the exact contours of the existing law. Such laws then 
become but potent tools designed to be invoked and ignored (like in the case of Waibha 
Kyndiah) selectively in order to consolidate and reproduce the power and resources of the 
indigenous elite. Transgressing Khasi women (and in some cases men), non-Khasi kin 
and children of inter-ethnic alliances are the ones most likely to find themselves on the 
chopping block. Their voices silenced and interests subordinated, they become a different 
breed of what Baruah (2005) calls “denizens,” inhabiting precariously the grey zone 
between “authentic” Khasi citizens and non-Khasi interlopers. It falls upon them, many 
of who very much consider themselves (and have historically been considered) to be a 
part of the jaitbynriew, to keep proving their belongingness and loyalty to the community 
and are (depending on other factors like their family name, their social or political 
influence, their class background or even their ‘racialized’ appearance/skin color) 
differently able to navigate their social “othering” and stave off exploitation and/or social 
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exclusion. I end by returning to a story by David Pyngrope explicating powerfully and 
poignantly this differential dynamic that plays out in the Shillong context: 
I have four children. Three of my children, they take mother’s title, and one child takes my title. 
So it’s not that I tell her to do that. Willingly on her own she has done that. When she has come to 
her own understanding, then she changed. Even there was a time when I told her that look here 
your sister and your brothers they are of that title, now you’re of this title, it will confuse. It will 
confuse in the family, it will confuse in the society. It will confuse everybody. That three children 
are of the same title, one is not of the same title, but they belong to same father and same 
mother…so please don’t do this, it will confuse. But against that, on her own she even went for an 
affidavit that she is not of mother’s title but father’s title. But anyway, she remains a Khasi, she 
remains a Khasi, a Scheduled Tribe, because her father is a Khasi and her mother is a Khasi. So 
she becomes acceptable in the society. There are many who have adopted their father’s title…they 
are acceptable to society. In their own clans, in their own kurs also they are accepted. Not that they 
are shunted out, no. Not that they are being disowned, no. It’s not that… 
 
No, maybe one or two stray cases maybe like that [where taking the father’s name is the rejection 
of matriliny in favor of patriliny], but those who change, its because of the affection they have for 
their father…by not keeping the title of their father they feel that they are disconnected by force 
from their father, as if their father is a non-entity in the house. You see, maybe that kind of feeling. 
But mostly it’s the love, the attachment they have to their father. They want to give the equal share 
to their mother and their father as well. And in some cases they give both the titles, mother and 
father’s. So matrilineal society in this case has not in any way affected the way of thinking of the 
present generation. I don’t think they bother much about it – like look here I must stick to 
mother’s title, father’s title is not… because then one big issue comes into the picture. Its because 
of what we call the, this Schedule Tribe. To be classified as a ST… because see if you have a non-
Khasi father and you give the father’s title, then by looking at the name alone, then you are not a 
Khasi, you are not known as Khasi, you cannot identify yourself as Khasi. And then there are laws 
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that if you apply for this Khasi ST certificate you may not be granted one because your title is not 
a Khasi. Then hence, they say [adopting mock theatrical tone and referring to children with a non-
Khasi father] we are matrilineal society, we have matrilineal society, I take mother’s title. But 
behind it, it is that Schedule Tribe certificate. Because being a ST then you have lots of 
facilities…we are a Scheduled Tribe, we like to enjoy all those facilities provided to us by the 
Constitution of India. These rights are Constitutional. We would like to make full use of those 
rights. Because we still need that protection. That’s why we have the Sixth Schedule, that’s why 
we have this District Council. For those kind of special protections. So then we stick to the 
matrilineal, I mean those who are of non-tribal fathers. They are they ones who will vouch, [mock 
grand voice again] yah we are matrilineal society. But if I have a Khasi father, like my daughter 
she is also Scheduled Tribe because I am a Khasi. She does not bother much about the matrilineal 
society. Either ways she is a Scheduled Tribe. That doesn’t mean that my daughter loves her 
mother less than those who vouch for matrilineal society. Maybe she loves more. Because with 
them maybe it is motivated, with her it’s not motivated. It’s the originality that is attached to it. So 
that is about matrilineal society. It has its influence no doubt but not the way it has been thought 
about. Not that way. 
Bah David’s narrative here spins the claim to matriliny as an identity category in a 
wholly different way. Far from Ellie Shullai’s contention that without matriliny “we may 
as well not call ourselves Khasi anymore,” in this rendition being matrilineal is 
something that ‘they’ (i.e. those with a non-tribal father) have to keep harping on. In his 
account, however, the fact that ‘they doth insist too much’ is linked to an ulterior motive 
– to accrue all the benefits that come with being ST, and it is the high pitch of their 
avowal of matriliny that seems (to him) to give the game away. This line of thinking does 
not acknowledge or empathize with the subtle yet mounting stigma that ki khun shiteng 
(half-blood children) often contend with in Khasi society, particularly if their father is 
dkhar. In contrast his daughter (having two Khasi parents) can be so secure in the 
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“originality” of her matrilineal identity (despite going against the customary regulation 
and taking her father’s name) that she “does not bother much about the matrilineal 
society.” Her tribal status guaranteed she is free to shape her own matrilineal identity 
without really even needing to reference it too much or too loudly. 
In this chapter I have begun to flesh out some of the complexities surrounding the 
socio-political domain of Khasi matriliny, showing how Khasi kinship and attendant 
understandings of gender are not merely a subject of academic inquiry but is instead 
bound up with larger relationships of indigenous identities within postcolonial nation-
states and in dialogue with global imaginaries. Deconstructionist approaches that 
emphasize the reflective nature of kinship and critiques of them that argue that kinship is 
premised upon something concrete or discernible (whether it is the “mutuality of being” 
(Sahlins 2011a, 2011b) or the existence of a “universal genealogical or procreative grid” 
(Shapiro 2009:3)) both seem unable to account for the fact that ‘whatever kinship is’ is 
not so significant for the Khasis, for whom it is everything. This is to say that the 
materiality of kinship explored in this and the previous chapter (and that is by no means 
inconsequential) gets superseded in a sense by how kinship matters differentially for 
people within Khasi society and studying these interconnections arguably injects the 
question of ethics and politics into debates around knowledge economies of kinship. 
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Chapter 4 
Khasi Men In-Sight: The Recursive Enactment of 
Emasculation 	  	  	  	  
I was sitting next to the bed in Aiphang’s room one evening, browsing through 
the movie collection on his laptop, when his mother walked in to say hi to me, and to ask 
him if he had received a response from the architecture college he had applied to for a 
Masters program. The letter had arrived indeed, reported Aiphang with a satisfied look, 
and he had to leave for Ahmedabad early next month for an interview. His mother flashed 
him a pleased smile, and told him to prepare appropriately, since of course he knew that 
the interviewers would likely be ruthless. Herself a well-known medical doctor, 
Aiphang’s mother had groomed her son from a young age to excel in his studies and aim 
high; there was no point “being a big fish in a small pond when there is the whole ocean,” 
she would often say to him. Her guidance was well received – Aiphang was a good 
student, and a good son. Overall, he subscribed to his mother’s worldview and even his 
critiques of some of her parenting techniques were measured and kind. 
On her way out Aiphang’s mother remarked on what she called his “unkempt 
look.” It was vacation time and since he was done with college he had let his hair grow 
out (it was covering his ears only just a little). She said, “soon you’ll be gelling and 
spiking your hair and start looking like a ruffian, and people will think you’ve become a 
typical Khasi guy.” Her comment was made in jest and we all chuckled but all the more 
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because the concern was premised on a few uncomfortably real things. While it was 
unlikely that an architecture school in Ahmedabad knew the first thing about what it 
meant to be a Khasi guy, typical or not, she was tapping into the idea that in mainland 
India, Aiphang as a Northeasterner would be marked as different.  
As Nido Taniam’s example (see Chapter 1) demonstrates, racist attitudes can lead 
to grisly outcomes for people from the Northeast living in mainland cities. Associated 
with an entire ensemble of negative steretotypes, their distinct appearance makes them 
easy targets. As Duncan McDuie-Ra documents in his ethnography of Northeast migrants 
in Delhi, even when people from the Northeast try to dress like the mainlanders they 
continue to be racially targeted, so instead they decide to own their difference and dress 
as they would back home in the Northeast (2014:169). He writes: 
For Northeast migrants in Delhi, dress matters. Many of the looks are styled on East Asian 
fashion, including Korea, and some Western subcultures…Respondents made the point that if they 
had spare income they would spend it on clothes. It has become an important part of Northeast 
identity to dress well and with a sense of style different from other people in Delhi (168). 
Being acknowledged as different and fashionable both gets people from the Northeast 
jobs in the service and retail industry and also renders them a target of racial barbs, 
sexual harassment and gender stereotyping that often take on violent forms. The fact that 
many young men from the Northeast are equally invested in their appearance – clothes, 
shoes, accessories, hairstyles etc. – is confusing to most people from mainland India. The 
stereotype that ‘real’ or ‘macho’ men don’t indulge in such things becomes compounded 
by pre-existing ideas about the effeminicy of tribal men from the Northeast. Their 
decision to wear their hair longer, spiky and in the style of Japanese or Korean youth, for 
instance, clashes with mainland Indian norms where short hair is associated with a 
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disciplined and proper masculinity. Further, the fact that they have access to reservations 
in the government and educational institutions feeds the prejudice of upper-caste 
mainlanders, for whom people from the reserved categories are perceived as usurping 
jobs and college seats from hard working, meritorious ‘average’ Indians like them. These 
negative assumptions become fused into the perception that there is something wrong or 
lacking in Northeast tribal masculinity, and this forms the backdrop against which 
Aiphang’s mother is insisting on her son’s visit to the hairdresser. Aiphang, on his part, is 
also well aware of these dynamics and would see the sporting of a unique Northeast 
aesthetic as potentially jeopardizing his future, a risk he would not personally elect to 
take.  
This broader race-gender-sexuality matrix that frames mainland ideas about 
Northeast masculinity becomes in my reading, crystallized in the figure of the “typical 
Khasi guy.” A section of educated Khasi men have been articulating concerns about the 
degradation of Khasi masculinity since the early 1960s. Their diagnosis lays the blame of 
these troubles, which begin with individual men but then impact society more broadly, on 
the matrilineal kinship system. In their analysis traditional Khasi matriliny has fallen out 
of joint in the contemporary context, making it an impediment to the optimal functioning 
of the community, which has seen massive transformations in its close interactions with 
non-indigenous groups, both colonial and postcolonial. Additionally they argue that 
Western modernity, Christianity, neoliberalism and globalization have also influenced 
both individual sensibilities and the larger social field to such an extent that the 
worldview endorsed by the traditional matrilineal system has been rendered largely 
superfluous. The disjunction that ensues is inextricably linked to the problems being 
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faced by matrilineal Khasi men in a world that is organized by the logic of patriarchy, but 
of the patrilineal kind.  
Caught in between these two worlds Khasi men find themselves struggling, and 
the contention of the more recent anti-matriliny group Synkhong Rympei Thymmai (SRT) 
is that Khasi men will only be able to properly align themselves with globally endorsed 
ideas and enactments of masculinity by eschewing matriliny and embracing patriliny. 
Through SRT lobbying since the early 90s, which has and continues to receive much 
attention from the national and international media, the figure of a fundamentally flawed 
if not failed Khasi man has come to loom large in the Shillong context and it is around 
the trope of the “typical Khasi guy” that this chapter is framed. The rebellious but 
ultimately lazy/incapable tribal and his counterpart, the addicted or inebriated vagabond, 
both in fact common stereotypical depictions of Northeast masculinity, are pitched as the 
products of an outmoded, conservative matrilineal system fundamentally incapable of 
responding to the needs of contemporary, liberal Khasi citizens.  
In the next chapter I will elaborate on the different manifestations of this ‘typical 
Khasi guy’ as well as on the multiple arguments and ideas being forwarded by the SRT, 
but here I wish to flag that the stereotype of the ‘typical Khasi guy’ was the other 
uncomfortable dynamic that Aiphang’s mother was referencing in her comment. It was 
hard, however, to imagine Aiphang as an example of the supposedly typical Khasi man; 
neatly coiffed with short hair, regular t-shirts and jeans, disciplined, cultured, ambitious, 
high achieving, punctual, polite, helpful and very respectful, Aiphang was seen by many 
Khasi parents as a role model for their children. He bore no resemblance whatsoever to 
the stereotype of the broken Khasi man, but its power nevertheless seemed to inject a 
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sliver of fear in his mother that Aiphang might let his performance of the particular brand 
of masculinity that she had worked hard to inculcate in him, slip. And even more pressing 
was the concern that if people began to see him as a ‘typical Khasi guy,’ then Aiphang 
might become precisely that. All the years of her hard work would come to nothing if her 
son morphed into a cliché – that of the drunken, irresponsible Khasi man.  
Here, in this incident, maternal anxieties seem to pick up intuitively on the 
performative aspect of gender, outlined by Judith Butler in her now canonical Gender 
Trouble (2006). Far from being the social expression of a pre-given or ‘natural’ sex (as 
posited by prior conceptualizations of the sex/gender matrix), gender comes to be through 
the everyday, repetition of multiple corporeal expressions that create tangible effects, and 
it is in the process of these variegated but highly regulated iterations that gendered 
ontologies are inaugurated. Aiphang’s mother’s fears further highlight the precarity of 
gendered existence in the face of robust stereotypes circulating in the social field. Even as 
Aiphang was religious in his presentation of a ‘non-typical’ Khasi masculinity, he had to 
be constantly vigilant to not falter or miss a single step in his unique performative 
sequence lest the potent discursive figure of the failed Khasi man sneak up on him. The 
failure to maintain his performative stance would run the risk of aligning him closer to 
this prototype of Khasi masculinity; loss of control over how he is being recognized 
might well amount to vulnerability or a loss of control over his own self. At least, this is 
what Aiphang’s mother implicitly suggests.   
In this chapter I suggest that Aiphang’s mother is in fact not being overly 
paranoid or whimsical. The frailty experienced by many Khasi men in Shillong today, 
which is being attributed to a purported mismatch between matriliny and modernity, is in 
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large part a product of the ways in which matrilineal masculinity (and gender/sexuality 
relations in general) has been and continues to be viewed by non-matrilineal outsiders. In 
a previous chapter we have already seen the impact of colonial (and colonial style) 
anthropology on the development of the very lenses through which people (both outsiders 
and Khasis) have been encouraged to apprehend the terrain of matrilineal lives. More 
specifically, I have shown how the embeddedness of the outsider-anthropologist in 
patrilineo-patriarchy has shaped their concerns about, and even further, their sustained 
interest in and attention to the ‘plight’ of men in general but also men qua fathers within 
what was seen as the ‘remarkable’ or ‘exotic’ social institution of matriliny. While falling 
out of favor within academic scholarship, the shelf life of such ideas (both of the 
supposed emasculation of matrilineal men and the relative ‘primitiveness’ of matrilineal 
systems which must necessarily give way to patriliny, particularly in their encounter with 
modernity) continue to underlie the ideas and sensibilities of mainstream/non-matrilineal 
people.  
Matrilineal Khasis are not immune to the pejorative concepts and perceptions that 
shape the way they know they are being read by hegemonic ‘others.’ In this chapter I 
draw attention to the prisms through which the ‘outsider-other’ views matrilineal society 
and more specifically, matrilineal masculinity. I will argue that not only is the infinite 
recursion of seeing, being seen, seeing that one is being seen, being what one is being 
seen as, and so forth a constitutive feature of gendered living, it is also shot through with 
the iterative and/or subversive possibilities of self-apprehension or identity formation that 
is co-constitutive with multiple modes of community forging and political struggle. 
Mobilizations by groups like the SRT (while not unconnected to internal Khasi social 
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dynamics) are fundamentally drawing on the ways in which non-matrilineal people’s 
ethnocentric reading of their structural ‘emasculation’ has the effect of not only saturating 
the visual field, thus determining what can and cannot be seen by the outsider eye in the 
first place, but also in turn producing a depleted Khasi masculinity.  
Outsider Looks, Insider Realities 
 
Postcolonial, psychoanalytic, feminist and queer theory have made explicit how 
looks are exchanged not by fully-formed identities, but rather it is precisely in the 
exchange of looks and in the recognition of the self via the Other’s gaze that racial, 
gendered and sexual subjectivities become ushered into existence. This might possibly 
explain then how, even as they strive to push against these constraints (and creations), the 
SRT has ended up breathing fresh life into the very monster it has supposedly been trying 
to restrain. The line between the rejection of stereotypes and their internalization 
becomes blurred in accounts of Khasi emasculation disseminated in the mass media by 
such groups, reinforcing ideas that were problematic to begin with. Such representations 
reproduce in a strangely circular manner the figure of the ‘typical Khasi guy’ as people 
from within the community (both men and women) behold anew through a fortified 
outsider’s eye a heightening of their failed, circumscribed masculinity. A failure of Khasi 
masculinity, as the SRT is keen to highlight, has consequences for the larger well being 
of the community and Aiphang’s mother (like other members of Shillong’s civil society) 
is certainly aware of and working through these dynamics.     
Given that Aiphang had often spoke of his mother’s strictness not only in terms of 
her ambitions for her offspring, but also as being a strict upholder of traditional Khasi 
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values and ways of doing things, it struck me as odd that she actively discouraged her son 
from making friends with other Khasi boys and ushered him instead towards the 
company of dkhar boys. This was counterintuitive to me, since most of the Khasis that I 
had encountered kept social circles that were predominantly Khasi, barring a few from 
the more elite and/or cosmopolitan echelons of Shillong society and of course those 
families that had married outside the community. What would make a conservative Khasi 
woman point her sons toward ‘outsider’ boys? The answer lies in the fact that Khasi boys 
are seen by her to be a bad influence, at least potentially. They are visible as ‘bad-boys’– 
very often with long/spiky hair, leather jackets and tattooed arms, loitering around by the 
roadside, sitting in their tinted-window cars, listening to loud heavy metal music, 
drinking, smoking, and generally being broody and/or anti-social. Keeping their company 
and being seen in their company would get any ambitious Khasi boy nowhere, and 
Aiphang’s mother was hyper-aware of this. Contradictions notwithstanding, ‘dkhar’ boys 
are perceived to be more studious, competitive, and also more plugged into realities that 
transcend the local context. 
The veracity of these perceptions is not that important – what is interesting is that 
Khasis and non-Khasis alike share them. The names of examination toppers published in 
the local papers are often noticed to be non-Khasi and, according to Kong Iba, a Khasi 
mother of five, their own children ‘take it easy because in the state they have everything 
handed to them on a plate.’ Dkhar children really have to struggle, she said, since most of 
the college seats and government jobs are reserved for Khasis, Jaintias and Garos. 
Superior academic performance was closely connected to notions of responsibility, 
respectability, politeness, obedience and ambition, and somehow the lack of these too 
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was often transposed upon Khasi men, given how much the cliché of the irresponsible 
Khasi male was invoked in Shillong.  
  And this cliché was invoked repeatedly. It was brought up by men and women, 
Khasi and non-Khasi, elite and working class, urban and non-urban. This is of course not 
at all to suggest that people in and around Shillong are preoccupied with the question of 
Khasi masculinity. They spoke variously of this matter depending on context and to 
differing degrees and were in no small measure incited by my own explicitly stated 
interest in the subject. However, what I’m gesturing toward is that as I conducted my 
research it became increasingly apparent that discussions of Khasi masculinity were not 
limited to a small fringe of individuals or groups as I had believed initially. I encountered 
both disparaging comments and considered reflections from persons I little expected to 
hear anything from. In this section I elaborate the ways that non-Khasis spoke about their 
perceptions of Khasi gender roles and relationships, given how central these are to the 
framing of various critiques of matriliny and of certain aspects of Khasi tradition, 
critiques which are extended by some of the men’s groups. 
  Shortly before I was scheduled to leave Shillong I happened to get into a 
conversation with a middle-aged non-Khasi woman, who was the wife of an Army 
officer; they were living on the military base until the next transfer order. When she 
asked about my research and I said something about being interested in gender issues, she 
immediately began nodding and mumbling something about Khasi men. I was fairly 
taken aback. My own experiences of life on military bases had familiarized me with how 
insular they tend to be, so the fact that these local stereotypes were powerful enough to 
infiltrate the military enclave was striking. Perhaps it shouldn’t have been. Despite the 
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fact that this woman admitted that she didn’t actually know any Khasi or that she rarely 
needed to leave the base by herself, she was still equipped enough with local tropes to tap 
into this commonplace notion of Khasi men as irresponsible and overly dominated by 
women. How was she familiar with these narratives? How loud were these voices and 
whence did they originate such that in her secluded domicile she still could hear their 
echoes?  
  From another standpoint it is hardly surprising that this woman was clued into the 
discussion about Khasi men and their alleged emasculation. Even back in the fifties when 
Chie Nakane (1976) conducted her research, these narratives were in active circulation, 
and she notes in her book, how outsiders visiting the Khasi Hills are struck by what they 
see as the lowly status of the Khasi husband and the high rates of divorce within the 
community. Of course the military isn’t just any outsider passing through – much like 
their colonial predecessors, their ability to ‘do their job’ is also premised on ‘knowing’ 
the terrain and the people in some measure. The role of anthropological accounts is likely 
crucial here too, and as Chapter 2 outlines, outsiders generating scholarship on Khasi 
matriliny have often smuggled into their research a host of patrilineo-patriarchal values 
and assumptions that betray skewed understandings and representations of Khasi gender 
roles and relations. Backed by the authority of knowledge, these texts have had no small 
part to play in the creation and reification of popular outsider narratives of Khasi male 
subjugation and emasculation. Stories about this emasculation abound in local chatter that 
you hear from plenty of non-Khasi residents in the city.  
  I had a taste of this narrative even before I entered the state. This was during my 
preparatory research visit to Shillong when I had landed at the airport in Guwahati. The 
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largest city in Assam, wedged between the sumptuous Brahmaputra to the north and the 
Khasi Plateau to the south, Guwahati was smoldering by the end of May when I arrived, 
and like others heading to Shillong I could hardly wait to find a taxi and commence my 
escape up into the propitious hills of Meghalaya. From the airport it is roughly a four-
hour drive to Shillong, but often securing a taxi can be more vexing than you’d expect. 
Much like in Shillong, where sharing taxis is the most popular mode of public transport, 
at the airport too there is an option of a shared taxi-ride into the city, if you’re quick to 
get to the queue. Not knowing this I had dawdled at baggage claim, so when I got to the 
taxi stand I witnessed the last full share-taxi departing, leaving me at the mercy of several 
rather aggressive Assamese taxi drivers. I had no option but to hire my own taxi and feel 
grateful for the University grant that was paying for it.  
  The journey into the hills was exhilarating, not least because the driver was a very 
young man with a penchant for the accelerator under his foot. I decided to embrace the 
tingling sensation in my spine and chat with him even as blurs of brown and green 
whizzed past the corner of my eyes. We conversed in a wobbly sort of local Hindi, which 
I realized later was what you might call a language unto itself, with a distinctly irreverent 
and rather creative lexicon, popular in Shillong (and perhaps other parts of the 
Northeast).  It turned out that the driver wasn’t Assamese but a Nepali from Shillong, 
where he lived with his brother and sister-in-law near Garikhana. I had noticed at the 
airport that there weren’t any Khasi taxi drivers waiting, and at some point I asked him if 
anything had happened, whether there was some trouble in Shillong. He gave me a 
naughty smile in the rearview. Khasi drivers leave early so that they can be back home 
before dark, he replied saucily.  
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  I gave him a quizzical look, which he took as his cue to launch into an analysis of 
Khasi culture in general and Khasi masculinity in particular. He elaborated on his view 
(one I was to hear repeatedly, by a few Khasis too) that Khasis were relatively lazy, 
unambitious and lacking in business acumen. He and his brother drove their taxi, taking 
turns, as much as they could and if they got a ride at night from Shillong, they would stay 
in Guwahati overnight, with a distant uncle. They had a goal, he said, to make enough 
money to buy more taxis and start their own company. Khasi men are not like us, he 
added. They are complacent in the comfort of their city, he professed, and don’t push 
themselves to do better. I wasn’t expecting all these ‘insights’ and sat back to listen 
quietly. Khasi drivers are happy to make one trip in a day, he said, if they can manage it, 
and then by evening they want to be back at home. Even Assamese men will be at the 
taxi stand till late hours of the night, fighting for a customer, but you won’t see any Khasi 
men. By this time Khasi men are either out drinking with their friends or at home 
watching television, he asserted.  
  Sensing my sustained interest (despite my best attempts at looking nonchalant), he 
launched into an anecdote – I was to hear many such ‘true story’ exemplifications of 
arguments being offered during my research –about a Khasi friend of his. Benedict, he 
said, had been driving his mother’s taxi in the city since he was sixteen, even before he 
finished school. His mother was stern and very religious; he wasn’t allowed to drive on 
Sundays or attend local events like the Autumn Festival with his friends. And moreover, 
my driver added, he was not even allowed to keep the money he earned from his 
circadian efforts, having to fork over his earnings to his mother every evening. He was 
nineteen now and in a recent argument with her he was told very explicitly that after he 
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got married he wouldn’t have the taxi anymore, so he should start making other 
arrangements for his livelihood. 
  This was a tale of Khasi male helplessness and possibly even exploitation, an 
instantiation of the hapless plight of a Khasi man, recounted by a non-matrilineal male 
ally. Now Benedict doesn’t care, he has nothing to gain, explained my companion. Still 
(the driver went on) he is very worried and in the evenings when we sit down with a beer, 
he tells me how he feels. At this point the story trailed off and my driver seemed to 
become lost in his thoughts. The pensiveness of my otherwise feisty driver released an 
inchoate wave of poignancy into our little taxi, induced by what I felt was sadness, even 
pity for the Khasi friend who was clearly being read as not only unfairly policed and 
financially disenfranchised but also perhaps as emotionally abused or neglected. For a 
patrilineo-patriarchal subject, the topsy-turvy world the Khasi male inhabits is set up, at 
the outset, to fail.  
  Against the backdrop of the perception of such anti-male sentiments that are seen 
as socially and structurally endorsed, the devolution of masculinity is seen as inevitable 
and thus the formation of the ‘typical Khasi guy,’ disturbed, drunk and sterilized, 
becomes readable to others outside the matrilineal framework. There was something 
striking about the unseen yet recurring bond that appeared to exist between many Khasi 
and non-Khasi men. Often it surfaced in conversations with non-Khasi men whose 
families had been living in Shillong for two or more generations, but it also emerged in 
conversations with more recent arrivals. On the one hand, there was an acknowledgement 
of bitterness and anger at being considered perpetual outsiders in Shillong, and these 
misgivings were directed mainly 
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management of the public sphere, and who are also seen as spearheading various anti-
outsider movements that have had a history of being particularly violent. Yet 
simultaneously, discussions about Khasi men invariably transformed from expressions of 
frustration and ridicule into those of pity and even sadness. A local Bengali professional 
in his thirties talked about how “everyone here knows” that “Khasi women, toh, are 
mostly unfaithful” and how they had nothing to fear because even if their husband left, 
they would still have a place to go and take their children with them. “Now you tell me,” 
he said, “which man can sit quietly and watch all this happen…naturally [said with 
disgust] he will feel disgraced, but what will he do, where should he go?” Two 
stereotypes are being welded into this one formulation; when the ‘loose’ Northeast tribal 
woman is additionally a matrilineal ‘shrew’ there is a heightening of shame, pity and 
even confusion generated in the Khasi man, from the perspective of the mainland 
outsider.  
  Tribal women in India (along with dalit women) have historically been perceived 
as sexually available to mainstream caste Hindu men. Falling outside the scope and 
strictures of religious and caste-based morality and often unprotected by class privileges, 
these women are not only routinely raped, assaulted and sexually violated, but this 
violence is erased in public discourse as they are seen to be “habituated to sex”28 and thus 
inherently inviolable, or pitched as liars in the assumption that no upper-caste man would 
choose to defile himself by having sexual contact with such an impure entity. As 
discussed in the first chapter, tribal women from the Northeast bear the brunt of 
intensified misogyny since their ethnic, cultural and religious differences often intersect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Language used in the landmark Supreme Court judgment in the 1972 Mathura rape case  
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in their tribal status to render them exceptionally sexualized and openly promiscuous. 
They are perceived to be racially distinct (thus exotic sexual objects), Christian (thus 
apparently more Westernized and sexually ‘modern’),29 and overall not culturally bound 
by the same mores of chastity and virtue into which mainstream Hindu (or what the 
ruling BJP would call “culturally Hindu”)30 women are theoretically conditioned. This 
perception is mobilized to justify routine yet aggravated violence against Northeast 
women by the non-tribal mainstream, both in the context of armed conflict within the 
region but also in the mainland where these women may seek education and/or 
employment.  
Patrilineal Confusions and Patriarchal Continuums  	  
  Insights from scholarship over the past several decades have cautioned us against 
attempting to study concepts like gender, sexuality, race, and nation, in isolation without 
grappling scrupulously with the overlapping and ‘intersectional’ ways in which they play 
out in any social field. An interesting subset of postcolonial theory deals with the ways 
that colonial representations of gender inadvertently snuck into popular Orientalist 
understandings about inherent racial differences between the colonizer and the so-called 
natives. Focusing on the Indian subcontinent, Mrinalini Sinha’s (1995) work examines 
colonially sponsored gendered dichotomizations between the “manly Englishman” and 
the “effeminate Bengali” that were crucial not only to the strategic consolidation of the 
project of British domination in India but also to the multiple political vocabularies and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Of the seven states in the Northeast only three – Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram – are Christian 
dominated states, but this would be just another instance of the sheer ignorance that most mainland Indians 
suffer with respect to the Northeast coupled with racist ideas as well.  
30 The BJP view aligns with the remarks of the RSS chief who, in a recent public speech, insisted that all 
Indians are Hindus, where Hindu refers not to a religious but a cultural identity.	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impulses being articulated from within the domain of Indian nationalism. Sinha shows us 
how nationalist thinkers internalized (to varying degrees) these colonial constructions of 
intricate typologies of gender, where some groups (like the Muslims, Marathas, Northeast 
tribals) were classified as more masculine, virile and warring, and others (like the babus 
and other upper-caste Hindus) more effete and enfeebled.  
  Arafaat Valiani (2014) points out an interesting tension in Gandhi’s response to 
colonial schematizations of ‘native’ masculinity. Even as Gandhi endorsed the British 
theory that Bengali babus, traders and other educated, upper caste Hindu males were 
weak and cowardly (in comparison with their more athletic and assertive British 
counterparts) he simultaneously conceptually attributed their flaccidity to the ingress of 
western civilization and modernity. In Hind Swaraj, Valiani notes, Gandhi advanced the 
idea that while pre-colonial Indian men, particularly caste Hindus, constantly had to fight 
against the so-called dacoits who attempted to pillage their communities, with the 
ensuing protection guaranteed by the imperial Army these plains men lost their 
fearlessness and tenacity and subsequently their moral immaculacy (509). His regimen 
for the recuperation of these relinquished values prescribed participation in wars and 
rekindling intimacy with weapons (British laws had denied Indians ownership of arms), 
“not to engage in superficial displays of courage or to satiate base desires of bloodlust,” 
(515) but instead to develop tolerance for (religiously marked) suffering and hardship, 
creating “masculine ‘warriors’ that were physically trained, morally anchored and 
fearless of their adversaries" (517).  
  This detour through Gandhi (facilitated by Valiani) brings to the fore multiple 
insights that merit pondering. Most broadly it reiterates the propensity of the powerful to 
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taint the racially sub-dominant masculine Other with unequivocal (either congenital or 
historically acquired) frailty and the inevitability of the internalization of this narrative by 
the subjugated peoples (theorized powerfully by writers like Fanon (1952), Sinha (1995) 
etc.). Here however we can see clearly how even liberatory struggles and nationalist 
leaders working within these spaces decidedly engage these discourses, making them 
their own by tweaking them and forwarding their own particular diagnostic theories and 
curative procedures, while being ultimately unable or unwilling to reject the fundamental 
terms of these dominant stagings, displaying instead a curious affinity to them. Gandhi’s 
own specific formulation is wound awkwardly around a theory of European civilizational 
modernity (which itself relies on classic Orientalist framings), whose advances and 
comforts quickly render caste Hindu men lazy and fearful, while mysteriously never 
detracting from the purported alpha masculinity of the British themselves. Unlike certain 
political projects that reject the very grounds upon which inequalities are justified and 
become articulated, seeking instead to wholly reframe the existing terrain, counter-
narratives, such as the above, that struggle against the violence of dominant and 
racialized framings of masculinity seem to be in equal measure beholden to them, marked 
by a simultaneous discomfort with and a peculiar penchant for retaining intimacy with 
them at all costs. Gandhi's own confusions and inconsistencies seem symptomatic of this 
tension.31  
  Gandhi’s call for a reconstitution of the Indian/Hindu male, while differing in its 
emphasis on moral force and the ability to suffer hardship, dovetails with the promotion 
of a sinewy, gladiatorial Hindu masculinity by the right-wing saffron brigade that would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  We will see later how this plays out in the Khasi context as well.  
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counter forcefully the ongoing imagined emasculation of caste Hindus. While Indian 
masculinity was, on the one hand, stabilized and recuperated through the nationalist 
struggle culminating in the ejection of the British, the other thorn in its side – the red-
blooded and procreative Muslims (heirs of the Mughal and other Islamic invaders/rulers) 
-- continues to be embedded within the Indian social fabric, a cause of grave concern for 
Hindu nationalists. It is this dominant avatar of Hindu masculinity (playing out as at once 
secure and also fraught) that people from the Northeast come up against, both because it 
is the normative national model that confronts them as citizens of India, but also because 
it is an implicit point of reference for the commonplace jibes and the intense violence 
they are subjected to on a regular basis as they move through the mainland 
  The internalization of Orientalist modes of thinking by mainstream Indians 
reaches a feverish pitch when it encounters the physical body of the Northeast tribal, 
marked distinctively as East Asian or ‘Oriental.’ In an interesting analysis of Henry 
Hwang’s acclaimed 1988 drama M. Butterfly, David Eng refashions Freud’s theory of 
fetishism in order to show how East Asian male bodies are castrated and effeminized. 
This dissertation takes seriously his suggestion to pay close attention to both how 
“articulations of national subjectivity depend intimately on racializing, gendering, and 
sexualizing strategies” and “the numerous ways in which subjects, both mainstream and 
minority, remain invested in the normative identifications, stereotypes, and fantasies that 
maintain the dominant social order” (2001:3-4). In the Northeast, racial othering 
harmonizes with notions of tribal ‘primitivism’ to produce a further diminished, 
beleaguered kind of masculinity against which both colonial and postcolonial 
mainstream/mainland masculinity (albeit in vastly different ways) set themselves up in 
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juxtaposition. Mirroring stereotypes of Khasi women, Khasi masculinity also finds itself 
doubly distanced from normative masculinity – first othered along racial/tribal grounds 
and then soon after, through its perceived emasculation for being matrilineal.  
  While it is certainly the case that in the Shillong context, all outsiders are not 
made equal, and allegiances between communities from the Northeast differently mediate 
discussions and perceptions of gender, it is also true that patrilineo-patriarchal 
communities from the region (including those identified and identifying as tribal) 
introduce their own unique patriarchal ideologies and expectations to the social field 
which, in no less measure, both bear upon and provide a foil to Khasi ideas, values and 
expectations around gender. Unlike the Bengalis or Nepalis, men from patrilineal tribes 
like the Mizos and Nagas are less likely to label Khasi women based upon mainland 
stereotypes of sexual impurity, but are as likely to agree with the former when it comes to 
the perception of Khasi men as relatively disempowered and lacking the authority that is 
their due.32 
  Women in the Northeast have historically enjoyed a somewhat more elevated 
position than their mainland counterparts and both men and women from the region often 
remarked upon this difference in conversations with me. McDuie-Ra examines some key 
indicators – tribal women have some of the highest literacy rates in the country, their 
employment rates are also much higher, women in the Northeast get married at a later 
age, and in all states barring Tripura the percentage of women making decisions within 
the household is much higher, with women in Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Important here are the differences even between Khasi and Jaintia gender worldviews that will be 
discussed subsequently. 
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Nagaland being almost double the national average. However, McDuie-Ra argues, 
“Beneath these indicators are strong patriarchal relations, though these are formed 
through different traditions to those in other parts of India and are commonly regarded, 
perhaps misleadingly, as evidence of a ‘softer’ patriarchy” (2012:115). Writing about 
Northeast tribal masculinity he notes its appearance in two dominant social constructions 
– the historical and the contemporary. In both these modes we find that tribal masculinity 
has been moored in ideas about hunting, warfare, decision-making and political or armed 
struggle, with men taking on the role of shielding their communities – from the armed 
forces, migrant populations, and rival tribal groups. He writes:  
This is enacted through involvement in armed violence, involvement in ethno-nationalist politics, 
vigilante activity (such as intimidating migrant laborers and shopkeepers), enforcing strikes and 
boycotts and moral policing of women from the ethnic or tribal group. Tribal men are warriors and 
protectors in an ongoing multifaceted battle for territorial control and community survival (115).    
I witnessed one aspect of this protectionist impulse during fieldwork. After dinner late 
one evening I was on the Laitumkhrah main road doing lorni (a unique word describing a 
particular kind of ‘hanging out’) with a group of young female friends, when one of 
them, a Naga undergraduate, suddenly got panicky, asking us to ‘hide’ her. We noticed a 
group of young men approaching on the other side and immediately everyone else in the 
group seemed to know what was going on. Giving this girl cover we ducked into a side 
street and walked up the hill to the shelter of someone’s home. I was told subsequently 
that certain groups (consisting mostly of men) within the Naga Students Union had taken 
on the mantle of moral policing, and young Naga women studying in Shillong had to 
endure a lot of scrutiny and coercion, with some even being compelled to give up their 
studies and return home if deemed ‘errant’. While it might be true that for many women 
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in the Northeast, particularly tribal women, problems like female infanticide and dowry 
death are not routine challenges (and the diversity within the region would likely belie all 
easy generalizations)33, the ubiquitous ethos of male supremacy and female subservience 
is a commonly discussed theme, culturally enshrined and often religiously sanctioned. 
  Thus, for several people raised within patrilineo-patriarchal communities and 
living in Shillong, the Khasi gender/kinship system was ultimately confounding. There 
seemed to be a fundamental difficulty in understanding how society could be structured 
in a way that didn’t exalt and venerate men at the expense of women, and many (men and 
women) interpreted the decentering of men necessarily as subjugation. A man’s authority 
over his wife and his children, his right to make decisions about the household and larger 
property matters unilaterally, his status as the patriarch and so forth were assumed 
implicitly, such that any other mode of organizing gendered life was seen as violently 
infringing on some natural law that decrees men’s status as supreme and legitimately 
imperious.  
  One of the questions I sought to answer through my research was whether 
matrilineal systems conferred gender identity differently than the normative patrilineal 
model, but for many of my interlocutors the possibility even that gender might mean 
different things to people raised within matrilineal societies did not even seem to arise; 
Khasi men are always already legible to non-Khasis. So despite the fact that for many 
Khasi men I spoke to, living with their wife in her ancestral home and meeting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For instance, horrific witch-hunting incidents in Assam are being reported in the national media and 
unsurprisingly most of the people targeted in these incidents are women. Earlier in 2015, the Governor of 
the state was reported to have awarded a honorary doctorate to a tribal woman from rural Assam for 
battling this problem for over a decade: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/witch-hunting-
survivor-who-turned-activist-gets-honorary-doctorate/ 
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responsibilities to her parents was not a source of grave emotional distress or an identity 
crisis, and was in fact often interlaced into their understanding of masculine existence, 
most non-matrilineal men would instinctively shudder at the thought of uxorilocality and 
automatically presume this to reference a lower status for Khasi men certainly but even 
perhaps a cruel social reality that must necessarily leave them feeling distressed and 
emasculated. 
  Both concerned and disparaging remarks about how Khasi men were indolent and 
enslaved and how Khasi women were overbearing and lacking virtue, were freely made 
in front of me (especially if I was recognized to be a non-Khasi), as though they were 
known and undisputed facts. Furthermore, my openly received status as a woman seemed 
to become eclipsed in these formulations. How was it that none of these people thought I 
might be sensitive to or upset by their blatantly misogynistic comments about Khasi 
women particularly, but also about the men? Especially when, wherever I went, my 
appearance, status, and research interests immediately made people assume, rather 
astutely I might add, that I was a feminist. I found that in these moments the solidity of 
gender seemed to splinter, where my being recognized as coming from a non-matrilineal 
world swiftly interpellated me into the mainstream, patrilineal discourse of patriarchy, 
cleanly extricating me from this obscurely gendered Khasi cosmos.  
  This was the steely face of patrilineo-patriarchy I found myself pushed up against. 
It was as though there existed an emotional/psychological continuum of masculinity and 
masculine identity that non-Khasis unthinkingly drew on, and the plight of Khasi men 
was always apprehended and discussed within this framework. This dominant version of 
patrilineo-patriarchy assumes that both men and women intuitively understand and 
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endorse a worldview where men are superior and/or enjoy a superior status; here men can 
consolidate their identity (their very humanity) only if they both feel superior and are 
seen and recognized as superior by all, particularly women, who must never challenge 
their authority, especially over their own bodies. Being a ‘normal’ woman, how could I 
but not be consumed by pity at the presumed plight of Khasi men, and in the face of their 
miserable reality how could I possibly be offended by misogynistic comments. On my 
part I did try to follow the logic of my non-Khasi interlocutors to see where it would lead, 
and if the comments weren’t completely out of line, I’d try to engage them. Soon I 
realized that there were an array of intertwined ideas in circulation that were fairly 
solidified, and at any given point, colorful, sometimes poignant anecdotes could be 
summoned to bolster these notions and ‘demonstrate’ their validity.  
  One of the things I seek to explore here are the ways that this dialectic plays in the 
minds of many Khasi males, who have no option but to confront and engage with, on an 
everyday basis, the patrilineo-patriarchal model of masculinity, not simply in their 
interactions with non-matrilineal cohabitants of the city, but also in the media, in movies, 
in church, in their travels and so forth.34 The dominant edifice of patrilineo-patriarchy 
from within which masculinity is scripted is inescapable and it is arguably its sheer 
pervasiveness that lends it its seductive and hegemonic quality. These images or markers 
of manhood abound and get juxtaposed precisely with non-corresponding markers within 
Khasi matriliny; not finding exact overlaps unnerves many Khasi men, shaping their own 
narratives of sorrow, shame and anger.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  One middle-aged Khasi father of two spoke about the awkwardness he felt when traveling in mainland 
India with his wife, having to confront odd looks from hotel receptionists who assumed that theirs was an 
‘ilicit’ relationship because each partner had a different last name.	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  Put in other words, the notion of the ‘typical Khasi guy’ is internalized by some, 
and strategically deployed by others, but in my conversations with Khasi men there was a 
palpable consciousness of the way in which they were being received by others as well as 
a desire to take stock of multiple perceptions from various sections of Khasi society. 
Through my research I tried very hard to understand and unravel this cliché. I was 
meeting and interacting closely with a whole range of Khasi men and most of them 
seemed levelheaded, lucid and largely capable. In stories however, there were varying 
degrees of concern being expressed on behalf of Khasi men – from outright rejection of 
any problem whatsoever, to claims about the sheer collapse of Khasi manhood. So many 
comments, both carefully explained and casual, were being made about Khasi men/boys 
that I was soon forced to take stock of exactly what was being flagged by these claims as 
I will discuss further in the next chapter.  
From Warriors to Breeding-Bulls: Reciting to Make Real 	  
  In the final section of this chapter I focus on the ways in which outsider views of 
matrilineality enter into and ricochet around within Khasi civil society, generating 
affective and material consequences for matrilineal life. Khasis in Shillong are more than 
conscious of the ways in which they are being read and represented by non-matrilineal 
outsiders. A Khasi woman narrated this story to me: 
There was this guy who has been brought up in Shillong and suddenly he says, “Yeah you know 
here the women rule the houses.” You know he’s telling this foreigner, a friend of mine from 
Belgium, and we were sitting there and he says “Yeah women rule.” I said, “Mohan, you just shut 
up. You studied your whole life here in Shillong, at least learn about the society properly before 
you go and open your mouth to everyone yaa. Because it’s not true, we don’t rule the houses, it’s 
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our husbands and our uncles and everyone that rules, we give so much importance to our men. 
How can you go and tell everyone that you know we dictate terms? We don’t dictate terms! 
This person’s frustration here is two-fold. The first stems from the false story being told 
about the autocratic Khasi woman, but bound up in it is another level of anger towards 
her companion Mohan (marked by name as a Hindu ‘outsider’), who despite having lived 
and studied in Shillong his “whole life,” was still spouting such fairy tales about Khasi 
society as could be expected from a veritable outsider. It is interesting that she does not 
try to change the terms of the discussion. She could have retorted by saying, “Even if 
that’s true, so what?” or “Khasi women are not servile like ‘your’ women are, we have a 
more egalitarian society.” Her Belgian friend might have even found it all fascinating. 
She recognizes however that this is serious business and there is no room for jokes or any 
kind of tomfoolery. Thus she attempts instead to falsify this claim by asserting that even 
among the Khasis it is the men who rule. We find in her statements both an expression of 
an internal Khasi patriarchy, which does bestow men with power, respect and status, and 
a simultaneous internalization/endorsement of the terms of mainstream patrilineo-
patriarchy where men are expected (both by men and women) to unambigiously ‘rule.’ 
While she is clearly irritated at the hyperbole she is confronted with and is keen that her 
Belgian friend be properly informed, it also seems explicit to her that hegemonic 
orderings of gender across the world (that are very much mirrored by the Khasi gender 
worldview that she was raised within) have no place for a system where women dominate 
over men and the idea of such a society will likely be met with much hilarity if not 
outright horror just as it would in the Khasi context. The mismatch occurs here however 
because she is missing out on the reality (as we have just seen) that for an outsider raised 
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within a patrilineo-patriarchal world, ‘dictating terms’ is the sole prerogative of men and 
if women are not subject to these terms then they may as well be the ‘rulers.’ While the 
idea of a ‘softer’ or more ‘egalitarian’ patriarchy does exist within tribal communities 
within the Northeast, mirroring less hierarchical and more flexible gender relations in 
Southeast Asia (Andaya 2006, Karim 1995, Ong and Peletz 1995), the structural 
significance given to women in matrilineal communities seems to cross a line for most, 
especially the mainland outsiders and even Western audiences for whom, beyond a point, 
such a reality defies comprehension.  
 But patrilineal people continue to be enchanted by the idea of matrilineal 
societies. Most don’t know exactly what they are, and following old scholarly traditions 
assume it refers to the socially sanctioned rule of matriarchs. However, when a class of 
people from within the matrilineal society confirms their assumptions, the tension 
generated certainly makes for high drama and media outfits are quick to capitalize on it. 
The SRT and its predecessor from the early 60s (see Chapter 5), which have been trying 
to publicize and garner support for their movement against matriliny, have intuitively 
picked up on both the sensational aspect of their ideology and the continuum of 
masculinity (discussed above) that makes their ‘plight’ instantly readable to the larger 
patrilineal audience. SRT’s President Keith Pariat, with whom I interacted closely during 
my fieldwork, spoke of the numerous people who had preceded me in interviewing him. 
He chuckled over an anecdote about a time when he was stopped on the street in 
Khyndailad by a white man, who recognized him from a photo of an article he had read 
in the French daily Le Monde.  
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Magazines, newspapers, blogposts in India and around the world (spanning 
Australia, France, the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, the UAE, Singapore and others) 
have featured stories about this group. A quick google search will throw up more recent 
articles like – “Reluctant Rulers: Matrilineal Tribe Tries to Shape Up Its Men” (Chicago 
Tribune 1996), “Where Women Rule the Roost and Men Demand Gender Equality” 
(Guardian 2011), “Meghalaya: Where Women Call the Shots” (AlJazeera 2013), “It’s a 
Woman’s World” (The Hindu 2013), “Men Under a State of Seige” (India Today 2013), 
“Men’s Rights in Meghalaya: The Story of a Men’s Liberation Movement” (The Open 
Magazine, 2013) and “Kingdom of Girls: Women Hold Power in this Remote Indian 
Village” (Washington Post 2015) – to name a few. The controversial politics of the SRT 
and perhaps the charisma of its leader, to whom many have flocked, have propelled the 
group and consequently the Khasis more broadly into international fame (or should we 
say infamy?) and recognition.  
  Sitting on the carpet and sifting through Peter’s carefully compiled collection of 
clippings from newspapers and magazines that chronicled the outside world’s interface 
with Khasi matriliny in blatantly pejorative ways, I listened to him talk about how he 
experiences each such article as a personal insult. “How do you think it makes us feel, to 
know that this is how the whole world is seeing us? We Khasis were long known for our 
courage as warriors… some researchers even claim that the reason we became a 
matrilineal society was because the men were always away, busy fighting wars… you 
know, I guess, that when a Khasi boy is born, he is given three arrows – protect his 
family, his clan and his people… this is our tradition, this is our history, but today what 
has it come to? People far away who didn’t even know we exist, now they’ll read this 
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article and laugh – Khasi men are mere breeding bulls?” He is referring to an article 
“Where Women Rule and Men Are Used As Breeding Bulls” in a yellowing Australian 
magazine that was open in front of me. “This has got to change, (he said) and we have 
got to do it.”  
  Here it is forgotten, perhaps unimportant, that these para-trooping foreign 
journalists are not writing such pieces based on ‘objective facts,’ or even from any 
subjective experiences they have had of Khasi gender dynamics. Their research typically 
consists of brief interviews with select anti-matriliny ideologues (like Bah Keith and 
others) that are always recommended to them, sought out and cited. They typically say 
the same things, perhaps with more conviction each time, and what ensues is a battery of 
news clippings that stereotype Khasi men as being weak and servile. Over the years these 
have acquired truth-value and taken on a life of their own, so that now they perhaps form 
the bedrock upon which men narrate their own personal tales of harassment and hurt. 
Enacting and beholding are central to the game of gender as it is played out in practice, 
and this can be seen strikingly in Shillong. One way or the other people are compelled to 
participate in the interminable network of looks – and in doing so, one recognizes oneself 
as the one hailed or recognized, in that famous Althusserian moment where subjectivity 
congeals (Althusser 1971). To refuse this convoluted and crisscrossing circuit of visual 
vectors is tantamount to refuse to be interpellated within larger ideological frameworks of 
society, to refuse meaning itself. 
  Even as most would distance themselves from the radical position of the SRT, we 
will see in the next chapter that several Khasi men (especially from Christian families) 
find themselves in an awkward situation. Where earlier they had an important role to play 
	  	   189 
as maternal uncles, this figure is somewhat redundant in contemporary Shillong where 
there is a preponderance of nuclear families. They perform their duties as fathers but 
many find themselves sidelined by the wife, her family and her clan who are directly 
responsible for the children and stake claim to them. Dissevered from a right to property, 
many men I spoke to felt vulnerable to the mounting pressures of a globalized, capitalist 
world, and in their personal lives expressed alienation both in their relationships with the 
in-laws but also in their mother/sisters’ home where they were no longer as warmly 
welcomed. High alcoholism rates were blamed on this state of social disrepair. Given 
these stories of frustration and sadness that circulate among Khasi men, it is not 
surprising that they struggle to cope with epithets connoting emasculation from non-
matrilineal men, but also from the broader world out there. 
  It is within this context that we can perhaps understand the fine line that 
Aiphang’s mother is treading; even as she desires her son to learn the traditional Khasi 
ways, she must simultaneously point him in the direction of a modern existence by 
showing him that his horizons extend beyond the Shillong skyline. She must teach him to 
be a good Khasi but in such an adroit way that he is not ensnared by the conundrums that 
several Khasi men are facing in their encounter with modernity. The (g)rumbling of 
discontent with matriliny coming from many elite, educated, well-traveled Khasi men 
needs to be read as expressions of the desire to become a part of a globally endorsed 
masculinity, which is based upon its ability to dominate women and to participate 
unhindered in global capitalist desires and practices, to transcend its roots as an 
indigenous society at the fringes of a larger nation-state, but even more powerfully 
perhaps to transcend the nation-state altogether and become a part of a larger patrilineal 
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world order where social structure, kinship, gender relations, religion, and economy all 
legitimate a male-oriented patriarchal worldview.  
Anti-Matrilineal Men in colonial Kerala 
 
In Chapter 2 I discussed the challenges posed by contemporary researchers – G. 
Arunima and K. Saradmoni – for critically engaging with matrilineal systems in Kerala 
especially in their intimate and foundational relationship with the classical 
anthropological studies conducted by Gough, Fuller and Moore. They show how 
anthropological research produced an ‘ideal type’ of Nayar matriliny that ends up 
invisibilizing the fact that matriliny was followed by a substantial portion of the 
population in the region, across caste, class and religious communities. In this section I 
focus on the dramatic changes that were on the cards for matrilineal communities in 
Kerala during the first half of the 20th century. These, as we will see, resonate strongly 
with the arguments being made by contemporary men’s groups in Shillong. Saradamoni’s 
analysis posits as the catalysts for these changes, a group of young, educated 
‘progressive’ men in Kerala, for whom matriliny was highly undesirable as a system of 
organizing kinship, family and economic affairs in their society.  
In a strange foreshadowing of the mobilizations of some of Khasi men’s groups, 
which will be analyzed in the next chapter, Nayar men argued that their matrilineal 
customs relegated them to a position of pre-modernity and barbarism, with ‘strange’ 
practices that had been cast off by the rest of the civilized world – not only the colonizer 
but also the rest of what came to be known as India with which they aspired to integrate, 
especially as the anti-colonial Indian nationalist movement was unfolding. Sardamoni 
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situates these demands for change within a larger framework of land settlements and 
reforms by the modern state of Travancore, but argues that these changes cannot be 
attributed solely to the judicial system. These were the result of efforts garnered by men 
educated into ‘modernity,’ who sought to radically overhaul aspects of their matrilineal 
culture, including formalizing sambandhams (which were the conjugal relationships that 
Nayar women entered into with men of the same or higher castes) as legal marriages, 
delimiting the powers of the karanavan (maternal uncle), glorifying paternal love in order 
to legitimize nuclear families and the conjugal bond, enabling the dismantling of the 
taravad (ancestral home), and passing on a father’s property to his own children instead 
of his sister’s children.  
The demands of these elite men gained a lot of traction leading to numerous 
legislative changes, which had a profound impact on families, social and economic 
relationships. For Saradamoni then, the movement away from matriliny is a painful 
rupture, a fall from the structural equalities built into her own past, that might have 
constituted the ‘just’ society that feminists today have to imagine and fight for, but were 
cast aside not so long ago by ‘progressive’ members of Kerala society.  
Arunima is much more wary of the nostalgia for the matrilineal heritage that we 
glimpse in contemporary Kerala, a nostalgia that attributes all its virtues to this utopian 
society where women ruled the roost, such that, from one feminist vantage point, the 
changes come to be experienced as loss. Her ambivalence stems from an understanding 
of the taravad as being the locus of power, wealth and prestige – only affluent and landed 
Nayars owned taravad property – and she argues that upper-caste, wealthy Nayar 
concerns underlie the historical refashioning of the lost figure of the powerful matrilineal 
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foremother. In a sense her project carves a much more subtle analysis of the dismantling 
of the matrilineal system, which resists the anthropological ideal-type of anthropologists 
as well as a feminist reclaiming of the past based on a somewhat questionable nostalgia, 
and instead undertakes a social history of the Malabar province foregrounding the 
taravad, upon which complex relationships between class, caste, gender, age and kinship 
converge.  
Arunima identifies the advent of colonial rule as the point of trauma for these 
societies. Colonial administration (with its patriarchal bias) appoints the oldest male as 
the legal representative of the property and the family, leading to (within a short span of 
five decades) a meteoric rise of the status of the karanavan as the ‘headman’ of the 
taravad. This elevation of position is accompanied by a putting into place of new and 
arbitrary hierarchies, where women and the younger members of the taravad are 
subordinated and made into legal dependents of the karanavan. Resistance to this 
autocracy of the karanavan is a feature of the late 19th century, with a plethora of 
strategies being mobilized by the younger members, such as moving away from the 
traditional taravad. These rebellions and changes were mostly undertaken by the younger 
men; the flurried activities of the men are accompanied by a concomitant passivity of 
women, who become increasingly relegated to the realm of the private, restricted from 
both education and employment.  
The impulse to move toward urban locales and lifestyles is also an impetus for the 
disintegration of the agrarian based taravad. Arunima argues that the draw of wider 
identity attachments, like caste and nation, propelled the transcendence of the limited 
zone of the family for Nayars in Kerala. The hegemonic power of individualism, 
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capitalism, patriarchal values and customs (both colonial and nationalist) take on a strong 
hold in the imagination of these men (and women), and it is within this context that we 
can understand their desire to jettison an older identity that was shackled to a strong sense 
of tradition and community. Polyandry and hypergamy begin to be seen as barbaric due 
to a confluence of widely held patriarchal values as well as inter-caste rivalries. It is 
against this backdrop that she situates the Nayar men’s demand for legal interventions by 
the colonial government that would endorse the patrilineal nuclear family, with its 
grounding in ‘love’ and shared access to property. These demands constituted, as she 
points out, not only a claim to a stake in property, but also a protest against a system that 
was too strongly associated with female authority or autonomy.  
We see many of these ideas resurfacing but in differently calibrated ways among 
certain sections of Khasi men in Meghalaya. The SRT men for instance were aware that 
matrilineal systems in Kerala had ‘disintegrated,’ but were not aware of the role of their 
(elite, educated, well-traveled) Nayar counterparts in the creation of legislations that 
dismantled matriliny over decades. The history of matriliny in Kerala, both of the male 
mobilizations and the feminist nostalgia and longing for the (now castrated) virile 
foremother, serves as a useful counterpoint to the contemporary debates around kinship, 
community, gender and sexuality unfolding among the Khasis, which will be the subject 
matter of the next chapter.  	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Chapter 5 
Matrilineal Anxieties: Gender Politics at an Impasse 
 
 
Don’t give a woman too much freedom/For worldly wise she can never become/Her womanly 
grace will degenerate/For she’ll unreasonably argue and castigate/She won’t bother of 
consequences big and small/She won’t realize what is right, what is wrong/Don’t give her too 
much liberty/For she may lose her dignity – Ka Jingsneng Tymmen (The Teaching of Elders) Part 
II (1903) 
 
Trra tak tak ngin ialeh ha ban da jop kumba phah I mei na ïing (We will fight victoriously as 
instructed by our mother from home) – Lyrics from song accompanying customary dance. 
 
Doing fieldwork in Shillong I spent a lot of time in taxis. I relied on them to get 
everywhere. The city has a fairly extensive and organized network of ‘shared taxis,’ and 
on a good day (when cops weren’t anticipated) up to 5-6 passengers could be squeezed 
into the dinky black Maruti 800 painted yellow on top. On days I wasn’t able to schedule 
an interview, or had no events to attend, and no place to be more generally speaking, I 
often found myself riding around in taxis. This was one of my favorite ways of being in 
the city; an inconspicuous way of traversing various localities, each slightly different than 
the other, to be in close proximity with people, which is of real physical comfort 
(especially on chilly winter days) when you’re alone, and to listen to them talk among 
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themselves or then loudly on the phone, with no expectation of privacy35. After listening 
to church sermons in Khasi, this was the next best way for me to practice understanding 
spoken Khasi. Often I was lucky and struck up conversations, which would then lead to 
further interactions. But even (and especially) if you choose to sit in a taxi just to 
commute you could count on spending a lot of time in it. Traffic ‘blocks’ proliferate 
around school (start and finish) times and the journey from say Jaiaw to Laitumkhrah, 
which normally takes around fifteen minutes, could extend into an hour and a half. This 
also gave me ample time to stare out the window and watch people going about their 
business, enacting their public lives. 
  The volume of young people in the city often struck me; Shillong is considered an 
educational hub within the Northeast and many ambitious students from across the region 
move to Shillong for higher studies. From the variety of youth of various fashions visible 
on the streets of Shillong, the ‘typical Khasi guy’ was sharply contrasted. Across various 
localities they were typically seen behind tinted windows in cars parked by the roadside 
blaring heavy metal music smoking cigarettes and drinking with friends. When they 
emerged in their black t-shirts or leather jackets, sporting tattoos and greasy spiked hair, 
they seemed aloof and owned their difference from quotidian folk. Alternatively they 
could be seen riding through main streets on pulsating bikes. Like them their vehicles 
tend to have a flamboyant mien; a particular ‘gang’ from Laban picked a bright pink to 
have their cars stand out. I couldn’t say if all these young men had critiques of matriliny 
or whether they were just going through a particularly dark or rebellious phase, but they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 An audio-visual installation art project by Shillong-based artists explores the relationship between 
people, cityscapes and memory as they play out in the confined yet unfettered space of the taxicab. For 
details see http://reddur.com/work/kali-kamai/ 
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were certainly referenced constantly by those who did, pointing to them as the perfect 
instantiation of the decrepit state that Khasi masculinity had fallen into in contemporary 
times. They certainly were the most visible avatar of the ‘typical Khasi guy;’ the other 
important one was often less noticeable: stumbling around in the comfort of darkness was 
the inebriated Khasi man. Because of the shameful and furtive nature of this problem 
alcoholism often slips through official statistics, but high incidences were reported by so 
many of my interlocutors; most acknowledged the truth behind one man’s assertion that  
“nowadays each and every family has at least one man, sometimes woman, who has died 
of drink. I know one family where four out of four brothers, all taken to the bottle and 
died of it.”  
  In this chapter I analyze some of the concerns being raised by Khasi men’s groups 
fighting against matriliny and male subordination, which starts to open up our 
understandings of a Khasi masculinity that, as I argued in the previous chapter, is being 
shaped by and against the ideological framework of patrilineo-patriarchy. I undertake an 
analysis of the organizing principles and logics of the anti-matrilineal ideology espoused 
by the SRT and some others. While elaborations of the problems with matriliny are 
directed on the twin axes of matriliny as ‘traditional’ and as ‘contemporary’ systems, my 
theorization outlines a critique of the compulsive framing of these struggles primarily as 
products of the matrilineal system.  
  Further I show how the remapping of the tribulations of Khasi men onto more 
pressing social concerns leads to the gendering and hierarchization of feelings. I examine 
the forms that these assertions of hardship take, the ‘scientific’ and evolutionary ideas 
they draw on, and the resulting framing of history and colonial relations, clan and gender 
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dynamics that occurs. These articulations pivot on two figures that are staged in an 
antagonistic struggle for power – the maternal uncle and the youngest daughter and I 
bring these up for analysis. Finally, I explore the status of ‘truth stories’ that described a 
fantastic, demonic world – a treacherous, bloodthirsty world with power gone awry, that 
can be restored only through the casting out of matrilineal principles.  
  Simultaneously, in this chapter I attend to voices that are countering these efforts, 
especially those from a feminist perspective. I detail this debate that is spectacularized in 
the figure of the youngest daughter threatening to undo patriarchal authority, not merely 
to analyze the problem of systemic power and much less to establish who has it more or 
in what forms, but to see how power is being taken up as a discursive device. I’m 
interested in the moments of rhetorical conflict and the kinds of narratives that they both 
throw up and shore up. I argue that in studying the staging of politics or politics in action 
rather than power itself we can be attentive to unexpected discursive alliances that get 
formed, which need to be thought through especially for how they might be pushing 
feminism to come up against some of its own limits.  
Extinction as Event: Construction of a Community in Crisis 
 
  The atrophy of the human body, its slow but certain putrefaction, follows the 
unraveling of the mind, both engorged with drink and despair, impelled into this 
wretched state by potent forces outside their control. Dulled, distressed, this ‘typical 
Khasi guy’ was precisely the fallout of a bankrupt social system that, unable to keep up 
with changing times, has gone terribly awry. The group that has garnered the most 
attention for pitching this as the dismal backdrop against which it proffers its critique of 
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matriliny has been the Synkhong Rympei Thymmai (SRT). As discussed earlier, the SRT 
has perhaps been the most prominent face of anti-matriliny in Meghalaya with its 
proposal to switch to a patrilineal system instead, and has received enormous publicity 
from journalists across the world. To a western audience barely coming to terms with 
feminist movements and starting to acknowledge the concept of women’s rights, this 
story immediately piques the curiosity of many. Academic audiences I have detailed my 
research to, have also reacted instinctively with fascination. 
  There is something rather quaint and anachronistic in the story of a group of men 
in what Anna Tsing has called an “out-of-the-way-place” in (an overly misogynistic) 
India agitating against a social system where women are perceived to be either dominant 
(due to the oft-repeated slippage between matriliny and matriarchy as discussed in 
previous chapters) or equal. In the media and popular discourse the debate tends to focus 
on the more radical demand for a complete overturn of matriliny being made by SRT. But 
there are other groups and individuals offering parallel critiques of social realities, based 
on problems they argue are inherent to the matrilineal traditions of the community. Most 
striking in this context is the Maitshaphrang Movement (“strive forward”) (MSM), which 
has been advocating for the passing of an “Equitable Distribution of Ancestral and Self-
Acquired Property Act” and the “Meghalaya Compulsory Registration of Marriages Act.” 
In 2012 MSM succeeded in converting its latter demand into law. Since the passing of 
this Act in 2012 its convener – Michael Syiem (who was also a close collaborator) – has 
further been protesting the tardiness of the government in actually framing rules that can 
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be legally implemented.36 On March 3rd 2015, the Meghalaya Cabinet announced its 
approval of amendments and rules for the Act to be introduced in the upcoming 
Assembly session, which in the absence of serious public opposition, will become signed 
into law. 
Since it doesn’t advocate explicitly for patriliny, the MSM was seen by many of 
my informants (especially those who agree that some things do need to change) as being 
less radical and more practical than the SRT and therefore relatively palatable but also 
more importantly perhaps less socially stigmatized and unacceptable. Nongbri (2014:57) 
notes that the tendency to be one-sided “led to the failure of the men’s movement in 
Meghalaya, which despite the initial enthusiasm it generated not only ended in a 
whimper, but also failed to bring about the desired reforms in the system necessary to 
keep up with the changing times.” While debates about the contemporary relevance of 
matriliny might have been very charged during the nineties, particularly with the rise of 
the SRT and the MSM, it would be premature to dismiss these movements as having 
failed or died out. The playing field may be uneven for these anti-matriliny groups but the 
larger terrain is also arguably lurching – increasingly people, mostly men but also 
women, find themselves gravitating towards the arguments being made by these groups, 
especially since (as Nongbri would argue) there is a veritable paucity of positions that are 
more balanced, thoughtful or nuanced. 
Opposing these groups is ostensibly the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council 
(KHADC) that has been trying to consolidate (but in selective and strategic ways as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 He was incidentally described by others as “eccentric,” and “a loner,” but also as being someone who 
believes strongly in his ideals and was willing to “sit alone outside the Secretariat doing dharna 
(protesting) for days without caring what others think.”  	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have already seen) the matrilineal traditions of the Khasis. This underscoring of tradition 
is not merely a reaction to modern cosmologies and ways of life or a romantic 
idealization of past plenitude now under threat. As discussed previously, the Indian 
Constitutional emphasis on the key role of the Autonomous District Councils as bearer 
and enforcer of customary laws and practices for the hill-tribes of the Northeast creates a 
framework whereby tribal subjects are necessarily routed through ‘tradition’ in order to 
be legitimately interpellated as modern or contemporary Indian subjects. Set against these 
two opposing factions (the SRT and the KHADC) the relative success of the MSM is 
often seen precisely as a product of a somewhat more balanced, more acceptable position, 
even as it shares much of its theoretical arsenal with the SRT in terms of its 
understanding of multiple lines of social degradation (based on gendered disharmonies 
and the floundering of men) caused by contemporary problems emanating from within 
Khasi matriliny. Even though MSM was formed with eight people in 1990, the same year 
that the SRT comes together, it has been an independent group. Bah Mike distinguishes 
the MSM from the SRT saying, “It is a very [his emphasis in speech] informal 
organization, we do not have a Constitution. It’s like a movement of ideas. We don’t take 
up issues. It’s all about ideas and propagating those ideas.”37 
The articulation of a crisis engulfing Khasi men has been discursively mapped 
onto a perceived crisis of the entire jaitbynriew; kinship, gender and nationalism have 
become tightly knit together making dissent (particularly from women) tantamount to 
disloyalty. The reassertion (and reorganization in the case of SRT/MSM) of national 
identity has historically been associated with peoples’ struggles against colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Bah Mike would for example endorse children taking their father’s name if they choose to but isn’t 
overtly prescribing that for the community.	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dominance and hegemony. Scholars of the ‘nation’ have long called our attention to the 
unyielding nexus between racist ideologies/discourses and nationalism. Etienne Balibar 
demonstrates how within the ostensibly egalitarian nation-state, racism functions as a 
broad and heterogeneous system of crisscrossing lines of domination and marginalization 
such that “ethnic racism” and “sexual racism” cannot be isolated, thus arguing that 
“racism and sexism function together, and in particular racism always presupposes 
sexism” (1988:49). Feminists like Cynthia Enloe (1989) have further shown how within 
these struggles for a national identity gender has been a key mobilizing vector. On the 
one hand, the nation itself has been gendered feminine38 (and thus in need of protection) 
and women turned into symbols of the nation (both for needing protection and for being 
child-bearers and child-rearers, thus responsible for the reproduction of the uniqueness of 
the nation along both physical and cultural/moral lines).39 On the other hand, the voices 
and demands of actual women are most often suppressed; even as they contribute 
significantly to these struggles for self-determination they are asked to postpone their 
goals until after the nationalist dream has been realized. 
It is within this context that Cynthia Enloe argues that rather than having anything 
to do with the experiences of women, nationalism springs “from masculinized memory, 
masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope” (1989:44). The overarching 
patriarchal ethos and the influence wielded by Khasi men in the public/political domain 
has, as Nongbri’s work demonstrates, led to the crystallization of an anti-woman stance, 
with ideologically opposed groups (pro-matriliny and pro-reform) both pushing for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In Khasi the word for nation/country ‘Ri’ has a ‘Ka’ (signifying female) prefix 
39 I was told by a non-converted informant that Khasis consider women to be the Lukhimai or the goddess 
of the house, and is made to wear a crown, symbolizing her position as queen or royalty, even as the “most 
important member of the clan is the uncle.”   
	  	   202 
masculine primacy and the control of women. The exclusion of women’s voices enables 
men to freely draw on multiple imaginaries in order to strategically consolidate their 
authority, which they argue has both been damaged and dissipated in the transition from 
‘tradition’ to ‘modernity.’ The picture being painted is that of an enervated Khasi man, 
depleted of his khadar bor (twelve units of energy), thus unable to fulfill his traditional 
role of leader and protector of the community, particularly in the face of increased influx 
of non-tribals in the city.40 
These groups of (mostly) men in Shillong have identified matriliny as the source 
of numerous problems that have come to plague contemporary Khasi society, upsetting 
the ‘proper’ orderings of gender (distilled from both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
narratives) and unleashing multiple waves of crises perceived to be a threat to the very 
existence and continuity of the tribe. Their account of the destabilization of gender roles, 
responsibilities, expectations, and hierarchies that follows from a purported dislocation of 
‘traditional’ Khasi matriliny within the contemporary moment is the subject of this 
chapter. I will explore their rationales for challenging what the SRT calls the ‘custom’ of 
matriliny. Framing matriliny as a custom rather than a part of ‘culture’ is a theoretico-
political move – while culture must be preserved at all costs, customs that become 
outmoded ought to be jettisoned, they argue. As one person put it, “Culture is a way of 
life; it’s how you live. Customs are the practices that show the world how different you 
are from the world. These customs can be made away with but culture we should not lose 
sight of.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The Khasis have a saying: U rangbah khadar bor, Ka kynthei shi bor [A man has 12 units of energy, a 
woman has one] – often cited as an instance of the traditional Khasi conceptualization of men as physically 
(but also mentally) superior.  	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Opposition to these groups is strong, yet it is important to note that there are as 
many responses to these men’s groups as there are Khasis (each person comes to this 
subject with their unique set of experiences and perspectives), and trying to catalog or 
typologize them is always already a fraught task. This is nothing special about Shillong 
or this topic particularly but is instead perhaps an enduring philosophical and 
methodological dilemma of anthropological (or more broadly humanities/social science) 
research – how might one contend most ethically with the scholarly ‘impulse’ to distill 
generalities about social existence without sacrificing at the altar (often violently) the 
quality of human distinctiveness or that which resists categorization? Rather than trying 
to map the various kinds of reactions then, I take up the voices of a few people (in the 
same fragmentary and idiosyncratic vein that runs through projects such as this) and 
analyze them in relation to each other, so as to draw out some of the theoretical 
complexities being raised by these unique conjunctions between matriliny and gender and 
explore what insights and challenges these throw up for the field of feminist theory and 
praxis. 
  The popularity of the SRT in the national and international media could suggest 
that lobbying against matriliny is a recent trend within Khasi society. However voices of 
dissent, mostly male, began emerging back in the early 60s, when the precursor to the 
SRT, called the Iktiar Longbriew Manbriew (ILM), translating figuratively to ‘the 
powers/rights gifted to people to bring up life,’ took cognizance of what they found to be 
a growing crisis within Khasi society.41 Spurred by a book written by J. Darningstone 
Lyngdoh, which tabulated some of the problems emerging from within Khasi society and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This group thus predates many of the men’s rights groups that have burgeoned across the globe primarily 
in response to feminist battles within socio-political and legal arenas.	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argued that the matrilineal system divested men of responsibilities, a group of around 
thirty men congregated to address these problems. Men found themselves in their wives’ 
home after marriage and the pressures of that transition were exacerbated by impressions 
that they were being treated like an outsider or then a guest in their new home. The 
arrival of children on the scene did not assuage this disconnect but rather amplified it, as 
they were often reminded, particularly during times of conflict around issues like child-
rearing strategies or decisions around children, that the children belonged to the wife’s 
clan and were their primary responsibility. 
  Because of these feelings of not belonging and being unmoored from their 
children, men had no strong structural ties to their marital kin, the group observed. Bah 
Constant, himself a frail man in his eighties, commented on the fragility of marriages in 
those days, where men would ‘run off…if anything happens, even a small quarrel…and 
take another wife.’ The loss of the husband was never a serious one, according to him, 
because if one left, a woman could easily marry again, and her children could continue 
their lives within the ïing (family home) with little interruption. Bah Constant pointed to 
the dispensability of married men and perhaps a fundamental lack of value associated 
with them by saying “…actually the males, they aren’t anything. Sometimes when the 
wife doesn’t like him she will push him away and he will go off to his mother’s house.” 
  Having identified problems such as these, the ILM held meetings within the 
community, organized debates in schools and so forth, but Bah Constant spoke of “great 
opposition from people,” widespread anger, suspicion and threats. Women would show 
up to their meetings with betel nut knives under their sleeves to threaten these men. The 
group nevertheless met privately and tried to mobilize ideas and resources, but over the 
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years, ended up falling apart, mostly because their jobs took them in different directions 
away from Shillong. The SRT, which pitches itself as the reincarnation of this group, 
narrates their history like this: 
…gradually the group became defunct but the idea never died, it resurfaced years later, after a few 
young article writers, on this particular subject, decided to meet and this sparked the spirit of 
resurrection of this group and on the 14th of April, 1990, the “Syngkong Rympei Thymmai” was 
born at the YMCA Hall at Mawkhar, Shillong in the presence of a few of the surviving members 
like J. Darningstone Lyngdoh, Dr. A. Lyngwi, Shri. Kress Mohon Lyngdoh and others.42 
Inter-generational familial bonds, shared stories and experiences seem to be at the heart 
of this resurrection, along with the recognition that many of the problems that were 
identified in the past still resonated with contemporary social realities. Some of the older 
ILM men staunchly supported and mentored the younger members of the SRT, affording 
them a sense of history, continuity and purpose. The son of a late ILM member remarked 
on his father’s keen sense of observation and his perceptiveness. Likening him to a 
“social prophet,” he said: “many things which he told me in an offhand manner, which I 
never realized to think deeply in those days, but now I see them happening day by day, 
day by day. I see changes happening in the way exactly he said it would.” An older SRT 
member remembered that this gentleman used to wonder out loud – “sometimes I’m 
surprised, why do I worry about a race that’s not worried about itself, why am I alone 
worried about it? But I can’t help it. I worry. That’s why I do all this.” 
  Many of the SRT men construe themselves as both ordinary and exceptional – 
ordinary in that they are not elite or well-to-do but extraordinary in their ability to see the 
systemic problems unfolding around them, and in their struggle “to do something for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 http://www.srtshillong.com/about-srt/ 
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Khasi race,” unlike the rest who are “only bothered to make money and live rich lives.” A 
predominantly educated group, these men have taken on the responsibility of educating 
the rest of Khasi society about the ills of matriliny, conducting meetings in villages and 
traveling to different places like Smit, Jowai, Ribhoi, Mawlai, carrying pamphlets, and 
giving speeches. “Wherever we went we had a big audience, invariably people came to 
join. In the end we had a register of about 2000 people,” Keith Pariat, the president of the 
SRT said to me.  
  Martial imagery is often invoked, the feeling of having to push hard against the 
tide of mainstream Khasi society. When some of the men come to him saying their wives 
are complaining, they’re being asked to quit, Bah Keith would tell them, “You expect this 
please. Don’t think this is going to be a rosy path, where you can just amble across. This 
is going to be war basically. You’ll get sticks and stones, chappals. Don’t think it is 
going to be easy. If you face brickbats and you back out, you are a coward. You face 
them proudly and lift your head high and try to make them understand that what you’re 
throwing at me is not going to hurt me, its going to hurt you and the Khasi race.” Another 
person spoke about the vulnerability of the Khasis as a group: “You see a foreign invader 
will invade us at any time of the day, because he knows that we are not the masters of our 
own. A Khasi male is not the master of his land, he’s not the master of his clan, he’s not 
the master of his family, he’s not the master of his own self. He does not have even a title 
re!” 
  Several jokes were in circulation on the subject. “Khasi male is the third sex,” I 
was told. I must have looked perplexed and I certainly wasn’t chuckling – “females, 
males and males,” they added to help me out. This feeling that Khasi men “had frankly 
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become not men anymore” was experienced painfully by many of my informants. Direct 
comparisons were made to the patrilineal outsiders whose aggression was linked 
structurally to their dominant role within the family. In contrast: 
Here the Khasi men cannot fight back, because we have been raised by this custom to become you 
know… being pushed here and there, from the house you leave empty handed, you go and live in 
your wife’s house where you become quite useless frankly, you produce children, they’re not 
yours. Theek hai (it’s okay) I’m happy because I have no responsibility. So I play the guitar and I 
drink and I die by 35. 
The degradation of the Khasi male is inextricably linked to the future of the Khasi 
jaitbynriew, which in turn fundamentally animates the SRT call for a change to patriliny. 
A study conducted by Kong Biloris Lyndem (an eminent educationist and former 
chairperson of the state Women’s Commission),43 which found that all of a hundred and 
seventy nine Khasi women interviewed reported a preference for a non-Khasi mate, was 
often cited as incontrovertible proof of the “sunk down” state that Khasi men find 
themselves in.44 Concerned with the plight of these men, groups like the SRT and MSM 
are asking why it is that Khasi men have become or perceive themselves to be such pitiful 
characters and what are some of the measures that need to be taken to remedy the 
situation. Bah Keith puts it poignantly thus:  
Most Khasi women seem to want to marry non-Khasis…but nobody has ever been bothered to 
find out why the men have sunk down so low. They just say, ah, how can I marry that man – he’s 
a drunkard, he’s a drug addict, but has anybody worried, or spent some energy to find out why did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  A male friend jokingly calls the Women’s Commission Seng Ot Tiar (roughly Women who cut up 
things) 44	  I was shown a clipping of this article. While Kong Biloris does cite this study she doesn’t exactly link it 
to the “sunk down” state of Khasi men but rather to their cruelty and violence. “It is scary to even think of 
the types of abuses that are inflicted on women,” she writes as an explanation for why Khasi women are 
choosing non-Khasi men.	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Khasi men sink so low? Nobody’s ever bothered, there has to be some reason why he’s sunk down 
so low for Khasi women to not want to marry him anymore. 
The answer to this question is clear in his mind – Khasi men have “sunk down so low” 
because of matriliny. However it is important to note here that many of the issues being 
highlighted by the SRT as failures of masculinity that are direct outcomes of the 
continuation of the supposedly outmoded matrilineal system also end up surfacing in 
elaborations of the problems being faced by non-matrilineal Northeast tribal men more 
broadly. Duncan McDuie-Ra’s (2012; 2013) nuanced work on Northeast tribal 
masculinity in migration is eye-opening, and reading through it you can immediately see 
the resonances between the Khasi male experience (as explicated by the men’s groups) 
and those of other Northeast tribal men encountering a baffling range of challenges 
especially in their encounter with non-tribal mainlanders as they seek education and 
employment in Indian cities like Delhi. The framing of the future of the jaitbynriew as 
being on the verge of disintegration simply because Khasi men are supposedly being 
consumed by matriliny starts to seem paranoid and exaggerated against this larger 
backdrop. 
  Even though it was amply clear to him through our multiple interactions that I 
didn’t share his “ideology” as he called it, Bah Keith seemed glad that I was genuinely 
interested in the questions he was asking, and wanted to know my diagnosis of the 
problems faced by Khasi men and what they were being triggered by. In part my work 
seeks to respond concretely and adequately to the many points that he made to me over 
extended discussions and time spent hanging out. Incidentally what I learned in Shillong 
was that many others (both men and women) were asking similar questions as he was but 
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did not necessarily support the solutions that his group has been proposing. We will 
return to some of these voices later in this chapter. 
  The Khasi male’s purported undesirability as a mate is not a problem just for him 
however. If Khasi women don’t want to marry Khasi men anymore, then where will you 
get Khasi children from, ask many of these men? Contrary to those who argue that even 
if a Khasi woman marries an outsider, her children (provided they are raised according to 
Khasi norms) will ensure the continuance of the Khasi race, these men subscribe to an 
understanding of lineage and race that is bound up with ideas about physical 
distinctiveness and the purity of blood. As one person put it, the race “will carry on, but 
with what blood strain? Not a Khasi blood strain.” Many of my informants vaguely 
referenced scientific studies that ‘prove’ that it is the father’s DNA that is more 
significant for the appearance of the child, thus also justifying why Khasi men marrying 
non-Khasis did not pose a problem for the sanctity of the race, as opposed to when Khasi 
women took non-Khasi husbands. “The seed comes from the man, the woman is the soil 
so to say, where the seed is put in so that another Khasi can come out,” I was told. 
Another SRT person put it, “if things are going as they are, I’ll give you 50 years. Khasis 
will live only in name, not in physical features, not in tradition, not in culture. They’ll just 
make a few statutes there and keep you in the museum and say there once was a race like 
this, they dressed like this, they ate like this, they looked like this.” 
  Being educated, having studied or worked outside the state, both in other parts of 
India and abroad, these men strategically draw on disparate tropes in order to bolster their 
case against matriliny. Science, seen as the bastion of modernity and reason, the engine 
of progress, is often juxtaposed with ‘traditional’ customs and beliefs. “You have to run a 
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society based on intelligence, on observation, what is good what is bad, not on sentiments 
that are redundant,” I was told by Bah Keith early on while discussing the positive impact 
that the entry of women into the Dorbars (a sphere that women have traditionally been 
excluded from) has had.45 Also the Rangbah Shnong (elected leader of the Dorbar) of his 
locality, Jaiaw Pdeng, he affirmed their role saying, “I think it’s very, very good. Women 
are very balanced, they think from a women’s point of view. But Khasi people are 
generally very emotional, they want to hang on to traditions…especially in rural places, 
they don’t want women in the Dorbar. What’s been set please don’t touch they say.” This 
then became a perfect segue into the ideological stance taken by the SRT, which too sees 
itself as battling against the supposedly traditional, superstitious and emotional nature of 
the unenlightened (or then self-seeking) Khasis, and recourse to science – theories, 
methods, an entire worldview – is a dominant and recurring theme in this narrative. 
  The withering away of the race as a physically discrete entity (most scholarly 
accounts of the Khasis refer to them as belonging to the Mon-Khmer group, distinct even 
from the other Northeast tribes who are seen as being Tibeto-Burman) is one axis along 
which the men argue that the tribe is under threat; the other is the very physical existence 
of the people and their land. One person outlined the impact of matriliny on border 
communities – Khasis have traditionally practiced village endogamy, such that both their 
consanguineal and affinal kin would be present in the same village, making it easier for 
men to not only move between their marital and natal homes, but also to protect the 
boundaries of their properties and villages. With time however, the complexity of 
interrelations compelled people to marry outside their village, leaving the borders to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Dorbars	  are	  the	  traditional	  administrative/judicial	  units	  that	  are	  protected	  by	  the	  Sixth	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  Constitution.	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oversight of men who were from a different village, who has – “no right, he doesn’t feel 
he belongs there because why should I bother fighting for this boundary, its not my land.” 
The problem of border encroachment (“now Meghalaya is being eaten up area wise, from 
Assam, from Block 1, Block 2, from Garo hills, Jaintia Hills, all over”) is a matter of 
great public concern in Shillong and this connection being made by the SRT is designed 
to touch a nerve. 
Absent Uncles, Abject Fathers: The Story of the “Sunk-down” Khasi Man 	  
  When men leave their villages after marriage the other outcome is that they’re 
unable to fully participate in the everyday lives of their ïing members, and their role as 
brother and maternal uncle begins to diminish. Mass migration from villages to cities has 
also had the same effect. In the contemporary urban context, between work and their own 
nuclear families, men rarely have the time to attend to the needs of their lineage mates. 
The influence of religion is significant too, an informant explained – “majority of the 
Khasis now are Christians and we are taught that the family is the mainstay. Here it is the 
father, the mother and the children, whereas in the Khasi context, it is the kñi (uncle) and 
the pyrsa (niece and nephew).” Many claimed (including those who did not support the 
SRT in any way) that the kñi’s role these days is a severely circumscribed one – the 
parental unit was the primary source of authority for the children. As one person put it, 
“He’s still the kñi in name, but he doesn’t come and interfere, he’s not there anymore. 
The kñi is there for show.” 
  We have previously noted the strong influence of the British on the Khasi 
worldview given how their relationship unfolded in close proximity to each other, first in 
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Sohra and then with Shillong becoming the capital of colonial Assam. Even today, if 
forced to pick a ruler, many would state their preference for the British rather than the 
dkhars. Particularly for the majority Christian population, the British were the bearers of 
progress, development, modernity, and a better, more enlightened and spiritually 
sophisticated way of life. The indigenous religion is likewise perceived as being less 
modern. “The cutting of the roosters head and reading the entrails, breaking the egg and 
telling the future, and what’s going to happen to the crop…In this modern world, can 
you, I don’t know, I have no right to say all this, but I find it hard to still take out the 
entrails of the rooster and read my future from there. It’s not acceptable anymore with the 
modern society, so I don’t want to believe in that religion anymore, but that is culture, 
and culture and religion for the Khasis are entwined like this, you cannot separate them,” 
said one interlocutor.  
  The wholehearted acceptance of Christianity by the majority (and the proximity 
that most Khasis feel toward the conventional markers of modernity and westernization) 
creates a somewhat disjointed relationship with what is understood as ‘traditional’ 
matrilineal customs and relationships, something that the SRT is trying hard to tap into. 
“We are sick of the funcles,” a queer friend of mine said to me mysteriously one night we 
were returning from a fashion show. “Funcles?” I repeated a little confused. “You 
know…the f*ckin’ uncles.” Like most others she did not in any way support the SRT, but 
was nevertheless pointing to the relative insignificance of maternal uncles in 
contemporary Shillong, or the feelings of distaste they induced when they tried to 
interfere unnecessarily, particularly in those Christian households where the fathers are 
respected and loving figures. While this did not prompt people to reject matriliny, only to 
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see it as undergoing changes, the SRT would build on this sentiment in order to pitch for 
the adoption of patriliny. I was told of an older ILM member who would apparently joke 
with his detractors saying – “You people have all gone and become Christian. But God 
did not send his nephew, he sent his son. Your nephew will not come to save you.”  
  The affinity between Christianity and patriliny is a recurring if fraught theme. 
According to an SRT member, “Christian religion teaches nothing but patriliny. 
Generation after generation they’ll name only men. Its totally patrilineal or patriarchal 
you can say.” However while religious leaders have molded people's behaviors in 
enormously significant ways, they have steered away from critiquing matrilineal 
practices that were seen as social (while expressly forbidding those related to the 
indigenous religion). “They don’t preach that you should keep the husband as head of the 
house, wives should be a little lower in status in the family, the husband should be the 
head of the house. All that is stated clearly in the Bible. But do these pastors say that in 
church? If they say that then all the women will become some other religion, they’ll leave 
Christianity, that’s why they keep quiet. None of the pastors will preach this because why 
are they there, only to draw more people,” he added.  
  Michael Syiem (of the Maitshaphrang Movement discussed above), a Christian 
but “not a church going” one, offered a different critique in his quiet witty manner. “The 
religion that we’re teaching is also church-based. That’s why Meghalaya is such a corrupt 
state. We’re Christians only in church no?” While many of these educated Khasi men 
might have some critiques of religion or religious institutions, they nevertheless deploy 
Christianity (as the unmarked religion in the Khasi context) strategically in order to 
forward their ideology, playing in fact on the very emotional sentiments of people that 
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they simultaneously critique. The reference to God’s choosing his son over his nephew 
playfully seeks to enjoin people as good Christians to embrace completely the message(s) 
of the Bible, especially those that pertain to the desirability and propriety of patrilineo-
patriarchy.  
  At the same time since Christianity is not the only religion, and these men are also 
keen to reach out to people following the Niam Khasi, they try to keep religious 
references to a minimum. “If we go to a village where we know that all have converted 
then we talk about the Bible more, otherwise we are little careful,” I was told. The SRT 
Constitution expressly requires members to avoid both religion and politics, so as to keep 
their ideology clear and untarnished. This principle led to a splintering of the SRT when 
the former General Secretary, a staunch Christian, started “Bible-thumping” too much. 
Another faction was formed subsequently, which draws on the Bible a great deal in order 
to push for patriliny. When I asked if I could have this person’s contact information I was 
told that he would not be willing to talk to me since I am an outsider. What was being 
suggested to me implicitly is that the combination of Khasi chauvinism with excessive 
religiosity detracts from the ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’ logics and sensibilities that the SRT 
is keen to identity itself with, even as it promotes a world where women are expected to 
play second-fiddle to men.  
  Thus while the explicit goal of the SRT policy to not rely too heavily on religion 
is ostensibly formulated to not alienate the non-Christian population, it was also a means 
for them to shroud their gender-conservatism by distancing themselves from potentially 
problematic discourses and instead aligning themselves with modern and globally 
popular discourses of indigenous rights, human rights, justice, dignity and gender 
	  	   215 
equality. It is important to note that Christianity is not being rejected here at all. In fact 
there is a clear reliance on the dominant Christian endorsement (implicit as it may be) of 
a patrilineal ethos through nuclear families, paternal authority and the not-too-uncommon 
adopting of the father’s name (unproblematic for those with two Khasi parents as we 
have seen), but this Christianity is differently configured from the one being sold by the 
former General Secretary discussed above. Rather than ‘rabid’ or ‘conservative’ it is 
uniquely aligned with a constellation of ideas about Western modernity, renaissance, 
science, technology, rationality and so forth.46 It is against this backdrop that we have to 
situate the SRT claims that matriliny is outmoded in the contemporary world where 
Khasis are aspiring to become like the advanced West. As one of my informants put it 
“we would like to be equal to them, but our society is being run by customs that are Stone 
Age. These rules and laws are bound to take us backwards not forwards.” 
  No longer wielding the same kind of authority and influence in their own ïing, 
men (most of them Christian) seek to assert themselves as heads of their family of 
procreation. But according to Bah Mike these changes are not accepted by Khasis – “we 
still say that uhh… it’s the uncle. So the father he’s not really the head of the family.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In the face of a spurt in violence against Christians since the Modi government has come into power, 
Christian intellectuals around the country are explicitly making the connection between Christianity and the 
countries of the modern West that India is keen to have strong ties with. As Mari Marcel Thekaekara 
writes, “The new war on Christianity is counterproductive, and strategically stupid. It will not only harm 
the image of India globally, it puts into jeopardy the millions of Hindus living peacefully and happily in the 
U.S., Britian, Europe, Canada and Australia…The NRIs who funded the Modi campaign will not be 
pleased about the damage of India’s image just as they are beginning to be proud of the country’s emerging 
global position. Nor will they appreciate the backlash that might affect them sooner or later, as news 
spreads to churches abroad about the vandalizing of Christian churches, the rape of nuns in Kolkatta and 
Orissa, and the burning down of a Delhi church.” The association between Christianity and the modern 
(theoretically secular but affectively Christian) West is an intimate one and Christians in India draw on it 
both in terms of making sense of their own identity-as-Other within the Indian (read Hindu) nation-state but 
also in order to caution the mainstream to not take them as powerless, unseen, unrepresented minorties that 
can be violated with impunity. See: www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/being-christian-in-
india/article7036448.ece  
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Tales of paternal disenfranchisement abound is conversation with men against 
matrilineage. Even though for the Khasis the father is a key figure in the nuclear unit47 
and his family/lineage (referred to as kha) shown a lot of respect, there is strong 
discomfort around the fact that structurally speaking, the husband (being of a different 
kur) is considered an outsider by the matrilineal kur of his wife and children. In a 
previous chapter we encountered the sense of alienation that men feel in their new homes 
after marriage, particularly around eating spaces. Even after children are born and men 
have adjusted a little in their new environment, they are periodically reminded of their 
outsider status. A passionate expression of this discontentment goes as follows: 
If they have a clan meeting, father is left out because he’s not [of the same clan]. My children can 
go, my wife can go. Me, the father, I can’t even peep from the window and see what they’re 
talking. You’re breaking the family into two. I have no right to go with my children and wife? 
What are you doing? Tearing the family apart, from the root! Family is the basic foundation of 
society, if your family is broken into two, don’t talk about society, it’s never going to stand up. 
And now because of this practice – the children belong to the wife – I have no authority over them 
when it comes to major decisions, because the clan will have more authority, because they belong 
to that clan, because here for the Khasis, its all kur kur kur kur. The kur will take the decision. The 
father becomes totally powerless. 
Even as the father is rendered too abject and isolated to “even peep from the window” his 
condition is never isolable from larger social concerns. Here we encounter a reiteration of 
a key theme outlined above – the compulsory interlacing of the personal with the 
systemic. Problems are never significant enough solely at the level of individuals or even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Despite stories about how historically Khasi husbands only visited at night and never had any role to play 
as husbands or fathers, Khasi fathers have for long been considered one of the key pillars in the Khasi 
kinship cosmology, as Bah Syntiew reminded us in the previous chapter. Alternatively some Khasis will 
entirely disavow this practice saying that this is a feature of Jaintia society, and in a cruel twist of fate end 
up likening Jaintia men to “breeding bulls.” 	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families – they must necessarily be connected to the bigger picture of society and 
jaitbynriew. In this way they are similar to mainland India’s men’s rights groups 
described by Romit Chowdhury, who use the very discursive framework of men’s rights 
to argue against a purely individualistic, rights-based women’s movement that they 
perceive to be in conflict with traditional Indian family values. He writes: 
This apparent inconsistency is explained if we understand that the call for men’s rights in its 
present form is hardly ever about the male individual. Rather its demands are couched in the larger 
moral project of saving the family and the nation. Any conflict between the demand for men’s 
legal rights and family/community values is, therefore, mitigated not so much by a simple 
assertion of male supremacy but by the moral terms that structure the project of men’s rights. 
[2014:41] 
With the SRT men too we find a strategic use of rights-based language/logic that 
questions the fairness of the matrilineal system for men, but never purely for their own 
individual sake. Within such a framing, neither is it possible to conceive of fathers who 
are not very interested in being a part of their wives’ clan meetings and do not consider 
them a threat to their families, nor can we take seriously the experiences of men dealing 
with frustration, anger, grief, ridicule, loss, isolation, angst, injustice etc. on their own 
terms. While feelings are a very important component of the dynamic being described by 
Khasi men, there is a simultaneous impulse to quickly remap them onto ‘more important’ 
social realities. 
  In the stories of these men we can sense also how sentiments get gendered and 
hierarchized – anger, frustration, humiliation, injustice and rebellion become fronted and 
legitimized, while melancholia, paranoia, insecurity, grief, loss and others are quickly 
passed over. One the one hand I was asked repeatedly to weigh in on questions relating to 
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justice. Is it fair that there are so many expectations on the father (“feed your children, 
clothe your children, educate your children,” “go running to the doctor for medicines”) 
but “he has no rights” [when up against the clan]? I was told if a child’s mother dies they 
are considered orphans even if the father is alive, and will be taken by the kur, “unless I 
force it, unless I challenge the customary law to take them with me.” A young woman 
who is a member of the SRT argued, “In our system, the khun khadduh gets everything. I 
feel that’s biasedness, because why should the last daughter get everything? In today’s 
world all the siblings should have equal rights to the property.” 
  Other kinds of feelings on the other hand became subjugated – when I 
commiserated with an interlocutor about how if it was true that Khasi men were suffering 
then something ought to be done about it, he replied promptly and emphatically: “I would 
not say that we have to change because men are suffering. Khasi men are too 
irresponsible to feel any pain, any suffering. I would say go for a change because we have 
to save the land. We have to save the land.” The tendency to self-castigate is also 
frequent and perhaps part of the goal to provoke audiences (both Khasi and outsider) to 
pay closer attention to their message (“Khasi men are too lackadaisical and easygoing,” 
“we Khasis don’t know how to progress, we are like frogs in a well, always pulling others 
down to our level” and so forth). Saving the land, uplifting the tribe, preserving the race 
and so forth become far more elevated and compelling projects than attending to the 
everyday experiences of socially gendered men and women. 
  Further, we find here that the contemporariness of the nuclear family, its 
discursive glorification in the chaotic ‘modern’ world, becomes the yardstick against 
which the Khasi family, with its archaic insistence on “kur kur kur kur,” is measured. As 
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Chowdhury argues, for many of the men’s rights groups that have proliferated across 
mainland India since the early 90s, the fact that “the holy institution of family is 
struggling today for its survival and suffering with dislocation in the era of globalization 
for India [sic],”48 is attributed to the blossoming of the “new Indian woman,” in turn 
associated with the rise of consumerism, neoliberal policies and logics, global media and 
most importantly to feminist legal and political interventions. Protection of the Indian 
joint family, which now flexibly includes the nuclear family where the father’s aged 
parents may reside, becomes construed as an antidote to an individual-centric, 
materialistic, ‘modern’ Western culture under which the legitimacy of their masculine 
authority has been called into question. 
  For the SRT men in contrast, matrilineal ‘customs’ are experienced as a hindrance 
to the progress of the tribe; the nuclear family is pitted against it, in fact as a mark of and 
the vehicle to a more evolved, modern, progressive and westernized social system of 
organization that has freed itself from the regressive powers of the kur. Within this more 
modern, less matrilineal nuclear family the relationship between a father and child is 
understood to really flourish. Under matriliny, according to the SRT, this ‘natural’ 
relationship is described as being stymied; as the concept of the nuclear family took hold 
fathers had something of a ‘coming to see’ moment. As one person put it – “now they 
[fathers] understand, no, these are my children,” as opposed to matrilineal fathers who 
supposedly didn’t recognize the relevance of that bond. “So even in traditional 
households, Khasis who are still staunch supporters of the traditional belief, a father 
would nowadays spend more time with his children. It is just natural for him to do so than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Cited from a circular shared at the 4th Annual National Men’s Rights Meet (2014:38). 
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with his nephews and nieces,” he added. The pitting of these two sets of relationships 
against each other assumes that individuals are incapable of forging deep and meaningful 
bonds with multiple sets of relations; since one must necessarily pick between pyrsa and 
khun (children), it becomes but ‘natural’ that the closer blood kin would be chosen. 
  Any potential of the dilution of the power of the father, the fact that it can 
potentially by contested by the wife, and through her structurally by her kur is a principal 
thorn in the side of men arguing for patriliny. Here too the SRT relies on evolutionary 
ideas about “matriarchates” or women-dominated societies being both outmoded and 
unnatural. “In the west women were shouting for their survival, here in Khasi society 
women were trampling men over their head,” said one Khasi man mirthfully. Drawing on 
both Khasi and patrilineo-patriarchal gendered imaginaries around women being the 
“weaker sex,” the SRT poses the question of how reasonable it is to give so much power 
to women. The young SRT member cited above (herself a bright, articulate and ambitious 
sounding person) spoke of how “a woman doesn’t have as much thinking power” and is 
more suited to “support a man, like you know the saying ‘Behind every successful man is 
a woman’.” Khasi women are “too projected” and even though “they are the weaker sex, 
they keep them right at the head,” she added. This “traditional” domination of women, 
who she believes “are on top of the men” leads to Khasi men “lacking exposure” and 
confidence and thus “lagging far behind.” 
  Not only are women seen to be the weaker sex, they are also considered the 
“weaker link.” Land is being ceded not only at the borders as the informant above 
emphasizes, but also in the very heart of Meghalaya. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the problem of “infiltration” by outsiders is placed squarely at the feet of Khasi 
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women with little consideration to how men might be complicit in facilitating benami 
transactions for their personal gain. Outsider men are said to charm naïve Khasi women 
and through them are able to buy land, acquire business and “capture the economy.” 
“What is the use of the Land Transfer Act?” asked one person, “if my sister marries a 
non-Khasi he can easily buy land in her name or her children’s name.” Many pointed out 
how most of the shops in Police Bazaar and Laitumkhrah are owned by outsiders now, 
and “these days outsiders are trying to enter into government too,” I was told. The fact 
that most outsiders seeking their fortune in Meghalaya today are men (which of course 
stems from the greater mobility of men) means that there is a visible increase in alliances 
between Khasi women and non-Khasi men. The fact that women have historically been 
seen as symbols of the nation, and literal bearers of the community fosters the potent 
feeling that Khasi women are not producing ‘Khasi’ children in marriages with non-
Khasis. Citing the example of the children of a prominent business family with a Khasi 
mother and non-Khasi father, an SRT leader explained: 
Now they’ve [the children] become Passah because of their mother. When we were in school 
together, we never knew they were Passah. It was only when they had to go to college, they had to 
get scholarships, then they had to become Passah, taking their mother’s title. Now all that while 
they’ve been living as high class Hindus, with their father Roy – but when they applied for 
Scheduled Tribe certificate, they gave their title as Passah which they’ve never given ever in their 
school life, and they’ve become Khasis now. Now that’s happened before that decision of the 
Supreme Court but there are hundreds of thousands of other families living in the same kind of 
situation with their forward class non-tribal fathers, having a tribal mother, they become Khasis. 
How is that possible after the Supreme Court decision? I want to find out the reason why a 
Supreme Court ruling is not being followed here. 
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Implicit in this is another complaint about how Khasi women who marry non-Khasis 
easily allow their children to give the father’s title, and might even change theirs. “If they 
get married to a Khasi and you say the children should give their father’s title, they’ll say 
‘Oh My God, tradition doesn’t allow us,’ but if they marry a non-tribal they’ll say ‘theek 
hai no problem.’ Why? That’s crazy,” this person puzzled irritably. This seems to 
underscore their observation that “Khasi men have sunk so low,” that they “bring out the 
true nature of Khasi women…bossiness.” 
  However, the manipulation of the system by non-Khasi men and “their children,” 
is the key point being emphasized here. Even though many of these children that I spoke 
to described being raised in the “proper Khasi way,” they are looked down upon both for 
being half dkhars or ki khun shiteng (half bloods) and for supposedly “misusing” the 
system and selectively adopting Khasi lineage and customs when it suits them despite 
also enjoying the (patrilineo-patriarchal) privileges of their possibly elite, upper caste, 
non-tribal fathers. Thus one of the objectives cited in the SRT Constitution is to compel a 
Khasi woman (but not a man) married outside the community to forfeit her share of the 
property even as “family assets/properties shall be apportioned off equally among sons 
and daughters alike.” 
  Here the SRT is also referencing a 2006 Supreme Court decision by Justice H.K 
Sema and Justice A.R. Lakshmanan in the case of Anjan Kumar v. Union of India & 
Others that adjudicated that the petitioner (born of a Scheduled Tribe mother and 
Kayastha ie. Forward caste father) could not apply for a Scheduled Tribe certificate since 
he was raised in his father’s caste and did not suffer any disadvantages associated with 
having a tribal status. The tendency of similar cases previously has been to presume that, 
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since India is a patriarchal and patrilineal society, children acquire the caste of the father. 
Such judgments were “significant for us who are fighting against the matrilineal system,” 
supporting their ideology by rendering children of non-Khasi Hindu fathers into non-
tribals. However the then Chief Minister D.D. Lapang made a public announcement that 
this rule would not apply in Meghalaya but did not apparently give a reason for it, 
causing frustration among the SRT ranks, since a judgment of the highest court of the 
land should legally take precedence over a KHADC law. 
  A more recent decision by the Supreme Court could be seen as further thwarting 
the SRT’s hopes of gaining legitimacy through the judicial machinery. In 2012 Justice 
Aftab Alam and Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai (in the case of Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika 
v. State of Gujarat & Others) observed that the status of children born of inter-caste or 
tribal and non-tribal parents is to “be decided on the basis of the facts adduced in each 
case.” While there might be a presumption that the child adopts the caste of the father, 
this presumption is “by no means conclusive or irrebuttable and it is open to the child of 
such marriage to lead evidence to show that he/she was brought up by the mother who 
belonged to the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe…[and]…that he was always treated as 
a member of the community to which her mother belonged not only by that community 
but by people outside the community as well.” 
  Reading this judgment in conjunction with the KHADC Lineage Act is likely to 
lead to an intensification of the sense of injustice SRT members feel; the Act, which in its 
purported project of ossifying traditions, ends up granting ‘ki khun shiteng’ full Khasi 
citizenship (as long as they meet the listed criteria), while denying it to the pukka Khasi 
children (both parents Khasi), much to the chagrin of the SRT. However, as we saw in 
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the case of the politician Waibha Kyndiah, it is very difficult for the KHADC to really 
penalize children born of two Khasi parents even if they take their father’s name. When 
he took his case to the courts, they decided that he was in fact eligible to contest for 
elections from the tribal seat; since both his parents are tribal he has to be tribal. 
Similarly, when I asked a Khasi father whose children (with a Khasi woman) all took his 
last name whether the KHADC created any trouble for him he replied, “Yeah, they tried 
to create a problem but I argued no? I said you give me in writing that my children are 
not Khasis. They couldn’t give in writing so they had to give me the certificates.” Even 
though this man didn’t actually apply for scholarships to educate his children it was 
clearly important for him to insist (successfully) on being issued those certificates. 
  Khasi women are also seen to be marrying outside the community much more 
frequently than Khasi men when they leave Shillong for higher education. “When they go 
out to study they don’t come back. They get married there, they don’t come back. The 
percentage is frightening, that’s why my wife and her family decided not to send my 
[only] daughter out, because they want her to marry a Khasi,” explained one person. In 
my interactions I did notice a tendency for families to be more hesitant to allow their 
khun khadduh to pursue an education elsewhere or leave Shillong for employment 
opportunities. This is of course part of the larger set of restrictions that fall upon the 
youngest daughter, who traditionally speaking can be disinherited for a number of 
transgressions. Being the custodian of the family religion the expectations upon her are 
far greater than those on her other siblings, and this tends to continue even among the 
Christian Khasis. 
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Anxious Reflections: Spectacle of the Monstrous Female 
 
  I will return to some of these narratives about the pressures that fall upon 
youngest daughters, but it’s sufficient to note here that such stories do not appear on the 
radar of the SRT men, for whom the youngest daughter is a darker, much more potent 
and manipulative figure. With the waning power of the maternal uncle and the 
circumscribed authority of the father the khadduh has taken control of the household 
affairs and decisions, they argue. “They [matriliny apologists] say youngest daughter is 
only the custodian but now that the maternal uncle has run off she is acting like she is the 
heiress,” I was told bitterly. Colonial policies around land administration ignited the 
process of mapping land in terms of individual ownership rights, and with the British 
emphasis on customary laws, we find that land deeds or pattas began to be written in the 
name of the khadduh, or much more rarely in the name of the maternal uncle. 
  Disputes over property have historically led to court cases, with the courts ruling 
in favor of the khun khadduh. A 2011 decision by Gauhati High Court Justice Anima 
Hazarika (in the case of U Bernard Kurbah and Smti. Joan Krissilda Rani v. Ka 
Bernadette Mary Kurbah and Ka Resetta Mary Kurbah) also upheld Khasi traditional 
laws. She observed that the plaintiff is the only daughter “and therefore according to 
custom the Khadduh (youngest of the womb)…Under Khasi customary law no male 
member can inherit the ancestral properties left behind by his mother when there is a 
youngest daughter surviving in the family, who would automatically be the heir and 
successor of ancestral property left behind by her mother.” The power that customary 
laws carry forward with them into the mainstream judicial system is what the SRT men 
find themselves reacting strongly to. “The laws have emancipated youngest daughters to 
	  	   226 
such an extent that they are no longer custodians,” asserted one person. While the 
proportion of youngest daughters seeking legal redress are few, and most who wish to 
continue to live and maintain ties with their kin try in fact to live up to the expectations 
upon them, the SRT feels that ultimately the legal powers lie with the khadduh and so she 
is not really just a custodian. 
  Also, she isn’t a custodian they argue, because nowadays youngest daughters 
couldn’t be bothered to care for their siblings, particularly their brothers. A sad ‘true 
story’ of an unfortunate man went like this: Bah Hep (a carpenter) and his wife lived with 
his mother in a nice Assam style house while she was alive (like U Bernard Kurbah 
above), but upon her death the daughter (married to a British man) returned from England 
and after all the ceremonies were completed, locked the main house and sent her brother 
to live in a small single room outhouse. Lacking any means of his own the brother had to 
comply, and led a pitiful existence “eating potatoes, salt and this ‘white stuff’ (local 
brew) for dinner.” I heard numerous stories like this during my fieldwork. “It may not 
appear in some good families, but it is happening rampantly in all the other rural areas. 
The khadduhs are usurping everything, brothers are being thrown out of the house,”	  I was 
told. 
  This was connected to an allied “weakness” attributed to by the SRT woman cited 
above – “women feel insecure all the time and want to sell off things, because they don’t 
have a sense of owning, a sense of belonging,” she observed. In a context of a heightened 
threat experienced by many Khasis in the face of outsider influx, the importance of 
ownership and community is what she felt needed to be emphasized more. “So what I 
want to do is I want to own something. I will start a business and I will be an example to 
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others. I will own something and not sell it off and not allow any outsiders to come and 
control it,” she added with great clarity. Youngest daughters who didn’t have a right to 
own property in the old days and were expected to undertake the responsibility of their 
siblings, particularly those unmarried or divorced, had now become proprietors. Unable 
to really manage the responsibilities that come with all this power women were 
crumbling and letting the community down at multiple levels was the fairly explicit 
position being staked by the SRT. “Name one family where the youngest daughter is 
taking care of her drunk brother,” I was challenged. 
  This description of a strain visited upon the somewhat ‘marvelous’ sibling bond 
(that has been described as a foundational premise of matrilineal societies) becomes 
soldered onto another more garden-variety tale of the battle between sexes. Freed from 
oversight of the uncle, not obligated to submit to the authority of the father and with the 
full force of law behind them, Khasi sisters (with the youngest often as the mascot) are 
described as strategically coming together to wrest complete control over resources and 
decision-making within the lineage. In this conspiracy, not only are men in their role as 
fathers sidelined, but as brothers too they are described as being neglected at best or else 
expressly crushed or cast out: 
There is a family in Nongthymmai, I can give you the name, the son is a drunk and the sisters keep 
telling their mother give him money, give him. He gets money, he doesn’t trouble the house. 
They’d rather give him money, go drink some more so you die fast, go drink. These things happen 
but people don’t really realize. Or they don’t want to see. 
This story is rendered especially horrific given how it plays alongside another more 
commonly narrated story – that of structural alienation and discrimination against boys in 
the family. In traditional Khasi society (the story goes) people would openly lament about 
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their son – that he will go off to live with others/become a part of someone else’s home (u 
ban leit sha ïing ki briew). Of course in places like Shillong you are unlikely to hear such 
a thing anymore since people are supposedly more ‘gender sensitive,’ though lingering 
traces of this sentiment were still palpable to people as they recounted stories from their 
families to me. A middle-aged professional woman from a well-to-do family, eldest of 
four daughters and mother of two, spoke about how her family was not conservative and 
didn’t follow customary practices: 
Yeah, my mom like when we were young… her belongings, her assets, which she got from my 
grandmother you know, she had like crockery, very old crockery, jewelry, gold chains and all you 
know which were again very old, handed down from my great grandmother, so that was her share, 
she always divided it equally amongst us, she never said that the youngest will get all. Like we all 
got this Khasi bracelet she gave each one of us one, and gold chain (showing it to me) she gave 
each of us one, and it was the same size, not one gets smaller and the youngest sister gets bigger, 
not like that. So my mom, that was already there, instilled in us, equality. Maybe because we were 
all girls, so it was easier. But then my mom, she would make these statements – if you had a 
brother I wouldn’t have given it to him, because he’s going to go to another woman’s family, and 
he’s going to carry this property or whatever I’m giving him to another woman, so what’s the 
point giving him. She had that mentality. 
This “mentality” (particularly in the older generations and more conservative households) 
that sons will leave (traditionally after marriage they are supposed to leave with nothing 
but the shirt on their back) and become a part of someone else’s family is supposed to 
explain why lineage resources (particularly ancestral property) are not handed down to 
them. Then there is also the cultural stereotype that Khasis, particularly those originating 
from Sohra, are khap nap (stingy or petty with money). Further, part of this story is the 
oft-repeated refrain of how Khasi society has become individualistic, money-minded, 
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cutthroat and so forth. Set against all this is the image of sisters conspiring amongst 
themselves and intentionally handing out money to drunken brothers to induce their early 
death. 
These macabre tales intentionally overturn two founding (and possibly universally 
held) stereotypes about humans – a) that the female-sex 49  is inherently 
emotional/empathetic and hard-wired to be nurturers and b) that basic bonds between 
closely related individuals within the family are inherently strong and immune to such a 
systemic level of breakdown. In doing so, the tales alert the audience to the gravity of the 
problem being discussed, enjoining them to ‘see’ what is happening right around them 
and intervene quickly. The abnormal figure here is most certainly the Khasi woman, who 
in this singular conjunction of matriliny with modernity, seems to have become reshaped 
into some kind of freakish abomination. The image of Khasi sisters wresting control and 
killing off the men both overtly hides/inverts and inadvertently reveals the normalization 
of the killing off of women within patriarchy – the monster female overshadows the 
monster male gesturing to the nascent violence at the heart of kinship relations.  
The monstrosity of this female spectacle draws on genuine discomforts around 
what a world ‘ruled’ by women would look like. What happens when ‘female power’ 
goes awry, destroying everything in its wake, including clan and blood? What do these 
anxieties open up for us? They seem to push against basic ideas of society/kinship, where 
fundamental 'roles' that dictate transfers of power and inheritance etc. are being subtly 
undercut. According to the SRT it is only with an extreme intervention (a switch to 
patriliny or a two pronged attempt to severely curtain female power and simultaneously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  In Shillong many of my informants referred to women as females, using the two interchangeably. 	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empower men) that the natural harmony of gender hierarchy can be restored, which is 
necessary for Khasi society to become ‘uplifted.’ I have tried thus far to critically unpack 
the complex and often convoluted claims being made by the SRT that draws strategically 
from feminism the language of gender equality even as it explicitly posits a worldview 
where women become the supporting cast. It is against this background that the SRT 
Constitution lists as its first aim/objective – “to give full authority to the father to be the 
master and protector of his wife and children; that the wife shall be the principal source 
of support for the family.” 
Troubled Engagements: Countering Anti-Matriliny Voices 
 
  Having come in such close proximity with the “much maligned monster” (Mitter 
1992) that the SRT paints the khadduh to be, it is perhaps apposite that we begin a section 
on some of the responses to anti-matriliny movements by encountering alternate accounts 
of this figure. I looked hard, in my admittedly limited range of experiences in Shillong, 
for a villainous, self-serving, or even ‘alpha’ khadduh, but my search was mostly in vain. 
Most youngest daughters in fact spoke of their status with fatigue, worry and sometimes, 
even distress. I once teased my Khasi language tutor, an energetic middle school teacher 
who happened to be a khun khadduh, about why she took on so many jobs (she tutored 
others too) when she could just relax and live comfortably on her ancestral property. She 
looked at me like I was insane, launching into a lengthy explanation about how her life 
was so much more complicated because she was the youngest daughter. A big source of 
her anxiety was that if she wasn’t doing well financially her husband was more likely to 
leave her (especially since she came with the added baggage of her household), and then 
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doing well financially became doubly important since she had to shoulder the 
responsibility of her children and her parents once they retired). Incidentally Khasi 
husbands relying on their wives’ income was not an uncommon story, even among some 
of the working class Kongs50 I would talk to in snack shops or jadoh stalls. 	   	   Even	   as	   youngest daughters tended to be loved and pampered, they also felt 
unfairly scrutinized and policed for gender appropriate behavior, rules of akor-burom, 
who they went out with, how they dressed, how long they could stay out at night, whom 
they could get into a relationship with and so forth. Most of them were not allowed to 
leave Shillong for fear that they would become “too exposed” and might decide to not 
return. This was a story by a friend of her friend: 
Poor Bari, she’s going to be 40, she’s still being ruled by her parents and by her brothers. She’s 
the only daughter, and she’s got a daughter already but she’s still being treated as a16, 18-year-old 
kid. That’s not fair. I mean it’s very difficult, whatever steps she makes in life, none of them, 
they’re not willing to let her be you know. And she’s like ‘Okay then I’ll move out, I’ll take my 
daughter and move out’. ‘Why are you emotionally blackmailing us,’ they say. And then at the 
same time the two brothers will be discussing with the parents. She married a guy and he left her, 
just imagine, that becomes a shame for them. There’s too much emphasis on this burom and 
everything you know. At the end of the day it’s like you don’t want your daughter to be ditched by 
a guy, or marry outside. So much responsibility on her no? Then you have to go through all that 
emotional thing no, you can’t even have a boyfriend, just because your husband has left you you 
can’t have a boyfriend? And they want to choose who you date, why can’t you just be happy with 
your daughter… 
The locus of her family’s honor (and in non-convert families the bearer of the family 
religion), a youngest daughter is traditionally expected to adhere most strongly to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 ‘Kong’ is the formal/respectful term of address for an older Khasi woman.	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customary rules and gendered expectations. Here we see clearly how the very power that 
she has over her parents (as the person who will be looking after them when they are old 
and enfeebled) is turned around to disempower her (in reading her needs as attempted 
“emotional blackmail”). Nobody who was not a khun khadduh wished to be one, but 
many expressed relief about not being the youngest, or not being married to the youngest. 
Several men I interviewed ended up admitting to the differing standards their youngest 
sisters were held to, that sometimes they themselves enforced. When I asked a male 
friend about whether his parents would have been upset about him marrying a non-Khasi 
he said that growing up they never said any such thing to him or his brother, but with 
their sister they would drop hints from time to time about how it would be best if she 
married a Khasi man.  
  My point in drawing on these narratives is not simply to reject the formulations of 
the men’s group by arguing that youngest daughters do not ‘actually’ have the agency 
and privilege being attributed to them, or that their lives are far more complicated than 
being portrayed given the numerous embodied responsibilities and negotiations they 
constantly have to undertake. This is a position that has already been staked by many – 
primarily those that are invested in maintaining the matrilineal system. These include a 
wide range of people from conservative voices upholding ‘traditional’ culture in the face 
of external changes to Khasi feminists51 opposed to the masculinist framing of matriliny 
as matriarchy that forms the terrain upon which the bid for change is being made. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 I use the term ‘Khasi feminists’ to refer to a particular subject-position of Khasis expressing investment 
in gender-based human rights and empowerment with the recognition that they might not use that term to 
describe themselves. In fact it is precisely these slippages that I am interested in.  
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  Here again Tiplut Nongbri’s work is the most significant, as she systematically 
demonstrates how the traditional system in fact endorses the domestication of women 
rather than bestowing unlimited authority and agency upon them. With regard to property 
the argument emphasized is often that the youngest daughter is the custodian, not the heir 
or the owner of the property and as one informant (a non-convert from a prominent 
family) put it, has to seek the “green signal of the mama for even the smallest decision in 
the house,” let alone before buying and selling property. According to him the youngest 
daughter is given the ‘lions share’ because she is the caretaker of the old parents and any 
one who falls upon hardship, while all the other siblings leave the home. If the family 
happens to be wealthy and has property to distribute, the group next in line that is entitled 
to property are the women since: 
A Khasi says a female has got one power a male has got twelve powers, khadar bor you see52. 
Because a male is supposed to work, he’s not supposed to stay idle at home. He’s supposed to 
work and bring income to the family. It is the male not the woman who should work. Why we call 
the women goddess of the house, because they are caretakers of the house, they are the ones who 
are supposed to take care of the daily needs of a man. So the second group that are entitled to 
share the property are the women folk, because they belong them to a weaker class as the Khasis 
class them. After that group, then comes the men padei. See in our family we all get, of course the 
youngest gets the lions share but even then it is distributed equally amongst us. I proclaim that 
what these young men are saying, that they have been ignored, they’re being left out - they’re a 
bunch of lazy lot, who don’t want to do anything, who don’t understand actually what the power 
that God as given them. They are supposed to work hard. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This fact is often pointed out but it is perhaps worthwhile to note that a precise scale (12:1 no less) of the 
difference in power is imagined within Khasi gendered cosmology rather than a more vague understanding 
that women are the ‘weaker sex.’  
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What we find here is an arguably awkward alliance between people who endorse the 
traditionally sanctioned gendered worldview (where women are “supposed to take care of 
the daily needs of a man” while men are “supposed to work and bring income”) and 
Khasi feminists who are forced to cite this in order to counter the Amazonian women 
narrative of the men’s groups. The battle then becomes about whether the khadduh is 
‘merely’ a custodian or then an overbearing heir, and in this clash of ideological stances 
everyday realities (that of course rarely fall on either end of political spectrums) become 
invisibilized and ignored. 
  Dianghunmon Rynjah provides an account of the transformations in the roles, 
expectations and standing of Khasi-Jaintia women where she pits the khadduh against the 
karta of the Hindu joint family (the father or the eldest son) in order to show how despite 
resemblances (both have special rights over the ancestral property and are entrusted with 
the role of parental/familial caregiving) there are some crucial differences between the 
two. As she puts it, “Ka khadduh obtains her important position as the family priestess, 
the karta as the person most suitable by age, experience and natural respect due from the 
family” (2009:40). Much of the actual management and decision-making regarding the 
household (that is the task of the karta) does not fall upon the khadduh (being the 
youngest and most inexperienced female), instead being carried out by the kñi, thus 
making it a big mistake to think of the khadduh as the heir or the owner (as the karta 
often is). Rynjah also outlines the various restrictions that fall upon the khadduh that if 
she were to disregard could lead to her being disinherited. 
  In explicating how within the ‘traditional’ Khasi kinship-religion system women 
are “passive custodians” whose power is not real but symbolic, Rynjah can then tackle 
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the influence of Christianity. “A tendency has been observed among Christians,” she 
writes, “to regard ka khadduh as having the unrestricted rights of an heir under other 
systems of laws” (42). Here we find an acknowledgement that the customary practices 
are not being followed in each instance, even as that difference is being bracketed and 
attributed to the distortions of the new religion/culture. This of course does not account 
both for the fact that changes are unfolding in both Christian and Niam Khasi households 
because of what one of my interlocutors called “the advancement of time” and also that 
majority of Khasis are Christian, thus dismissing them as the exception or aberration is 
not very practical or productive. “There would be a great injustice to other members of a 
family if the Courts in any way favour this new idea [that the khadduh is the heir],” she 
adds (42) with no discussion however about how the Courts are weighing in on these 
conflicts, a lacuna within Nongbri’s work too. In emphasizing women’s political 
marginalization and their subservience to male authority Khasi feminism arguably 
propagates a deafening silence around the multiple (and strategic) ways that Khasi 
women have both consolidated their existing powers and sought to wrest power for 
themselves with the shifting terrain of gender relations in Meghalaya. 
  I will return to this point after making a detour through my conversation with 
Ellie Shullai whom we encountered in the previous chapter. For Ellie matriliny is such a 
defining aspect of the community’s identity that without it, as she put it, “we might as 
well not call ourselves Khasi anymore.” This is a powerful statement to make, and Ellie 
is a strong woman, the oldest daughter of a successful businesswoman in Shillong. I 
would call her a friend, but I didn’t actually spend much time with her even though I met 
her frequently. Compassionate and down to earth, she would always stop to ask how I 
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was; I found that I could have a meaningful exchange with her during a quick 
conversation in a bookshop, or outside a crowded party with a group of smokers. She 
agreed to meet me one afternoon for an interview that lasted a couple of hours. We 
convened over Mai Tais and momos at Cloud 9, a fancy rooftop restaurant-cum-nightclub 
at Hotel Centre Point, affording verdant mountain views even as it overlooks the bustling 
Police Bazaar – what might well be considered the heart of Shillong, its ‘downtown,’ to 
try and express it in American cityscape terms. I asked her how her male friends/relatives 
would respond to this position she had just staked. This was the exchange that ensued: 
Ellie: I have an argument with everyone about this. Their argument is like oooh we have aiu…the 
same thing they say [not sharing the father’s title leads to a weakened bond with children]. But 
okay fine, your kids know you yaa. They know you’re the father. It’s not like the olden days when 
you’re a part-time father most of the time. Everyone knows and nowadays if you’re a doctor and 
you have a wife, people will say this is Dr. Freddy’s wife, whatever right? It doesn’t mean you 
have to share the same surname right? You’re in your own identity, she’s in her own identity. The 
kids, everyone knows they’re your kids. It’s just the system is that the surname goes from the 
ladies, that’s the one thing they have. 
Me: So what are they saying? 
Ellie: God only knows – half the time they say it should be patriarchal, and then next is that you 
get all the property and all, so I say make up your mind, you either want the property or [laughing] 
you want the surname or what is it? If you feel like you’re being dealt wrongly… but why can’t 
you just come above it all and say okay…like the older generation, like I told you about this grand 
uncle of mine, he must be 90 now, and this lecture he gave me when he was saying it’s our 
tradition, it’s our custom, we have to uphold it. When an old man can say such things, what is 
wrong with the younger generations that they feel that they are not who they are if their kids don’t 
take their titles? I don’t understand what makes them think they’ll be more responsible if the kids 
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have their title. It’s like kiddish you know, whatever they say. You’re arguing with someone who 
has not looked into it thoroughly. 
The emphasis on the value of traditional customs and practices for the “younger 
generations” – what Ellie’s report of her granduncle’s speech illuminates – was 
something I repeatedly encountered in Shillong. But as we have seen, ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ are inordinately flexible concepts that get deployed in numerous ways to 
push for a diverse and complex range of arguments and political stances. In a few short 
statements by Ellie too she maneuvers this dynamic – even as she chastises these men’s 
groups (and her individual male friends/family) for not rising above these seemingly 
petty problems and sticking up for the traditions and customs that make them unique, she 
is simultaneously appreciative of transformations to tradition that enable fathers to play a 
much more significant role in their children’s lives (“it’s not like the olden days when 
you’re a part-time father most of the time”) and from whom children and wives too are 
seen to derive their identity. 
Contra patrilineal systems where women lose their birth identity upon marriage, 
taking the husband’s name and entering symbolically into their lineage, here she is 
highlighting the resonances between the Khasi system and a more egalitarian vision of 
heterosexual alliances forming from a union of distinct yet equal entities. Mainstream 
feminism has long connected Euro-American norms enjoining women to change their 
surname upon marriage to coverture laws, which legally enshrined the patriarchal 
ideology that denied married women independent rights since they were seen merely as 
extensions of the husband’s property. This has made the decision to keep their maiden 
name after marriage a form of political expression for many feminists around the world. 
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For them a world where a woman’s identity is always already distinct from her husband’s 
is a utopic one where, as Ellie put it, a shared last name is unnecessary since “you’re in 
your own identity, she is in her own identity.” But Ellie’s world is not utopic; implicit in 
her statement “it’s just the system…that’s the one thing they have,” is the recognition that 
Khasi women are by no means emancipated from patriarchy and within that context it 
seems almost cruel to take away from her the “one” source of her agency – her ability to 
pass on her name to her children. Her response to SRT’s second objective as per its 
Constitution – “The lineage will go down from father to sons through all encoming [sic] 
generations” – is fairly straightforward: she calls it kiddish and not properly thought 
through.53 Demanding that they not be “dealt wrongly” is one thing she suggests but what 
makes these men think that becoming patrilineal will remedy all social wrongs? 
This is one overwhelming reaction of most Khasis to the anti-matriliny groups 
however – one of confusion that you can find echoed in Ellie’s remarks. Not only is she 
struggling to understand this impulse to counter the group’s matrilineal identity (“what is 
wrong with the younger generations”) but she also sounds baffled by the confusion she 
encounters in the stance(s) taken by those advocating for change (“so I say make up your 
mind…”). This confusion – “God only knows” – and the intermingling laughter is not 
incidental to the discussion. As indicated previously, for many of my interlocutors the 
call for a change to patriliny was simply too ludicrous to engage with. Those (like Ellie) 
who choose to engage these voices occupy an advantageous position stemming from the 
knowledge that backing them is the majority of the community (even as they represent 
vastly different stances) that is in support (by and large) of the status quo. From this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Interestingly no one that I spoke to (including the detractors of the men’s groups) argued that the quest of 
family solidarity could be achieved if men took their wives’ title after marriage. 
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position of authority/legitimacy, these respondents have the power (even as they 
participate in the discussion) to ultimately dismiss and laugh off the concerns they 
encounter. The playing field is, in one way, very uneven for these anti-matriliny groups; 
their minority position makes them an easy target of plenty of different kinds of jokes 
within the community. A favorite one (after personal “brickbats and name calling”) 
hinges on the intent of these groups – which is mired in a certain kind of confusion – 
“half the time they say it should be patriarchal [patrilineal], and the next is that you get all 
the property and all, so I say make up your mind, you either want the property or you 
want the surname, or what is it?” 
In this instance, underlying the accusation that these groups lack conceptual 
clarity in their demands is a slightly more subtle suggestion that they are being somewhat 
duplicitous: what they truly want is for men to be given a share of the property, but since 
they don’t wish to come across as scheming they have to couch it in broader, more 
philosophical terms. We laugh then because we see through the ruse, is the critical 
consensus. Being conscious of these taunts the anti-matriliny groups work not only at 
deflecting them, but also preemptively account for them in their proposals and strategies 
of argumentation. As we have seen these groups are at pains to eschew this explicitly 
money-oriented motivation, providing broader, more cerebral explanations for the need to 
either dismantle the matrilineal system or then seriously reform it. 
But money is a key piece of this puzzle and intellectual gymnastics apart a lot 
does come down to it. It seems to me ironic that money was precisely the subject that 
many anti-anti-matriliny Khasis were willing to engage these groups about. In her article 
(discussed above) Kong Biloris Lyndem Laso writes about the emerging popularity of the 
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idea of gender equality in Meghalaya saying, “The present generation is not very keen on 
the system of matrilineal hierarchy.” In her analysis, what she calls the “nongkynraw 
syndrome” (Khasi men not being allowed to carry self-acquired property with them after 
marriage) causes men to feel victimized leading to “social strife” between the sexes that 
ultimately leads to violence against women and the breakdown of marriages. Khasi 
feminists are also at pains to point out how in the case of abandonment, women often 
have to deal with the entire burden of raising children from that union, both caregiving 
and monetary since such fathers rarely extend child support. Bah Mike was also vocal 
about this problem – and in his view making marriage registration compulsory was 
important precisely because it gives a woman legal recourse to demand some form of 
alimony from such a husband. The slippage between ‘husband’ and ‘father of the child’ is 
clear here. Within this context, Bah Mike and others are referring to the high incidence of 
alliances that produce offspring, but that are not legally recognized as marriage, causing 
‘problems’ like illegitimate children. The question remains whether women and their clan 
members regard such offspring as ‘problems’ for being ‘unclaimed’ or whether educated 
and ‘modern’ Khasi men construe this as a problem having internalized a very different 
set of attitudes about family (discussed above). 
Further, while Kong Biloris does not advocate for a switch to patriliny and her 
article is in fact about the need for empowering women in the state (literacy, political 
representation and so forth), she simultaneously seems critical of “a system that leaves 
everything to the youngest daughter (khatduh) of the family,” making note of reports 
about youth unable to secure bank loans since they don’t own “permanent assets.” Many 
that I spoke to reiterated the continued significance of this problem, particularly in a city 
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with a relative paucity of vibrant employment opportunities. Government jobs (the most 
coveted kind) are hard to come by and many from more humble families talked about 
how you either have to know someone important, or be able to pay a lot of money to be 
considered for them. To start any business you need collateral, and to qualify for a loan 
these young men had to rely on their mothers or sisters to stand in as guarantors.  
Stories about the exclusion of men as brothers, fathers, husbands and uncles from 
important decision-making processes as well as from the protections that are their 
birthright within the family system were not only being told to me by the men against 
matriliny. A feminist, Catholic friend for instance told me about her maternal uncle, who 
was married to a youngest daughter from a family that practices the indigenous religion. 
It was a sad story of disputes and despair, with the youngest daughter being held 
responsible for much of the troubles. The thing that stuck out to me was my friend’s quiet 
emphasis on how the uncle was forbidden by his wife to even keep a Bible or a cross in 
the house and how he had to keep hiding them in different places.  
Again many would perhaps like to know what exactly is the prevalence of women 
denying their sons and brothers such financial support (if they have any to give), or 
actually how common is it for khadduhs to “kick out their brothers” and so forth. Is there 
really a crisis or is this narrative being concocted for some ulterior purpose (e.g. 
reconfirming patriarchal power and male authority)? Rather than answering these 
questions I would like us to consider where they come from, or put differently, what are 
the desires underlying these questions?   
There is a comfort that attaches itself to statistics, and we tend to cling to 
percentages and proportions to make sense of the world around us, but what value 
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accrues upon the experience of a minority, or the playing out of a single instance? While 
many spoke about how things are changing, and those who have wealth tend to distribute 
it among all siblings (“It’s not that they don’t give yaar,” said one person in frustration), 
how do we think meaningfully about the inner world of a solitary young professional, 
who causes a rift in his family because his youngest sister stops speaking to his mother 
who decided to finance a business in his name? Or the silent insecurity experienced by 
young men (educated within a human rights and social justice paradigm) who are not 
legally entitled to property within the ‘modern’ unfoldings of the matrilineal system even 
if eventually they are given something? What about the teenage boy who realizes that his 
mother is fighting his father harder for his sister to take her title, giving him up to the 
father ostensibly in the name of fairness (“one for your clan, one for mine”) but actually 
because she knows that him taking her title is less important since it will never be passed 
on through him to the next generation? 
While the solutions being proposed by the SRT were outlandish, extreme and 
undesirable to many, what I realized in many months of interacting with people in 
Shillong was that people felt that the problems they were pointing to were not concocted 
out of thin air. Many Khasis (both men and women) expressed a concern for what they 
felt were problems arising within the gender-kinship matrix in the contemporary context. 
I was leaving my friend Iamon’s house one evening where I ended up conducting an 
impromptu interview with a male friend of hers who had stopped by to say hello to her. 
She listened in on our conversation without saying much, but at the gate while saying 
goodbye she whispered loudly and emphatically: “We mothers, we’re sucking the life out 
of our sons.” As I fumbled around for my voice recorder in shock she continued, “I am 
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not a feminist. I don’t believe in fighting for women’s rights out here. What makes 
women so special? Men are being trampled upon too, but no one bothers about that.”  
There are a whole set of affective relations that are being subsumed here along 
with those of Khasi women struggling to fulfill their responsibilities, ‘keep their 
husbands,’ negotiate lack of control over their lives and so forth. In a way the politics of 
these men’s groups don’t exactly coincide with those of men’s rights groups in other 
places – possibly because there are more ‘internal’ to the problems they are outlining, 
they aren’t ‘merely’ refusing to acknowledge their privilege. Certain lines of questions 
being raised by the SRT (although subterranean in their own narratives) are uncannily 
similar to those that feminism has been invested in highlighting, particularly in their 
theorization of why “the personal is political.” Why for Khasi feminism is it so important 
to reject in toto the claims by these groups that Khasi men are experiencing gender-based 
inequality or violence? It is in Nongbri’s latest work that we find some acknowledgement 
of Khasi men’s problems. Apart from the ‘age-set’ system because of which jural 
authority escapes men who are not the oldest in their families, she (following Kong 
Biloris) identifies the inheritance system that denies sons property as a problem for men. 
“Discussions carried out with cross-sections of Khasi men reveal that more than the issue 
of lineage and authority, the main grouse against the system is the absence of property 
rights for sons [emphasis in original],” she writes arguing that the SRT’s “anti-woman 
stance,” even as it notes the problem of inheritance rights, ends up obscuring it and in 
calling for a change to patriliny succeeds in “failing to recognize the real crux of the 
problem” (2014:58). 
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How do we understand Khasi feminism’s failure though to engage deeply enough 
with the problems being experienced by both men and women in Shillong? Khasi 
feminism, in its tendency to borrow its tools from patrilineal feminism has tended to 
respond to groups like the SRT by flatly rejecting their claims. For patrilineal feminists 
interested in the relationship between social structures and gendered realities, matrilineal 
societies are immediately intriguing. They both offer fascinating prototypes of utopian 
worlds, whose alternative configurations of gender, kinship, property ownership and so 
forth spark fresh imaginings of an equitable society, and belie the notion that patriarchy 
has been the only structuring principle of society. But the patriarchy being discussed here 
is one grounded in a patrilineal social system, so it becomes essential to ask whether it 
might be violent in some measure to impose this understanding of patriarchy upon 
matrilineal communities. As Khasi feminists point out, matrilineal systems also tend to be 
patriarchal, but I suggest that we be cautious about conflating these two patriarchies.  
How does feminism (with its epistemological grounding in “women’s rights are 
human rights” framework) navigate the demand for Khasi men’s rights? While ideas 
about women’s rights might not have much currency within more critical feminist theory, 
which is seen instead as an analytic to study the consolidation of power through multiple 
categories and axes, I suggest nevertheless that there hasn’t been a complete unpairing of 
feminism from the politics of gendered bodies and identities. What does gender equality 
in matrilineal Shillong look like? What does feminism have to say about a minority 
society where women (if even just in theory) truly have more power? ? Can feminism 
find a way to take seriously the fact that a Khasi son might be less welcome than a 
daughter despite the larger global imbalance of power that it is contending with? We 
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come up here against a possible fracturing of the feminist horizon – is there a secret 
desire within it that transcends the parameters of gender equality? Fatigued by its battles 
against patrilineo-patriarchy the egalitarian impulse within feminism seems to hit up 
against its limits when faced with Khasi men claiming injustice along similar nodes. It’s 
what makes us smile instinctively when we hear about the political agenda of the SRT – 
when the rest of the world is struggling to counter the violence of normative patriarchy 
here are a group of men fighting for their ‘so-called’ rights, seems to be the source of our 
amusement. This uncomfortable amusement suggests an impasse – between an 
interrogated move towards ‘equality’ that seems contingent on historical amnesia and 
devoid of organic roots, and the impossibility of articulating the rights of the 'oppressed' 
in kinship structures without the haunting specter of power gone awry, the same awry 
power that the very rights-invoking feminism seeks to contest in patriarchal societies. 
Whether this can be unpacked depends on whether kinship itself can be reconceptualized. 
At the very least, an interrogation of this seemingly topsy-turvy world of matriliny holds 
up a troubling mirror to studies of feminism, power and kinship. 
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Conclusion 
 
I opened the discussion in this dissertation by examining the exceptional status of 
the Northeast and of the Northeast tribal more specifically in relation to the nation and 
the normative, or unmarked Indian citizen. In this examination I rely heavily on Etienne 
Balibar’s finessing of Benedict Anderson’s highly influential thesis in Imagined 
Communities (1983). Anderson describes the nation not as a pre-given reality but as a 
community that has to be imagined into existence by its citizens who, despite not 
knowing each other personally, still share a deep, horizontal feeling of fraternity for 
which they are willing to make sacrifices or even lay down their lives. Balibar instead 
contends that bonds of comradeship do not connect all citizens of the nation equally; 
central to the production of a sense of the shared legacies, cultures or concerns that bind a 
nation are processes of racialization or a “historical system of complementary exclusions 
and dominations that are mutually interconnected” (1988:49). Thus he argues that racism, 
which can be both external (directed against a group outside the nation) and internal 
(against those within national boundaries), is not an expression of nationalism but rather 
“a supplement internal to nationalism, always in excess of it, but always indispensible to 
its constitution and yet always still insufficient to achieve its project…” (54).  
Balibar’s insights are crucial to an understanding of the postcolonial Indian 
nation, which relies as heavily upon the idea that all citizens are equal by law as it is 
based on an idea of the ‘quintessential’ or invisible Indian – the upper-caste, Aryo-
Dravidian looking Hindu – whose Indianness can and will never be called into question. 
We can see here how fictive ideas about racial or ethnic differences do not completely 
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encompass Indian nationalism, yet they are extremely central to nationalistic imaginings 
of who is a ‘true’ Indian. In the context of an increasing saffronization of the nation I 
argue that it becomes all the more important to highlight the theoretical bankruptcy of 
popular beliefs in inherent Indian (read Hindu) ‘tolerance’ and slogans like ‘unity in 
diversity.’ Benedict Anderson’s point that nationalism requires a conceptualization of the 
nation as eternal, as having existed since the proverbial beginning of time, seems to apply 
equally well to a recently formed nation like India as well. That multiple and diverse 
communities have lived and thrived in the Northeast for thousands of years is forgotten 
by the mainstream Indian unwilling to acknowledge both the newness of India (as we 
know it) and the violence/negotiations that went into its making.  
This forgetting leads to the ease with which the Northeast gets ‘seen’ primarily as 
topography or space and its people invisibilized or rendered into dispensable itinerants. 
This ‘us-them’ paradigm is central to the mindset of the mainstream – at the least sign of 
conflict the fault lines in the idea of who is ‘truly’ Indian appear clearly. “If they have a 
problem, they can leave,” is what you will often hear from ‘patriotic’ Indians. This 
strategic conceptualization of the Northeast as the nation’s frontier zone allows it to be 
coopted as an integral belonging of India, even as the people who live there are cast as 
extraneous, anti-national, non-normative, backward and inherently different. 
Contemporary ‘Indians’ inherit their ideological assumptions from their British masters 
and I underscore the importance of recognizing and tracing the historical contiguities 
between colonial and post or, as I have argued elsewhere, ‘quasi’ colonial 
understandings, attitudes and policies towards the region (Gaikwad 2009). In Chapter 1, 
through an extended analysis of a debate on national television, I attempted to open up 
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the subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which mainland Indians indulge in a nationalistic 
appropriation of the Northeast – its land, resources, symbols, and people/talents – even as 
they continue to participate in the erasure of their realities and the denial of their equal 
humanity.  
It seems to me therefore that deciphering and diagnosing the multiple nodes along 
which the Northeast and its subjects are rendered exceptional or Other is not merely an 
ethico-political move (to acknowledge and redress their historical and ongoing 
marginalization) but a theoretico-philosophical one that challenges us to both 
disassemble/analyze the dominant discourses around which the popular Indian 
imagination is organized and push at the limits of our understandings of postcolonial 
nationalism, modernity, citizenship and so forth. This can be seen then as an ethnography 
of ideas about and expressions of national subjectivity that are organized around complex 
and variegated modalities of understanding differences along the lines of race, tribe, 
gender, sexuality and kinship. Since nationalistic identities, imaginaries and affects are 
not the sole prerogative of the Indian nation and its citizens what we have at hand 
consequently is the complex interplay between multiple competing and/or coexisting 
(sub)/nationalisms that warrant scrutiny.  
The preponderance of nationalisms in the Northeast has two distinct genealogies – 
1) the internalization of the idea of inherent difference that has historically been imposed 
upon people in the Northeast, particularly those belonging to hill-tribal communities, and 
2) the postcolonial Indian state’s adoption of what Baruah (2005:184) calls the British 
“protective discrimination regime,” that used isolation within a delimited zone (outside 
the jurisdiction of the rest of the country) as a technique for the ‘pacification’ and 
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effective ‘management’ of what were considered the ‘savage’ groups. Within this 
protected enclave, tribal communities were allowed to continue practicing their 
customary laws, kinship systems and clan-based rules for land, property, inheritance and 
so on.     
National leaders replicated these ideologies and tactics with the drawing up of the 
Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which delineates special provisions for the 
administration of Assam’s ‘Tribal Areas.’ In the Northeast, already under erasure by the 
mainstream/land, the Indian government’s policies have promulgated a system/ethos 
where marginalized communities, particularly the hill-tribes, fall back on colonially 
produced knowledge (that consolidates them as a ‘tribe’ or ‘race’) in order to express 
their vulnerability and demand rights that are deeply fashioned by ideas about 
nationalism and patriotism, which draw freely on rhetorics of community qua identity, 
belonging and difference. The successful mobilization of these hill-tribes for 
independence from Assamese hegemony resulted in the designation of specific territories 
or ‘homelands’ to majority tribal groups. The long and intimate association between 
tribes and land in the Northeast has contributed to the continuation of inextricable 
connections between tribal/ethnic identity and figurations of nationalism.  
In the Khasi context we can note two different articulations of nationalism – the 
first, a subnationalism that peaked in the 1972 approval of a separate state, Meghalaya, 
deemed the exclusive home of the Khasis (including Jaintias) and Garos, and the second, 
a more secessionist Khasi nationalism, that had its heyday in the 1980s and 90s with the 
proliferation of several anti-India groups, some of which were subsequently proscribed 
but that continue to make their presence felt in fits and bursts. The overwhelming 
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majority of Khasis that I interacted with did not subscribe to anti-India ideologies but 
there is a distinctly palpable investment (that draws its lineage from the first mode of 
nationalism) in a Khasi sub/nationalism that could be a part of the larger Indian 
framework but only if it can retain its own unique identity. This is most often expressed 
in concerns about the future of the Khasi jaitbynriew (a principal concern of this 
dissertation) in the face of instability and change. That concern for the jaitbynriew gets 
articulated along the lines of race is not coincidental, and goes back to a strong 
internalization of colonial discourses by formerly colonized people.  
English-speaking Khasis often use the word ‘outsider,’ a broader concept 
denoting non-Khasis, even when what they wish to connote is non-hill-tribal/non-
foreigner. I recognized this as a slippage when I realized that linguistically dkhar was 
never used for other hill-tribal people or white people (saheps) or foreigners in general 
(farengs). What I was alerted to here is that the idea of the Khasi jaitbynriew (not 
coincidentally translated as Khasi ‘race’) is at heart a racially inflected one, which rests 
on fundamental, inherent oppositions with non-tribal people from the plains of South 
Asia. Any non-recognition of the interchangeable ways in which ‘outsider’ is used to 
stand in for dkhar has the effect of glossing over the complex interplay between highly 
mobile ideas about race and ethnicity as they become manifested in various (often high-
pitched) nationalistic discussions about the jaitbynriew.  
There is a palpable difference in attitudes towards outsiders qua dkhars that is 
based on counter-articulations of irreconcilable racial, ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic differences from plains people as well as varying degrees of antipathy towards 
them. This research shows how ideas about Khasi uniqueness can often hinge on highly 
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problematic/stereotypical perceptions of ‘racialized’ appearance and concerns for the 
survival of a Khasi identity tend to smuggle in endorsements and replications of broader, 
hegemonic racial and gender hierarchies as well as perpetuate silences around intra-group 
differences and structural inequalities in the name of a singular, united ‘Khasi’ identity. 
My dissertation grapples with the significance of these divergent anxieties about the well 
being of a historically marginalized minority community even as it pushes for a 
reconsideration of uncritical formulations of Khasi nationalism that replicate the 
violences of the mainstream or dominant nationalism that it is constantly in (an often 
critical) dialog with.    
This conceptual framework of a parallel and crisscrossing network of nationalistic 
fields, sensibilities and politics in their imbrications with allied ideas about race, kinship, 
gender and sexuality undergirds all the main themes that come up for discussion in this 
dissertation, which is invested in analyzing the complexities produced through these 
conversations and conflicts. Taking the figure of the enervated ‘typical’ Khasi male as its 
starting point, my research analyzes both the assertions of crisis being made by men’s 
groups lobbying against the matrilineal system, identified as the cause of the unraveling 
of the Khasi male (and consequently the community), and also of some responses that 
they generate from different sections of Khasi civil society.  
Given that kinship inhabits the intimate space of the personal, it is at one level 
baffling that it becomes the subject of such energetic and public debate in Shillong. It is 
also not surprising (or unique to Shillong) however, that discussions about national 
sanctity and sovereignty turn on the question of women’s bodies and their reproductive 
capabilities in paranoid fashion. In the case of Shillong and Khasi identity, for 
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historically curious reasons, matriliny becomes the defining and unique feature. To track 
the way in which a category like matriliny becomes the centerpoint of a community’s 
very existence and future, I analyze those aspects of Khasi kinship that surface most 
strongly in the sphere of the political, in Chapters 2 and 3. 
My discussion develops from a significant insight I stumbled across, in passing 
conversation with an interlocutor in Shillong, that it was the advent of colonial 
anthropologists that led to the invention of the category ‘matriliny’. It was in the 
anthropological mode that the origins of this ‘key feature’ of Khasi identity lie – this I 
chart as the first axis on which Khasi matriliny can be analyzed. Here, I critically 
evaluate the complex relationship between ideas of what constitutes Khasi matriliny even 
today, and the fundamental role that classical anthropology has played in those 
imaginings. From the time of anthropologists Gurdon and Nakane, who on the surface 
appeared to simply register for posterity the elements of Khasi life, I show how those 
subjective narratives (at times veering on the speculative, and often hinging on the 
problematic) have created imprints in the histories, memories, and thereby, inhabitings of 
contemporary Khasis. Classical anthropological accounts have provided nothing less than 
an infusion of a framework through which Khasis self-evaluate their lived realities and 
interactions.  
Going back to study these classical anthropological texts is not merely an esoteric 
academic activity. I posit that the close relationship between colonial knowledge 
production and tribal identity makes reading these texts against the grain a crucial, 
political move. In order to critically think about the concepts we are working with today, 
it is important to trace their legacies, to understand how this knowledge was put together, 
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what assumptions they relied on and how they came to be understood as having truth 
value. I further assert that challenging some of these taken-for-granted truths might 
enable us to better contend with the ‘problems’ being highlighted by multiple groups in 
the present moment, grounded as many of them are in these powerful colonial discourses. 
Thus, even as I elaborate a sustained critique of colonial anthropology’s engagement with 
Khasi matriliny I highlight the significance of taking this anthropology’s governing 
concepts seriously since they have left a deep imprint and continue to have purchase on 
contemporary Khasi life.  
The overwhelming emphasis on the structure of Khasi matriliny that I kept 
encountering both in academic accounts and popular discourse gave me pause. To 
counter this tendency I have prompted us to think about the unfolding of Khasi matriliny 
along a second axis of attention to the unfolding of people’s everyday lives. I argue that 
along this axis of the everyday moment, matriliny as a substantively laden category 
begins to dissipate. It is in fact, in the everyday moments, that there is an unravelling of 
the overarching presence of the framing categories of kinship or identity, an unravelling 
that allows for different inscriptions of the day-to-day lives of the Khasis.  My focus in 
Chapter 3 is to construct a different framing of kinship, beyond the structural, which is 
attentive to the elusive afterthought, the half-remembered routine of the everyday, 
habitual behaviors and interactions occurring almost without conscious consideration. 
Within this framing, I explore the skeletal patterns of the social, patterns that shape and 
reshape, repeat and enact in myriad forms, sometimes arbitrarily, and sometimes quite 
consciously, the changes and alterations brought into the frame by individuals and 
individual families. 
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The association of matriliny with the political identity of the group is I argue a 
third axis upon which Khasi matriliny comes alive. In Chapter 3 I also delve into the 
various aspects of this conflation and the complexities emerging from them. The decision 
of the Indian state to permit the Northeast tribes to govern themselves according to their 
own customary laws and preserve their cultural traditions and ethnic identity has had an 
enormous, wide-ranging impact. The Constitutional framework empowers the KHADC 
to legislate on Khasi citizenship (the stakes of which are very high given the benefits 
bestowed on members of Scheduled Tribes) through which citizenship into the nation is 
then necessarily facilitated. I show how this creates an odd sort of contradiction where in 
order to be a ‘proper’ Northeast citizen-subject of the Indian nation-state you have to fit 
into the ‘traditional’ tribal mold but in being a ‘traditional’ tribal you can hardly claim the 
position of the unmarked Indian citizen and the associated ‘modern’ rights become harder 
for you to access.  
Through an analysis of the Khasi Social Custom of Lineage Act (1997) I argue 
that even though the KHADC aims ostensibly to regulate alliances along ‘traditional’ 
lines, this is an entirely modern conceptualization of ‘tradition.’ Formulated to tackle 
problems encountered by Khasis in the contemporary moment, such laws (with their 
selective incorporation of practices) end up formally legalizing norms that end up being 
regressive. These laws then arguably dissolve the freedom of ‘modern’ Khasis to make 
very personal choices, instead holding them at bay from many of their ‘modern’ rights as 
(non-tribal) Indian or even global citizens.  
Building on Tiplut Nongbri’s analysis of the anti-woman stance shared by 
ideologically opposed groups like the KHADC and the SRT (a stance that ultimately 
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preserves masculine interests) I show how a sense of confusion becomes attached to laws 
like the Lineage Act. I argue that there is a complex relationship between the passing of 
the laws and their effect: the very process of enforcement lends itself to a different order 
of claim and choice. That is, there is ample room for inconsistent enforcement, significant 
modifications or repeal through the efforts of opposing groups, and the final 
implementation of the law lays bare the moment that allows the status quo to selectively 
invoke or ignore the law. In this case, it is the indigenous elite that is able to powerfully 
use these laws to solidify and reproduce their own status and resources. The notion of 
matriliny that men’s groups like SRT have propagated propels it to the status of a critical 
flaw or chink in the armor of Khasi society. The idea, which has become commonplace 
over the decades, suggests that this is the one vulnerability of Khasi society that the 
outsiders (dkhars) seek to exploit. It is arguably this notion that ultimately led to the 
Lineage Act being passed. 
The debates around which this Act has come into existence have been successful 
in fundamentally reshaping the Khasi intellectual horizon over time, relying on 
patriarchal attitudes and logics in combination with problematic racialized figurations of 
the ‘outsider,’ steering consensus, discourse and decision-making towards an increased 
scrutiny and disciplining of Khasi women. In this scenario, certain figures necessarily 
find themselves at the fringes—Khasi women (and men) crossing the frenzied line of 
family and clan duty that surrounds them, non-Khasis in relationships with Khasi women, 
and, the children of such inter-ethnic heterosexual alliances. I argue that these awkwardly 
positioned figures become a different kind of what Baruah (2000) calls “denizens” – 
neither outside, nor inside; neither ‘authentically’ Khasi, nor fully non-Khasi. To ward 
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off the ever looming threat of exclusion and exploitation, these figures, who identify as a 
part of the jaitbynriew, and have historically been accepted as such, must now constantly 
perform their loyalty, (a border inside a border, an overscrutinized performance of 
belonging)—each with a different set of resources and ability to negotiate, depending on 
their family status, their financial standing and their ‘racial appearance.’ Understandings 
of Khasi identity and gender are in fact enmeshed in broader indigenous identities, which 
are in constant negotiation and dialogue with postcolonial nation-states and global 
imaginaries. 
Being matrilineal was not merely a thing that rendered Khasis in Shillong 
different. It also allowed many of them to identify themselves in terms of a more 
‘authentic’ modern reality that emerged from their own traditional customs that were 
often seen as predating (Western) modernity. As against the way that the people of the 
plains (ignorant of the histories of this self-definition) might see them—backward, stuck 
in the past, and inferior, these Khasis would situate themselves in terms of a far more 
liberal and Westernized context. Locating themselves in terms of global paradigms 
allows for a radically different terrain where their unique history in the region, and their 
tribal, matrilineal culture become aligned to form a mirror that reflects to them 
progressive and/or Western notions of gender and sexual expression. 
But not everyone is proud of their unique lineage system – being matrilineal is a 
source of anxiety for several Khasi men who see it as an antiquated set of ‘customs’ that 
have (or ought to have) little to do with Khasi culture and should be jettisoned instead in 
the broader interests of the community. For men’s groups like the SRT traditional 
matriliny is not only incapable of dealing with the newer realities that contemporary 
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Khasis have to face, but it is also at odds with a modern Khasi identity. This has for 
various reasons (that they are keen to highlight) led to a ‘crisis’ of Khasi masculinity.  
In Chapter 4 I engage with the discursive figure of the ‘typical Khasi guy’ and 
show how it has been produced through the interplay between non-matrilineal outsider 
perceptions and Khasi self-understandings of gender dynamics emerging out of kinship 
systems and practices. I trace the different modes through which Khasi masculinity has 
come to be easily readable to patrilineal outsiders as ‘lack’ or ‘failure’ and argue that 
Khasi men are effeminized and doubly displaced from hegemonic masculinity – first, 
through a combination of their ‘racialization’ as East/Southeast Asian and their tribal 
status and second, through their matrilineal culture. Simultaneously Khasi women have to 
contend with two layers of misogyny – a racialized reading of them as the ‘loose’ tribal 
woman as well as perceptions of them as Amazonian women intent on humbling ‘their’ 
men.  
As was the case with colonial anthropology, contemporary ethnocentric 
understandings of Khasi emasculation continue to powerfully shape the prisms through 
which outsiders are able to even ‘see’ much less understand what is happening in Khasi 
society. The recognition of this distorted version of the ‘self’ in the eyes of the other has 
had no small role to play in the production of ideas and feelings about a depleted Khasi 
masculinity. Behind these processes is an underlying system – what I am calling 
patrilineo-patriarchy – which is founded upon the twin ideals of male supremacy and 
female subservience. Here authority over his wife and children (even if not exercised 
violently but given ‘freely’) is what bestows on a man his rightful status; a different 
ordering of gender where men and women have more equitable relations (especially 
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when sanctioned by structural norms) becomes seen as a fundamental infringement on the 
‘natural’ rights of men.  
Patrilineo-patriarchy institutes what I call an emotional and psychological 
continuum of masculinity and masculine identity that non-Khasis (and through them 
some Khasis too) draw on so as to read the ‘plight’ of Khasi men as pitiful. Through my 
interactions with people I picked up on the circular manner in which Khasi men’s 
mobilizations against matriliny have in turn ended up putting the Khasis on the national 
and international map, but for unfavorable reasons, creating in fact feelings of confusion 
if not failure and lack for Khasi men who are forced now to contend with the negative 
ways in which they have been represented over the years across various media. This is a 
classic example of ‘naming as making true’ and the battery of stereotypes about Khasi 
men have become for some the basis upon which they understand and narrate their own 
gendered experiences as pathetic or shameful.  
I suggest that while a chasm exists between pro and anti-matriliny Khasis, they 
both share the desire to find a niche for themselves as a small minority community within 
a larger globalizing world. For some matriliny enables them to bypass the problems 
associated with mainland Indian attitudes and lifestyles and become a part of a more 
liberal, international system, but for others (like the SRT men) matriliny distances them 
from the powerful, hegemonic model of masculinity that is produced within patrlineo-
patriarchy and around which their idea of a vibrant modernity is organized. Eschewing 
matriliny thus enables them to become a part of a globally endorsed and seductive kind of 
masculinity, based upon its ability (implicit or explicit) to dominate over women and 
participate freely in the neoliberal world economy. By rejecting matriliny they feel they 
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can best transcend both their traditional, indigenous roots and possibly also the regressive 
Indian setup they are tethered to by virtue of citizenship.  
In Chapter 5 I undertake a detailed explication and analysis of the organizing 
principles and logics of the anti-matrilineal ideology espoused by the SRT. Tracing their 
genealogy back to the politics of another men’s group in the early 60s, I highlight the 
significance of masculine bonds spanning generations through which stories, experiences 
and insights are shared, bestowing the contemporary members with a sense of history and 
purpose in a social milieu where their propositions have not found much favor. 
Articulations of problems with matriliny are directed both at aspects inherent to the 
‘traditional’ system and its practices and also at the kinds of complications generated by 
the influence of modernity on contemporary Khasi life. These generate immense strife for 
individual men as the SRT (and also groups like the MSM) tries to convey to multiple 
audiences. I suggest, however, that the simultaneous move to compulsively reframe these 
individual or familial struggles as primarily systemic problems (about society and 
jaitbynriew) has the effect of both making assumptions about the whole community based 
on individual stories while simultaneously not accounting seriously for the experiences of 
those individual men dealing with varying degrees of emotional distress.  
The propensity to constantly remap the tribulations of Khasi men onto more 
pressing social concerns also leads to the gendering and hierarchization of feelings – 
some like sadness, melancholia, paranoia, insecurity and loss find themselves subjugated 
at the expense of others like anger, frustration, humiliation, injustice and rebellion that 
are glorified and legitimated. Martial imagery is often invoked, with the narrative being 
that of a battle being fought both within the community (for acceptance) and against the 
	  	   260 
usurping alpha (mainland) ‘outsider’ male whose shadow upon the state is perceived as 
being the ultimate threat to the survival of the Khasi jaitbynriew.  
Using the matrilineal structure to their benefit, outsiders in the form of dkhars are 
seen as both invading at the borders and infecting the community from within. These 
men’s groups then both draw on and in turn perpetuate understandings of the jaitbynriew 
along the lines of racial distinctiveness and purity, quoting fantastic ‘scientific’ theories 
(much like Subramanium Swamy discussed in the first chapter) to argue that non-Khasi 
men marrying into the community causes a ‘dilution’ of Khasi blood since it is the 
father’s DNA that determines the appearance of the child. Consequently despite there 
being a long history of an acceptance of inter-ethnic marriages and alliances within Khasi 
matriliny, there is an increasing scrutiny that Khasi women are falling under, where their 
personal choice to marry outside the community is being framed as selfish and disloyal.  
Of course, as many of informants pointed out, there are discrepancies here with Khasi 
women marrying saheps or farengs being considered lucky, while those marrying dark-
skinned South Asians or Africans are openly looked down upon.   
Relying on evolutionary ideas about the primitivism and unnaturalness of the 
matrilineal system these men are indirectly questioning whether it is at all reasonable to 
allow women access to ‘unfettered’ power, given that in both Khasi and patrilineo-
patriarchal gendered worldviews they are construed as the ‘weaker sex.’ This, according 
to them, is a particular problem arising from the shape Khasi matriliny has more recently 
taken, with the legal standing of property ownership given to youngest daughters who 
were customarily supposed to have been ‘custodians’ of the family wealth and religion. 
This conversion of customary norms and practices into the domain of enforceable law is a 
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product of colonial and postcolonial state policies and attitudes towards the Northeast 
tribes, and it is this power of ‘traditional’ practices that the men’s groups are selectively 
and strategically objecting to.   
While traditionally the maternal uncle was supposed to be the figure of authority 
for his clan members, in the contemporary moment he has more of a symbolic status 
rather than playing an active role in his natal family. Here the importance of the influence 
of Christianity (and the patrilineal bias built into it) is very explicit; its emphasis on 
nuclear, father-headed families has shaped Khasi sensibilities to a large extent, corroding 
over time the dominant position held by the mother’s oldest brother. With the maternal 
uncle having “run off,” as one SRT member put it, and the father displaced from absolute 
and legally endorsed authority, power unmitigated by masculine control or supervision 
falls into the hands of Khasi women, particularly the youngest daughter, seen as wresting 
control over resources and decision-making within the lineage while conspiring to 
sideline men both as fathers and as brothers.  
The excessive, demonic overtones of the female extravaganza being described in 
the numerous ‘true stories’ being offered by SRT men draws on deeply felt (and 
internalized) concerns about the nature of a society ‘ruled’ by women – an entirely 
treacherous, bacchanalian world. I suggest that the image of power-hungry, bloodthirsty 
Khasi sisters both conceals and renders explicit the normalization of violence against 
women in patriarchy; to restore the ‘natural’ harmony of gender relations requires 
according to SRT men, a decisive intervention – the casting out of matrilineal principles 
so as to curtail this female-power-gone-awry while simultaneously empowering Khasi 
men.  
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Along with framing and problematizing the conceptual armor and rhetoric of the 
anti-matriliny men’s groups Chapter 5 also advances a discussion of a few responses 
emerging from other sections of Khasi society. I bring up for analysis the other face of 
the youngest daughter – frustration over constantly being under the watchful eye of the 
family and the clan who often dictated where she could go and who she could become 
friendly with, being held to higher standards of decency and decorum, not being able to 
assert free will, not being allowed to study or work outside Shillong, and being expected 
to marry within and reproduce for the clan and community.  In countering the narrative of 
the SRT, I don’t simply wish to push back against one of the bases of their ideology. In 
fact I argue that this is a position taken up by many divergent groups opposed to the 
SRT’s diagnoses and propositions and tends to suffer from similar kinds of pitfalls. In the 
battle between whether the khadduh is ‘merely’ a custodian or then an overbearing heir, 
ideological positions become hardened and everyday realities that are rarely clear-cut get 
ignored and invisibilized. 
For Khasi feminism, adopting a stance against the men’s groups has not been 
unproblematic. In opposing anti-matriliny arguments, feminism often ends up in an 
awkward alliance with more conservative ‘traditionalists’ and has consequently been 
unable to grapple with the strategic and creative ways that Khasi women have navigated 
the mobile field of gender relations in Meghalaya over the years. Further, in its efforts to 
contend appropriately with the forceful mainstream view (inspired by theories of cultural 
evolution) that has understood matriliny to be coterminous with matriarchy, Khasi 
feminism has tended to not only ignore arenas of marginalization or disprivilege 
experienced by Khasi men but also to outright deny them. Through these fraught 
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engagements (or the lack of them) we can trace the lineage of Khasi feminism to its 
patrilineal counterpart, which has offered us many complex tools and concepts to analyze 
patriarchy, which were, however, primarily developed within and to address patrilineal 
gender orderings. I have tried to argue that not only might it be ineffective to use 
patrilineo-patriarchical lenses and analytics to engage with matrilineal societies, but it 
might also be violent in some measure, or have dangerous consequences that we need to 
be vigilant about. While it is certainly true, as Khasi feminists point out, that matrilineal 
systems also tend to be patriarchal, I suggest that we be cautious about conflating these 
two patriarchies. 
I ask then finally, what lies behind Khasi feminism’s failure to take seriously the 
problems experienced by men in Shillong? Through Khasi feminism’s grounding in 
patrilineal feminism I contend that we come up against some fundamental limits of 
mainstream feminism. Mainstream feminism appears to have reached a limit-point when 
confronted with Khasi men’s protest against injustice along the lines of egalitarianism. 
The framing of this limit-point is neither rational-theoretical, nor ethical-political—it is in 
fact, a non-politics of fatigue, almost as if exhausted by the constant confrontation with 
the patrilineo-patriarchy, mainstream feminism cannot uphold its own egalitarian impulse 
in this differently gendered context.  
There is an impasse then, subliminal and overt at the same time, and I return to 
Balibar in framing this as the divide between the deep, horizontal feeling of ‘equality,’ 
that is contingent on historical amnesia, and the formative history of mainstream 
feminism that has taken so particular a path, that it can only bond in an irrational (half-
amused, half-dismissive) feeling of ‘difference’ with the rights of the ‘oppressed’ in these 
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kinship structures. It is the ‘sense’ of difference that is at once the result of what Balibar 
above calls the “historical systems of complementary exclusions and dominations,” as 
well as the fictive ideas about racial or ethnic differences. It is the feeling of fraternity 
that gave breath to the fiction of India – both, the liberal, egalitarian nation by law as well 
as the violent idea of ‘true’ Indians (saffronized, tolerant). And it is the feeling of sorority 
within which the ‘sense’ of difference of the Khasi men against matrilineage surfaces. 
And thereby forms the mirror, against which the imagined community of mainstream 
feminism erases its own inhabitings – in the non-indigenous, the patriarchal, the 
‘solidarity’ space of non-difference. 
 What then can be a ground to articulate: 1) the politics of community and, 2) the 
politics of gender? In my analysis, two kinds of powerful feelings have surfaced, both 
enshrined in wholeness, modernity, legitimacy, and truth—the feeling for ‘community’ 
(nation, clan, race) and the feeling for ‘equality’ (rights, justice, oppressed). In contrast 
are the messy feelings that cannot be ‘placed’ easily: racially problematic, ethnocentric, 
some might argue communal sentiments, or then the ‘rights’ of men against matriliny. In 
these ‘awkward’ assertions one finds a different kind of voice, and a different kind of 
dismissal, than in hegemonic or unchallenged nationalism, or patrilineo-patriarchy, and 
through them it is possible arguably to glimpse through the looking glass of both 
mainstream nationalism and feminism. Intersectional interventions have raised a 
powerful (horizontal) critique of the liberal-utopic impulses of feminism. Here, along the 
axes of postcolonial indigeneity, I have elaborated a temporal critique of the inside out of 
liberal feminist utopias-to-come, to only arrive at the beginning of a profound rethinking 
of gender relations, kinship, the dominant discourses that shape postcolonial modernity, 
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and mainstream feminism. In doing so, I hope to have also taken a small step in moving 
beyond the binaries of tribal and mainland, the liberal humanist feminist and traditional 
matriliny, and instead, gesturing towards a third space from which indigeneity can be 
thought.   
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